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The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first 
published in 1975.  The new association between 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the University of Strathclyde’s 
Business School provides the Fraser of Allander Institute 
with the support to continue the Commentary, and we 
gratefully acknowledge this support.  The Fraser of Allander 
Institute is a research unit within the Department of 
Economics at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow.  The 
Institute carries out research on the Scottish economy, 
including the analysis of short-term movements in economic 
activity.  Its researchers have an international reputation in 
modelling regional economies and in regional development.  
One-off research projects can be commissioned by private 
and public sector clients.  If you would like further 
information on the Institute’s research or services, please 
contact the Institute Administrator on 0141 548 3958 or 
email the Institute at fraser@strath.ac.uk. 
 
The Fraser of Allander Institute was established in 1975 as 
a result of a donation from the Hugh Fraser Foundation.  We 
gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Buchanan 
and Ewing Bequest towards the publication costs of the 
Commentary.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PwC support the production of the Economic Commentary but have 
no control of its editorial content, including, in particular, the 
economic forecasts.  PwC produces its own regular review of UK 
and international economic prospects, the next issue of which will 
be published on their website:  
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/uk_economic_outlook.html 
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This is the first in a series of ‘Special Issues’ which will 
gather together a number of current and policy related 
papers on a particular theme. This first collection of papers 
draws together research from across the UK on the themes 
and implications of energy and climate change. As the guest 
editors note, we hope this collection stimulates discussion 
amongst the business and policy making communities in 
Scotland. 
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Foreword  
 
Michael Timar,  
Energy Specialist and Partner at PwC in Scotland 
 
 
Climate change, emissions reduction, renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and fuel poverty: subjects that are both 
very topical and very emotive across the globe and at all 
levels in society.  
 
At the tail end of 2010 we had the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Mexico, the UK government 
announcing its proposals for electricity market reform (many 
of which are focused on providing the incentives to invest in 
nuclear and renewable energy) and in Scotland, one of the 
coldest and snowiest starts to a winter ever, with the country 
almost brought to a standstill and rumours of potential 
shortages of heating oil. 
 
Against this backdrop, the Scottish Government has set out 
a bold vision. The Climate Change (Scotland) Act sets world 
leading targets for emission reductions by 2020 - at levels 
greater than those set by the UK government or the EU. 
Targets have also been set for electricity generation- 80% of 
our energy consumption should come from renewable 
sources by 2020. Renewable energy has been identified as 
a platform for major economic growth, through capital 
investment, the export of power and the export of know how. 
 
Is this vision achievable? 
 
Scotland has significant natural resource in the form of wind 
and marine power, and a long history of engineering 
expertise. We have industry leaders in the development of 
renewable power generation in SSE and Scottish Power 
Renewables, and in wave power technology development 
with companies such as Pelamis Wave Power and 
Aquamarine Wave Power.  
 
Scotland's oil & gas industry has many years of experience 
operating in the harsh North Sea environment that will be 
important to the development of offshore wind power. The 
Scottish Government has supported this vision in recent 
months with the launch of the £70m National Renewables 
Infrastructure Fund. 
 
At this high level, the signs are certainly positive. Start to 
peel back the layers however, and the complexity of this 
subject, with its interplay of political, economic and moral 
factors becomes evident. 
 
Much of the work that PwC is currently doing in the sector is 
on how to attract the investment that will ensure the build 
out of renewable generation and in particular offshore wind. 
But there are many other issues to be explored.  
 
• How should emissions be measured - based on 
production within our geographic borders or on the 
generation required to support Scotland's 
consumption regardless of origin? 
 
• How can a Scottish climate change policy succeed 
in an economy and electricity market which is 
embedded in the UK and EU markets? 
 
• What independent levers does the Scottish 
Government have in achieving the targets they 
have set? 
 
• What part might our communities play in emissions 
reduction and energy efficiency? 
 
• Does the "rebound effect" mean that planned 
energy efficiency savings will only be partially 
realised due to our propensity to consume? 
 
• To what extent is the consumer prepared to pay for 
a future where power generation is "greener", and 
what are their preferences in choosing between 
alternative impacts?  
 
• What might Scotland's future generation capacity 
look like - embedded as it is within a UK market 
that will require a balance across coal, gas, 
nuclear, wind, marine and hydro to provide for a 
secure and sustainable supply of power? 
 
Published by the Fraser of Allander Institute in partnership 
with PwC, the following papers discuss these questions and 
are each thought provoking in their own way.  
 
They will help us understand just some of the complexities 
that will need to be addressed in achieving the targets and 
ambitions that have been set out for Scotland's future as a 
leader in the world of climate change. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Karen Turner, Guest Editor 
ESRC Climate Change Leadership Fellow  
University of Stirling 
 
Janine De Fence, Guest Editor 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
University of Strathclyde 
 
 
Alongside its research into the Scottish economy, the Fraser 
of Allander Institute has a growing reputation for research 
into environmental and energy issues that impact the 
Scottish and UK economies. FAI researchers and 
associates currently hold a number of grants from the UK 
Research Councils and the EU FP7 programme to 
investigate issues such as the introduction of different 
renewable technologies, energy efficiency and pollution 
embodied in interregional and international trade flows. 
Moreover, the researchers on these projects are all active 
members of the Scottish Institute for Research in 
Economics (SIRE) Environmental and Energy Economics 
(EEE) Workshop, which has been set up to foster 
collaborative activity among colleagues at the eight main 
Scottish universities.  
 
The publication of this special issue of the Fraser Economic 
Commentary coincides with the end of a project funded by 
the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), 
based at the Universities of Strathclyde and University of 
Stirling, and with the support and involvement of the FAI 
team throughout. The project is one of six ESRC Climate 
Change Leadership Fellowships awarded in 2008. 
Therefore, it is an exciting development that this special 
issue, under the guest editorship of the Fellowship team, 
gives us the opportunity to highlight some of the cutting 
edge economic research into energy and environmental 
problems being conducted primarily at the Universities of 
Strathclyde and Stirling, but involving collaboration with 
colleagues throughout the UK and across the world.  
 
Our first two papers, co-authored with a number of 
Fellowship collaborators, focus on our research into 
accounting for carbon generation associated with economic 
activities in the UK national and regional economies. These 
papers present non-technical expositions of new results, not 
yet published in the academic literature. This is entirely 
consistent with the priority placed on knowledge exchange 
that is shared by both the ESRC Climate Change 
Leadership Fellowship programme and by the Fraser of 
Allander Institute.  
 
In the other five papers, we present papers from other 
research projects based at the Universities of Strathclyde 
and Stirling, but which share the common theme of 
contributing to knowledge and understanding of the energy 
and environmental problems underlying climate change. 
The third paper, contributed by colleagues based at FAI 
provides an overview of Scottish Climate Change Policy, 
while the fourth, titled ‘Stimulating Diffusion of Low-Carbon 
Technology: Evidence from a Voluntary Program’, 
contributed by colleagues at Stirling, provides perspectives 
from policies implemented in the US.  
In the final three papers, we turn our attention specifically to 
energy issues. The fifth paper, titled ‘The Rebound Effect: 
Some Questions Answered’ focuses on some key issues 
arising from another ESRC funded project, based at the 
Universities of Stirling and Strathclyde on the unanticipated 
impacts of increased energy efficiency. This is followed by 
two papers focussing on specific areas of energy policy 
concern: one titled ‘Preferences for Energy Futures in 
Scotland’, contributed by colleagues based at Stirling, and 
the other titled ‘The electricity generation mix in Scotland: 
The long and windy road?’, which closes the issue by 
reporting on research funded by the Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) at the 
University of Strathclyde. 
 
We hope that this special issue of the Fraser Economic 
Commentary, the first of its kind, stimulates discussion on a 
variety of climate change related topics among the 
academic, business and policy communities within Scotland 
and beyond.   
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1. The research programme 
In 2008, the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) awarded six Climate Change Leadership 
Fellowships (CCLFs) to address key research issues and 
innovative approaches in mitigating/or adapting to climate 
change. Of  the six Fellowships, led by Dr Karen Turner 
(University of Stirling, formerly of the University of 
Strathclyde) we have engaged in a programme of 
communication with the policy and wider user community, 
primarily through a series of ESRC funded public seminars 
and workshops. One outcome of these activities has been 
the identification of a need to develop a user friendly, 
systematic and transparent accounting system that allows 
examination of the structure of pollution problems to be 
examined from a range of potential policy perspectives. 
Thus a key aim of this Climate Change Leadership 
Fellowship has been the development of a basic pollution 
accounting framework, based on the input-output (IO) 
methodology now widely adopted in both the academic 
literature and the policy advisory communities, and applied 
here to the case of CO2. This research has involved 
collaboration with colleagues at the Universities of Stirling, 
Strathclyde, Cardiff, Surrey, West Virginia and also at the 
OECD, the Stockholm Environment Institute and the 
Scottish Government, a number of whom are among the co-
authors of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to 
present the IO pollution accounting tool developed under the 
Fellowship, with case studies of carbon dioxide emissions at 
the UK national and Scottish regional levels. It is important 
to note that the development of the accounting tool relies on 
data for a single year (2004), some of which has had to be 
estimated in the absence of official statistics (such as UK IO 
tables in the analytical format). If there is a need to conduct 
pollution accounting on a regular basis, to form the basis for 
official indicators of sustainability, public investment in 
appropriate data provision will be a necessity. 
 
2. Two ways to account for carbon generation 
In recognition of the problems posed by failing to prevent 
climate change, an international agreement was reached in 
1997 in Kyoto on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
particularly CO2. However, more than a decade later a 
number of issues hindering the reduction of emissions have 
yet to be resolved. Major challenges still remain in securing 
the cooperation of all nations and in designing and 
delivering effective (and efficient) collective action within and 
between nations. One crucial issue impacting on unilateral 
attempts to fulfil national emissions reductions targets under 
the Kyoto Protocol is the impact of international trade on any 
one country’s domestic emissions generation. The basic 
problem is that the generation of emissions in producing 
goods and services to meet export demand is charged to 
the producing nation’s emissions account. That is, pollution 
generation in any one country is partly driven by consuming 
activities in others. 
 
Munksgaard and Pedersen (2001) highlight this issue in 
distinguishing between a ‘production accounting principle’ 
and a ‘consumption accounting principle’ in considering the 
structure of pollution problems. The former, which we shall 
label PAP, focuses on emissions produced within the 
geographical boundaries of the national economy. This is 
what is accounted for, and what individual national 
governments are responsible for reducing, under the Kyoto 
Protocol. In contrast, the latter, which we shall label CAP, 
focuses on emissions produced globally to meet 
consumption demand within the national economy. This is 
what increasingly popular measures such as carbon 
footprints attempt to measure, and what many people 
regard as more appropriate, given that human consumption 
decisions are commonly considered to lie at the heart of the 
climate change problem. In a closed economy, with no trade 
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in goods and services, emissions accounts constructed 
under the production and consumption accounting principles 
would be equal (by definition). However, where there is 
trade and pollution is embodied in that trade through 
emissions generated in one region or nation to meet 
consumption demand in another, these need not be equal. 
A foreign ‘trade balance’ in pollution will exist in terms of the 
difference between total emissions estimated on the basis of 
the production and consumption accounting principles, or 
more simply, the difference between the pollution embodied 
in exports and the pollution embodied in imports.  
 
Thus, the question arises as to whether PAP and/or CAP 
measures should be used to monitor and track pollution 
generation at the individual country level and what, if 
anything, can be done about foreign ‘trade balances’ in 
pollution. In this paper we present the IO accounting tool 
developed as part of the ESRC CCLF to estimate CO2 
emissions linked to economic activity for the UK and 
Scottish economies (in the accounting year of 2004) and 
consider what type of questions/issues can be addressed 
using PAP and CAP measures in each case.  
 
3. Summary carbon (CO2 equivalent) 
Accounting Results for the UK and Scotland1 
Our results suggest that in 2004 the ‘carbon footprint’ of UK 
consumption 813.5 tonnes of CO2 equivalent was 
significantly higher than the level of CO2 emissions 
generated within UK borders (643.8 million tonnes of CO2) 
– see Section 5 and Table 1 below for a more detailed 
analysis.2   That is, UK CO2 generation is 26% higher under 
the CAP than under the PAP measure that is the basis of 
CO2 reduction targets under Kyoto. This implies that the UK 
‘imports sustainability’ from its trade partners. This result 
might be expected in the case of an advanced economy 
where there has been a shift from domestic production of 
many manufactured goods towards a domestic focus on 
more service orientated activities with increasing imports of 
manufactured goods. However, it raises questions as to 
whether relying solely on PAP measures (as under the 
Kyoto Protocol targets) is then a good measure of the 
sustainability of the UK economy. 
 
The Scottish results, on the other hand, are more complex. 
Here we find that Scotland also ‘imports sustainability’, but 
with a much larger difference between CO2 allocated under 
PAP (48.9  million tonnes of CO2 in 2004) and CAP (71.5 
million tonnes of CO2) – i.e. a 46% increase as we move 
from measuring CO2 generated within Scotland, to 
considering Scotland’s ‘carbon’ (CO2 equivalent) footprint. 
See Section 6 and Table 3 below. However, a key 
underlying determinant of Scotland’s CO2 trade deficit, 
particularly with the rest of the UK is the fact that Scotland is  
a net exporter of electricity, which, given the (increasing) 
prevalence of renewable generation technologies in 
Scotland, means that the export side of its CO2 trade 
balance has a relatively low CO2 intensity and content. 
While of course there should be concern over the CO2 
content of Scottish imports, the key implication that emerges 
from our results is that Scotland, by its choices in terms of 
choosing to foster renewable technologies in electricity 
generation, is helping to lower the carbon footprints of its 
trade partners, particularly the rest of the UK. This is 
illustrated by the fact that if we were to assume that UK 
average polluting technologies apply throughout the nation 
in the CO2 accounting exercise, not only is Scottish 
domestic CO2 generation (estimated under PAP) higher (at 
66.7 million tonnes), we find that it would actually run a CO2 
trade surplus with the rest of the UK, and its carbon footprint 
would only be 17% higher than its domestic CO2 
generation, compared with the 26% difference at the UK 
level. Again, see Section 6 and Table 2 below for a more 
detailed analysis. Thus, it would seem that Scotland is 
‘punished’ in CO2 trade balance terms by having adopted 
cleaner technologies in producing what are usually quite 
CO2 intensive exports. This is reflected in the fact that the 
actual Scottish carbon footprint is around 8% lower where 
Scottish renewable electricity generation technologies are 
incorporated in the calculation (Table 3) relative to what it 
would be if UK average technologies applied (Table 2).   
 
Our carbon (in terms of CO2 equivalents) accounting results 
are detailed in Sections 5 and 6 below. However, reflecting 
points made in the introduction, the main question that we 
raise is whether the appropriate question in CO2 accounting 
terms is whether to adopt PAP or CAP measures when both 
measures are so clearly dependent on both consumption 
and technology decisions at home and abroad. Moreover, in 
the case of Scotland (and perhaps other UK regions), it 
raises questions as to the focus of indicators and targets 
within different regions that may play different roles in 
delivering on economic and environmental aspects of 
sustainable development objectives in the UK. This point 
links to the analysis in the second paper in this special issue 
of the Fraser Commentary, where we consider the case of 
Wales, a region of the UK characterised by relatively highly 
CO2 intensive production to meet export demand. There we 
consider how issues of jurisdictional control over polluting 
technologies impact on the arguments in favour of shifting 
focus towards consumption orientated measures.     
 
4. The input-output accounting approach  
Particularly in the environmental footprint literature (where 
focus is on accounting for emissions under the consumption 
accounting principle) input-output analysis has become  
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Figure 1:  Schematic diagram of an Input-Output Table - The UK as an illustrative example 
 
 
 
 
 
increasingly common as a technique to measure and 
allocate responsibility for emissions generation. See 
Wiedmann et al (2007), Wiedmann (2009), Turner et al, 
(2007) for reviews. This would seem a natural development, 
given that the focus of measures such as the carbon 
footprint is to capture the total (direct plus indirect) resource 
use embodied in final consumption in an economy. Input-
output analysis is based around a set of sectorally 
disaggregated economic accounts, where inputs to each 
industrial sector, and the subsequent uses of the output of 
those sectors, are separately identified. Therefore, by the 
use of straightforward mathematical routines, the 
interdependence of different activities can be quantified, and 
all direct, indirect and, where appropriate, induced, resource 
use embodied within consumption can be tracked. This is 
commonly referred to as IO multiplier analysis3. 
 
Ideally, a multi-region input-output method that incorporates 
multi-lateral trade will be used to account for emissions 
under the production and consumption accounting principles 
and to determine pollution trade balances. However, this 
effectively requires a world environmental input-output table. 
While several projects are underway around the world to 
construct such a framework (e.g. the World Input-Output 
Database project4) an appropriate one for UK regional and 
national analysis is not currently available. Moreover, as 
indicated above, a frequently stated concern at public 
events run as part of the CCLF project relates to a need to 
begin with a simple, transparent framework, that relies as 
much as possible on currently available rather than 
estimated data (given that the latter are commonly quite 
‘black box’ in nature, largely due to the complexity of the 
estimation methods). Therefore, one of our objectives in the 
CCLF project has been to develop a simple IO framework, 
which, while less comprehensive in nature (for example, not 
incorporating international feedback effects where imports to 
country X from country Y may require exports from X as 
intermediate inputs to production Y) allow a standardised 
accounting framework to be built up in stages that can be 
clearly explained to practitioners and users of accounting 
outputs. A central aim of the current paper is to provide a 
non-technical overview of the IO tool developed and used 
here.   
 
Input output (IO) tables are national balance sheets showing 
the value of all goods flows between production sectors in 
an economy and final demand groups over the period of a 
year. They are an example of single entry booking-keeping, 
where a sale (output) in one sector is simultaneously 
recorded as a purchase (input) in another. Where extended 
to include environmental data, such as emissions generated 
in production, the IO system can be used to account for 
emissions generation where both the quantities produced 
and the associated emissions can be accounted for. Figure 
1 shows a schematic IO table where the components of 
each section have been highlighted in a series of numbered 
blocks  
 
In an actual IO table, each block would be a series of 
columns and rows representing the inter-sectoral flows of 
goods and services between production sectors, primary 
inputs and sales to final consumers in value terms.. It is 
important to note that where an IO table is reported in the 
analytical format required for multiplier analysis, sectoral 
level entries in Block 7, ‘Total Inputs’, and Block 8 ,’Total 
Outputs’, must be equal.  
 
Breaking the IO table into the blocks allows for an easy 
explanation of each IO table section in turn:- 
 
Block 1 represents all production in the UK and accounts for 
sectors purchasing from other sectors within the UK 
economy. 
 
Block 2 represents UK demands, which includes all UK 
households, government and capital formation demands. 
1. Domestic Production Matrix ( All 
production within the UK by UK 
production sectors)
2 Domestic consumption of 
UK production ( UK 
households, UK 
Government, UK 
Investment)
3. External 
demands for UK 
production 
(foreign demand 
for UK production)
8.Total 
Outputs
4. Foreign imports for UK production
5. Foreign imports for UK 
consumption ( UK 
households, UK 
Government, UK Investment 
6. Value Added
7. Total Inputs
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The assumption with the conventional IO framework is that 
demand drives supply, so it is the demand groups within an 
economy that are responsible for the production sector 
producing a given level of output. 
 
Block 3 represents the external demands, which include all 
the foreign producers and consumers that buy UK goods 
and services (export demands). 
 
Block 4 represents purchases by UK producers from other 
countries to make UK goods and services. This can be 
thought of as UK producers buying parts for their own 
production. Note that in standard IO tables presented as 
part of national accounts, Block 4 would normally be 
represented as a single row showing the total value of 
imports to each production sector and final consumer. Here, 
and in the analysis that follows, we are grateful to 
colleagues at the Scottish Government and the Stockholm 
Environment Institute for assistance in identifying matrices 
for Scotland and the UK respectively where imports are 
broken down by commodity as well as by user. The same 
applies to Block 5. 
 
Block 5 represents the goods and services UK consumers 
buy from abroad. All foreign goods that we see in UK shops 
would be included in this part of the table.  
 
Block 6 represents payments to labour, profits and taxes, 
which are the value added components of the economy.  
 
Blocks 7 and 8 represent total inputs (the sum of all the 
columns) and total outputs (the sum of all the rows) 
respectively. In an analytical IO table the respective input 
and output entries will be equal for each individual 
production sector.  
 
So, which blocks do we consider for pollution generated 
under PAP? 
 
Pollution generated under PAP (the production accounting 
principle) – the focus of Kyoto Protocol targets - takes into 
consideration pollution generated within the borders of the 
economy under study, whether this is to meet domestic or 
foreign (export) demand. This will equate to the sum of 
pollution directly generated in domestic production and 
directly by final consumers (most usually households, for 
example in burning gas in central heating systems or petrol 
in cars). Referring to the IO framework above, all pollution 
generated in production (Block 1) is attributable to (driven 
by) the final demands for domestic outputs in Blocks 2 and 
3. Thus, as one of the components of final demand for a 
local economy, the external demand in Block 3 is included 
as a driver of domestic pollution generation. Thus PAP is 
considered by focussing solely on activity in Blocks 1 to 3, 
where Blocks 2 and 3 are responsible for the pollution 
generated in Block 1 (as well as any direct pollution 
generation within the economy under study by final 
consumers, which will generally only apply to Block 2 
(unless tourists, external consumers who consume within 
the target economy are separately identified). Blocks 4 and 
5, on the other hand, do not come into the PAP calculation. 
Thus, the PAP calculation allows us to look at emissions 
embodied in exports but it does not consider the other side 
of the pollution trade balance relationship; that is pollution 
embodied in imports. 
 
What about pollution generated under CAP? 
A CAP measurement (such as a carbon footprint), on the 
other hand, does take account of pollution embodied in 
imports. However, if we move to a CAP measure we no 
longer consider Block 3 (external demand) as this becomes 
part of another nation’s (or region’s) footprint. What this 
means is that we now include the goods that domestic 
producers and consumers buy from abroad, which are 
recorded in Blocks 4 and 5. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Measures under the CAP would be the sum of pollution 
generated in Block 1 to meet Block 2 demands, as well as 
the sum of the pollution generated in Blocks 4 and 5 to meet 
the demand requirements of Blocks 1 and 2. However, since 
demands in Block 1 and 4 are intermediate demands, all 
pollution embodied in imports are ultimately attributed, along 
with domestic pollution generation, to the domestic final 
consumers in Block 2.  In short, the CAP calculation gives 
us the sum of all pollution generated to allow the demands 
of domestic final consumers to be met, whether this 
pollution is generated at home or abroad. 
 
The problem of finding economic and 
pollution data for CAP measures 
As noted above, it has been possible to access data to 
populate the different blocks identified in Figures 1-3 above. 
However, there is a problem in that commodities produced 
in different countries will have different pollution profiles 
(reflecting different production methods). One issue that 
should be considered is that pollution generated in foreign 
production will depend on the production technology 
decisions made in each individual country and each 
production sector therein. Concerns surrounding the 
methodologies employed for the estimation of country 
specific pollution can be addressed using the Domestic 
Technology Assumption (DTA). The DTA approach is 
sometimes adopted in the literature (see Druckman et al, 
2008), as a way of overcoming a lack of available pollution 
data for other countries. What the DTA suggests is that by 
applying the same production technologies and therefore 
pollution intensity to foreign production of the commodities 
reported in Blocks 4 and 5 as is applied to domestic 
production (in Block 1) we are able to calculate a 
consumption measure based on the technology choices of 
the home economy.  However, if the economy under study 
is (on aggregate) more pollution intensive than the countries 
it imports from this will lead to an overestimated footprint 
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Figure 2:  Components of the IO table used for calculation of a PAP measure 
 
 
 
 
measure, and vice versa (of course this will depend on the 
mix of goods and services consumed, some of which will be 
more and some less pollution intensive).  In the second 
paper in this special issue, it is also argued that the DTA 
method may be appropriate if we wish to focus on 
technology decisions that fall under the jurisdictional control 
of domestic policymakers. In this way, the DTA method is 
argued to consider the footprint from the perspective of the 
savings made by not producing at home, rather than the 
costs abroad.  
 
A second approach that we have applied in the examples 
that follow in Sections 5 and 6 (and in the summary in 
Section 3 above) is to relax the DTA assumption. When and 
if actual country specific data do become available, the DTA 
assumption can be relaxed and the actual data inserted for 
whatever countries and/or sectors this is available for. With 
the assistance of our colleagues at the OECD we have been 
able to split out Blocks 4 and 5 to identify imports from 13 
different regions in the rest of the world (see Appendix 1), 
and to assign corresponding pollution intensities. Thus, we 
are able to report the CAP calculations first making the DTA 
assumption then relaxing it. The difference in the two 
calculations solely reflects differences in polluting 
technologies between the economy under study and the 
countries that it imports from (given that the scale of activity 
is the same in both calculations).  
 
5. Case study 1: the UK national economy 
To demonstrate the use of the IO tool we consider the case 
of the UK in 20046. The results of the PAP calculation (CO2 
generated within UK borders in 2004) and the CAP 
calculation (CO2 attributable to UK final consumption in 
2004), with the latter reported first under the DTA 
assumption then with this relaxed. 
 
The top row of Table 1 shows the headline figures. Under 
PAP, 643.8 million tonnes of CO2 (equivalent) were 
produced in the UK in 2004. The second entry in the PAP 
column shows that just over 25% of this (163.7 million 
tonnes of CO2) were directly generated in the household 
sector. However, reading down the column we see how the 
remaining 480.1 million tonnes directly generated in UK 
 
Figure 3:   Components of the IO table used for calculation of a CAP measure 
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Table 1:  UK CO2 generation (2004) under different IO accounting principles 
 
 
 
production are indirectly attributable to domestic and 
external demands in Blocks 2 and 3 (respectively) of the IO 
schematics above. We see that just under 24% of UK CO2 
was generated to meet external demands. Thus, the figure 
of 152.7million tonnes attributable to export demands is 
excluded from the carbon (CO2) footprint calculations in the 
last two columns. However, in its place (domestic emissions 
driven by domestic consumption are common to both the 
PAP and CAP calculations) we must bring in a measure of 
the CO2 embodied in imports. 
 
 
In the CAP (DTA) calculation, the CO2 embodied in imports 
at 221.6 million tonnes exceeds the CO2 embodied in 
exports with the implication that the estimated carbon 
footprint, 712.7 tonnes of CO2 exceeds UK domestic 
emissions under PAP. Thus, regardless of the direction of 
the goods and services trade balance, the UK runs a CO2 
trade deficit of 68.9 million tonnes and is effectively 
importing sustainability. Now, in 2004 the UK did run a trade 
deficit with imports exceeding exports by just over 12%. 
However, in the CAP (DTA) column of Table 1, the CO2 
embodied in imports exceeds the CO2 embodied in exports 
by 45%. Thus, even assuming no differences in polluting 
technologies, this tells us that the UK imported more CO2 
intensive goods and services than it exported. It is possible 
to speculate, then, that if the UK were not able to trade, its 
CO2 emissions under PAP would be much higher, and its 
ability to meet its targets under the Kyoto Protocol 
negatively affected. 
 
However, if we do take into account differences in polluting 
technologies, by relaxing the DTA assumption in the final 
column of Table 1, the picture is much worse: the UK 
carbon (CO2 equivalent) footprint rises by 14% from 712.7 
million tonnes of CO2 to 813.5 million tonnes. Underlying 
this is the huge (almost 46%) increase in the CO2 embodied 
in imports from 221.6 to 322.4 million tonnes. As explained 
above, this increase is entirely due to the fact we are taking 
differences in polluting technologies in the source country 
into account. This of course raises the question, considered 
in more detail in the second paper in this issue) as to what 
UK consumers and/or policymakers could do about this 
increase. We may choose how much to consume but what 
control do we have over how it is consumed? Of course, the 
same question could be raised in terms of UK consumers 
purchasing from UK producers. The key difference is that 
UK policymakers have some control over both the latter, but 
it is not clear that they could exert much, if any, impact on 
the technology decisions of producers in other countries. On 
the other hand, if CO2 accounting exercises such as this 
one reveal CO2 ‘hot spots’ in the supply chain, consumers 
may wish to change their consumption decisions and 
purchase from cleaner producers in cleaner countries. 
However, this would have implications for international trade 
and development. One solution may be to develop carbon
CO2 generated within 
UK - PAP 
UK 'carbon' (CO2) 
footprint - CAP (DTA)
UK 'carbon' (CO2) 
footprint - CAP (relax 
DTA)
Total CO2 attributed (tonnes)                   643,806,114                   712,677,329                   813,536,304 
CO2 supported by UK final consumption
Domestic (UK) CO2 generation:
Directly generated (households)                      163,676,326                      163,676,326                      163,676,326 
Indirect - generated in UK production sectors, supported by:
household final consumption                      235,930,577                      235,930,577                      235,930,577 
government final consumption                        50,032,572                        50,032,572                        50,032,572 
capital formation                        41,479,167                        41,479,167                        41,479,167 
                  491,118,642                   491,118,642                   491,118,642 
Indirect CO2 embodied in imports supported by :
household final consumption                      149,133,532                      232,247,838 
government final consumption                        22,242,094                        31,905,450 
capital formation                        50,183,062                        58,264,375 
                  221,558,688                   322,417,662 
CO2 supported by external demands for UK production                   152,687,472 
Implied CO2 trade balance (deficit):
CO2 embodied in exports minus CO2 embodied in imports
(CO2 generation under PAP minus CAP)                   (68,871,216)                 (169,730,190)
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 accounting practices in order to assign levels of shared 
responsibility (and this has been explored in the literature; 
both in terms of a ‘sharing’ of the domestic national 
emissions balance between producers and consumers 
(Andrew & Forgie (2008), Lenzen et al (2007)) and in terms 
of sharing the emissions embodied in trade (Peters, 2008)); 
the former measure provides a different way of thinking 
about domestic responsibility for the national emissions 
balance, but in the case of the latter approach at least, it is 
not clear what additional value this type of approach would 
add. 
 
The CAP and CO2 trade balance results reported for the UK 
in this study show a significant difference to those found in 
previous studies. Druckman and Jackson (2008) found that 
CO2 estimated under the CAP measure was 19% higher 
than under the PAP measure in 2004 using a quasi-multi-
regional input-output model (QMRIO). Similarly Wiedmann 
et al (2008) estimated the difference to be 21% using a 
multi-regional input-output model (MRIO). In this study we 
find the CO2 estimated under the CAP measure for 2004 
are 26% higher than under the PAP measure. While use of 
a fuller interregional framework allows additional effects 
such as interregional feedback effects and multiplier effects 
in source countries based on IO tables for those countries 
(rather than the UK combined use matrix approach used 
here), we would conclude that the OECD data used to 
estimate the pollution content of imports here are producing 
higher estimates than those estimated using GTAP data in 
the Druckman and Jackson (2008) and Wiedmann et al 
(2008) studies.  
 
Finally, note that, while we focus on the headline results in 
this text, the IO approach builds these up from the sectoral 
level. For the interested reader we have included in 
Appendix 2 a detailed explanation of sectoral level effects 
building up the share of the UK Food and Drink sector (as 
an example) in the overall PAP and CAP calculations.  
 
6. Case study 2: the Scottish economy 
Next, we consider the case of Scotland within the UK 
economy in 2004.  While corresponding IO tables for 
Scotland (augmented with matrices of imports to Scottish 
production and final consumption from the rest of the UK 
and rest of the world respectively), do not currently employ 
the Scottish CO2 intensity of the different production sectors 
as this is not publicly  available. Therefore, in the first 
instance we apply the UK average CO2 intensities used in 
the UK analyses above. The results of the PAP calculation 
(CO2 generated within Scottish borders in 2004) and the 
CAP calculation (CO2 attributable to Scottish final 
consumption in 2004), with the latter reported first under the 
DTA assumption then with this relaxed, are shown in Table 
2.  
 
As in the UK case, CO2 emissions attributed to Scotland are 
considerably higher under CAP than PAP. The first column 
of Table 2 reports Scottish CO2 under PAP in 2004 at 66.7 
million tonnes. In the first instance, where we use the DTA 
assumption in the CAP estimate the increase is only 3.5% to 
69 million tonnes of CO2. However, when we relax the DTA 
assumption, introducing the OECD data on sources of 
imports and corresponding CO2 intensities, CAP is 16.6% 
larger than PAP at 77.8 million tonnes of CO2. 
 
However, perhaps the most interesting point here is that 
while Scotland runs an overall CO2 trade deficit (importing 
more CO2 than it exports), the opposite is true in terms of 
Scottish trade with the rest of the UK, where CO2 embodied 
in exports (35 million tonnes) is considerably higher than 
CO2 embodied in imports from the rest of the UK (19.8 
million tonnes), with the implication that Scotland runs a 7.8 
million tonne CO2 trade surplus with the rest of the UK. 
 
This is an issue that was explored previously by McGregor 
et al (2008) , and, as in that analysis, the main explanation 
for this relationship is the fact that Scotland is a net exporter 
of electricity to the rest of the UK. However, what the 
analysis in Table 2 fails to reflect is the fact that, with her 
higher capacity for electricity generation from renewable 
sources, Scotland is actually a relatively clean producer of 
electricity, with the implication that it may be better for the 
UK (in CO2 generation terms at least) that this relationship 
exists. In order to explore further, it is necessary to 
introduce more accurate information on the CO2 intensity of 
Scottish electricity production, rather than relying on the UK 
average as we have done in Table 2.   
 
Table 3 compares the results of the PAP and CAP (with 
DTA relaxed) CO2 accounting exercise for Scotland if we 
introduce as single change. This is the introduction of a 
Scottish-specific CO2 intensity for the ‘Electricity production 
and distribution’ (IOC 38) sector. This was provided by 
colleagues at Scottish Government. It reflects the higher 
dependence on renewable technologies in Scotland and, at 
2616 tonnes of CO2 per £1million of output is around half 
the size of the UK average (5430 tonnes per £1million). The 
point of this exercise is to examine the impact of reducing 
the pollution intensity of this key polluting sector of the 
Scottish economy on the total CO2 emissions balance. 
 
The first column in Table 3 shows the estimated emissions 
that are generated so satisfy each type of final demand (in 
Blocks 2 and 3 in the schematics in Figures 1 and 2) under 
PAP. Here we can see that the total CO2 generated within 
Scottish (in 2004) under PAP at 48.9million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent is almost 27% less than the figure of 66.7 million 
tonnes reported in Table 2 (see columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 
for percentage comparisons). This difference is entirely due 
to the replacement of the UK CO2 intensity with a Scottish-
specific one in the electricity sector only. As in Table 2, total 
CO2 under PAP is split between domestic demands, which 
support 25.5 million tonnes, or 52% of CO2 generated. The 
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Table 2:  Scottish CO2 generation (2004) under different IO accounting principles 
UK average CO2 intensities applied to all Scottish and UK 
activities  
CO2 generated 
within Scot - 
PAP 
Scot 'carbon' 
(CO2) footprint - 
CAP (DTA) 
Scot 'carbon' 
(CO2) footprint - 
CAP (relax DTA) 
Total CO2 attributed (tonnes) 66,711,016 69,021,834 77,759,681 
        
CO2 supported by Scottish final consumption       
Domestic (Scottish) CO2 generation:       
Directly generated (households) 11,329,373 11,329,373 11,329,373 
Indirect - generated in Scottish production sectors, supported by:       
household final consumption 15,288,628 15,288,628 15,288,628 
government final consumption 3,630,530 3,630,530 3,630,530 
capital formation 1,479,033 1,479,033 1,479,033 
  31,727,564 31,727,564 31,727,564 
Indirect CO2 embodied in imports supported by :       
Imports from the rest of the UK       
household final consumption   15,116,687 15,116,687 
government final consumption   1,912,391 1,912,391 
capital formation   2,753,704 2,753,704 
    19,782,783 19,782,783 
Imports from the rest of the world       
household final consumption   12,352,490 19,683,011 
government final consumption   2,078,502 2,840,354 
capital formation   3,080,495 3,725,969 
    17,511,487 26,249,334 
        
Total emissions embodied in imports   37,294,270 46,032,117 
        
CO2 supported by external demands for Scotland production       
Demand from the rest of the UK 27,584,391     
Demand from the rest of the world 7,399,060     
        
Total 34,983,452     
        
Implied CO2 Trade Balance (Deficit):       
CO2 embodied in exports minus CO2 embodied in imports       
(CO2 generation under PAP minus CAP)       
Rest of the UK   7,801,608 7,801,608 
Rest of the world   -10,112,427 -18,850,274 
        
TOTAL   -2,310,819 -11,048,665 
 
 
remainder is attributable to export demands. However, the 
amount of CO2 attributable to export demand from the rest 
of the UK, at 17.6 million tonnes, is considerably (36%) 
lower than the 27.6 million tonnes in Table 2. Again, this is 
entirely due to the correction to better reflect Scottish 
electricity generation from less CO2-intensive renewable 
sources. 
 
However, the key point to note is that the impact of this is to 
change the direction of the CO2 trade balance relationship 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK, with a 2.1 million 
tonne deficit replacing the 7.8 million tonne  
 
surplus in Table 2. Overall, the Scottish CO2 footprint, 
reported in the third column (with DTA relaxed) does fall by 
8% from 77.8 million tonnes of CO2 in Table 2 to 71.5 
million tonnes in Table 3 with this more accurate 
representation of real conditions. Note that this is entirely 
due to the reduction in CO2 generated within Scotland to 
support Scottish demands as the CO2 embodied in imports 
is not affected by the adjustment to reflect the CO2 intensity 
of Scottish electricity production. Thus, the reduction in CAP 
in moving from Table 2 to Table 3 is smaller than that in 
PAP, which takes into account the reduction in CO2 
generation to support external demands also. 
 
 
JANUARY 2011 PAGE 13 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Table 3:  Impact of Scottish renewables technologies on Scottish CO2 generation (2004) 
Scottish-specific CO2 intensity for electricity generation (UK average CO2 intensities applied to all other Scottish and RUK 
  
  
CO2 
generated 
within Scot - 
PAP 
Change 
relative to 
Table 2, 
Column 1 
Scot 'carbon' 
(CO2) footprint 
- CAP (relax 
DTA) 
Change 
relative to 
Table 2, 
Column 3 
          
Total CO2 attributed (tonnes) 48,946,902 -26.63% 71,514,117 -8.03% 
          
CO2 supported by Scottish final consumption       
Domestic (Scottish) CO2 generation:         
Directly generated (households) 11,329,373 0.00% 11,329,373 0.00% 
Indirect - generated in Scottish production sectors, supported by:           
household final consumption 10,029,030 -34.40% 10,029,030 -34.40% 
government final consumption 2,875,185 -20.81% 2,875,185 -20.81% 
capital formation 1,248,411 -15.59% 1,248,411 -15.59% 
  25,482,000 -19.68% 25,482,000 -19.68% 
          
Indirect CO2 embodied in imports supported by :         
Imports from the rest of the UK         
household final consumption     15,116,687 0.00% 
government final consumption     1,912,391 0.00% 
capital formation     2,753,704 0.00% 
      19,782,783 0.00% 
Imports from the rest of the world         
household final consumption     19,683,011 0.00% 
government final consumption     2,840,354 0.00% 
capital formation     3,725,969 0.00% 
      26,249,334 0.00% 
          
Total emissions embodied in imports     46,032,117 0.00% 
          
CO2 supported by external demands for Scotland production     
Demand from the rest of the UK 17,644,815 -36.03%     
Demand from the rest of the world 5,820,087 -21.34%     
          
Total 23,464,902 -32.93%     
          
Implied CO2 Trade Balance (Deficit):         
CO2 embodied in exports minus CO2 embodied in imports         
(CO2 generation under PAP minus CAP)         
Rest of the UK     -2,137,968 -127.40% 
Rest of the world     -20,429,247 8.38% 
          
TOTAL     -22,567,215 104.25% 
 
 
The key point is that on the face of it, from a consumption 
accounting perspective, Scotland does not seem to perform 
quite so well in Table 3, with a much bigger wedge between 
PAP and CAP, reflected in the larger net CO2 trade deficit. 
However, this is not due to higher CO2 generation to meet 
Scottish consumption (CAP falls between Tables 2 and 3). 
Rather, it is due to Scotland using cleaner technologies in its 
production to meet export demand. Surely this is a good 
thing? As well as reducing Scottish PAP and CAP 
emissions, it will reduce the carbon footprint of trade 
partners, primarily the rest of the UK who buy this cleaner 
electricity, and means a net reduction in total global CO2 
emissions. This is the climate change problem that policy 
aims to address. Indeed, the Scottish results contrast with 
the Welsh case examined in the second paper in this 
special issue, where the relatively high CO2 intensity of 
Welsh production to meet export demands leads to it 
performing better on CAP than it does on PAP. 
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Thus, the conclusion that we draw here is that a CAP 
measure on its own is insufficient to consider the carbon 
and climate change implications of activity in an open 
economy. That is, the results of the analyses presented 
here would seem to raise the issue of whether the 
appropriate question in carbon accounting terms is whether 
to adopt PAP or CAP measures when both measures are so 
clearly dependent on both consumption and technology 
decisions at home and abroad. Rather, some mix of 
accounting principles would seem appropriate and, within 
that, considerations of issues such as shared responsibility 
with respect to what aspects of carbon generation can and 
should be considered the responsibility of producers and 
consumers will be relevant, particularly where these are 
located in different countries.    
 
7.  Conclusions 
A key point highlighted in the results reported here is that if 
we are focussed on a CAP measure, then we are 
completely unconcerned with any reduction in the emissions 
embodied in what we export, since under CAP this is the 
responsibility of consumers in another jurisdiction. Rather, 
what we are interested in under CAP is reducing the 
emissions embodied in what we consume, and so we may 
want to focus on sectors where the reduction in their 
emissions intensity has large impacts in reducing the 
emissions embodied in domestic consumption, whether the 
pollution involved occurs at home or abroad. The strategy 
employed to meet any target set must take account of what 
the target itself does and does not cover. For example, 
pursuing a CAP target may lead to the potentially 
paradoxical situation where domestic governments are not 
incentivised by this target to constrain domestic pollution 
where this is generated to serve foreign demands.  
 
It is important to note that we are not trying to suggest that 
there is little merit in consumption based targets. Rather,  
given the interest in the policy community in CAP based 
measures, we are taking this opportunity to pose questions 
such as why CAP rather than PAP targets are being 
promoted, what impacts it is that policymakers are 
concerned about, and what are the tradeoffs involved in the 
variety of measures that are available. We have argued 
elsewhere (see Jensen et al, 2010, and the second paper in 
this special issue) that there are other probing questions 
that need to be asked of policymakers pursuing footprint 
measures. For example, how useful is a CAP based 
measure when domestic policymakers have little say (and 
no jurisdiction) over the technologies employed to produce 
imported goods? While there are obvious and well known 
drawbacks to the use of PAP measures, CAP measures 
also have their problems. The difficulties involved in PAP 
and CAP measures are not insurmountable, but they do 
need to be discussed and understood. 
 
More generally, a core aim of this paper has been to 
introduce a carbon accounting tool based on IO techniques. 
The IO tool presented in this paper maintains the rigour of 
the traditional IO framework but shows how the IO has been 
developed into a user friendly tool that will allow the policy 
community and stakeholders to begin addressing numerous 
policy concerns and questions, hopefully with more 
interaction with a more transparent empirical tool. We hope 
that we have managed to present our analyses in an easy to 
understand format, with the aim of facilitating deeper 
comprehension about sustainable issues and ensure that 
the added value from use of IO as an accounting tool is 
obtained. Additionally, with IO tables being increasingly 
regularly reported at a regional and national level, the tool 
could be a first step towards a standardised measure across 
countries and regions, which would help address policy 
concerns that are bigger than the national level.  
 
Where the benefits of the IO tool for pollution accounting are 
true for all interested users, there are a few benefits that are 
especially valuable to the policy community. A few of these 
are highlighted below: 
 
• Allow the evaluation of the success of policy goals 
through the creation of indicators of resource 
sustainability;    
 
• Identify sectors or areas of the economy that could 
benefit from policy intervention;  
 
• Provide a better understanding of supply chains 
and where major impacts occur within them, and  
 
• Provide insight into the flows of such pollutants or 
resources embodied in products and services 
between the UK, the EU and the wider world.  
 
We welcome feedback from all potential users of the type of 
tool we have developed. Please contact 
karen.turner@str.ac.uk 
 
Appendix 1:  Use of OECD data to determine 
the pollution content of imports 
 
The OECD maintains detailed databases on international 
trade flows by country, and has recently added data on 
country and industry specific CO2 intensities, derived from 
underlying energy usages to this database. Working with 
our co-author Norihiko Yamano from the OECD, the 
fellowship team have been able to access to these data, 
and this paper reflects the first application of these data. 
This appendix is intended to give an overview of both the 
data themselves, and our specific application to create our 
weighted pollution intensities that we used here for the 
carbon footprint calculations for the UK and Scotland. 
 
The underlying data comprise import tables using the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (revision 3)7 
system. We started by extracting UK import matrixes for 
trade with all available countries. While all the data were in a 
consistent currency (US Dollars) they were not in a 
consistent year, and were adjusted using country specific 
inflation/deflation factors from the World Bank9. Clearly this 
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approach is vulnerable to criticism on the basis of currency 
fluctuations affecting the value of a dollar across time, but 
the approach taken did not generally require significant 
adjustment across years, and we think that our approach 
here represents a pragmatic approach to this problem. 
Having examined the range of countries that were covered 
by these data, we decided upon a regional classification 
approach, and aggregated the world (and our data) into 14 
regions. These were: 
 
1. United Kingdom 
2.  United States 
3.   Canada 
4. Germany 
5. France 
6.  Rest of OECD Europe and EU27 
7. Russia 
8. China 
9. Developed Asia and Oceania 
10. Developing Asia 
11. Australia and New Zealand 
12. Central and south America 
13. OPEC countries (excluding Indonesia) 
14. Rest of the World 
 
Also, we had to decide on a sectoral aggregation across the 
economic sectors that can be mapped to a classification that 
is consistent with both the UK input-output data and also the 
environmental data available from OECD. To this end, we 
settled upon a 45 sector aggregation which is contained in 
Table A1 below. This table shows the mapping from the full 
123 SIC used in the full input-output case to the 45 sector 
aggregation used here in this analysis. Our main purpose 
here is to establish what percentage of UK imports of sector 
i’s output are imported from region n. To this end, and using 
the consistent and aggregated (both in terms of regions and 
sectors) imports matrixes we worked out the share of total 
UK imports that were contributed (at the sectoral level) by 
each region.  
 
Due to limited data on imports we had to estimate these 
across sectors/commodities 28-34 and 34-45 using a 
constant import share for each region. In the case of sectors 
28-34 and 35-45, we believed that aggregating the available 
data across sectors for each region and estimating import 
shares based on them, provided the most consistent 
approach, and prevented the absence of data on imports 
from one sector leading to unusual and unexplainable 
results. So in effect (remembering principal purpose in using 
the OECD trade data is simply to obtain the share of imports 
from each sector contributed by each region) what our 
assumptions here are doing is to use proxy shares that we 
consider reasonable to fill the data gaps that exist. We do 
not believe that the assumptions that are outlined above and 
that we made in constructing our data compromise the 
integrity or usefulness of our approach. Using these data, 
we proceeded to estimate these sectoral level shares and 
create the share matrix [SM]. In a similar fashion, with no 
import data for sectors 26 and 27 (collection purification and 
distribution of water, and construction respectively) we 
made a decision to assume a split in import propensities for 
these sectors across the France, Germany and the rest of 
OECD Europe and EU27 regions.   
 
Having now obtained our import share matrix (the 
percentage of imports of each foregin sector/commodity 
output imported to the UK from each region) we proceed to 
estimate regional sectoral CO2 intensities (tonnes of CO2 
per monetary unit of output). We use the OECD CO2 
emissions from fuel combustion by sector as the basis for 
this intensity calculation, by first aggregating into our 14 
regions the total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by 
sector. Having done this, we had a matrix of total sectoral 
pollution which we divided by the matrix of regionally 
aggregated total sectoral output. In other words, we divided 
the total pollution generated in each sector in each region by 
the total of regional sectoral output for each sector from the 
OECD input-output data that we adjusted to be year 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
JANUARY 2011 PAGE 17 
Table A.1 
123 sectors Description 45 sector 123 sectors Description 45 sector 123 sectors Description 45 sector  
1 Agriculture 1 45 Chemical Products nes 10 89 Distribution and Motor Repair, etc 28 
2 Forestry 1 46 Man-Made Fibres 10 90 Wholesale Distribution 28 
3 Fishing 1 47 Rubber Products 11 91 Retail Distribution 28 
4 Coal Extraction etc 2 48 Plastic Products 11 92 Hotels, Catering, Pubs, etc 29 
5 Extraction - Oil and Gas 3 49 Glass and Glass Products 12 93 Railways 30 
6 Extraction - Metal Ores 4 50 Ceramic Goods 12 94 Other Land Transport 30 
7 Other Mining and Quarrying 4 51 Structural Clay Products 12 95 Water Transport 31 
8 Meat Processing 5 52 Cement, Lime and Plaster 12 96 Air Transport 32 
9 Fish and Fruit Processing 5 53 Articles of Concrete etc 12 97 Transport Services 33 
10 Oils and Fats 5 54 Iron and Steel 13 98 Postal Services 34 
11 Dairy Products 5 55 Non-ferrous Metals 13 99 Telecommunications 34 
12 Grain Milling and Starch 5 56 Metal Castings 13 100 Banking & other financial institutions 35 
13 Animal Feeding Stuffs 5 57 Structural Metal Products 14 101 Insurance and Pension Funds 35 
14 Bread, Biscuits, etc 5 58 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufacture 
of central heating radiators and boilers; manufacture of 
steam generators 
14 102 Auxiliary Financial Services nes and auxiliary to 
insurance 
35 
15 Sugar 5 59 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; 
powder metallurgy; treatment and coating of metals 
14 103 Owning and Dealing in Real Estate 36 
16 Confectionery 5 60 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 14 104 Letting of Dwellings 36 
17 Miscellaneous Foods 5 61 Metal Goods 14 105 Estate Agent Activities 36 
18 Spirits and Wines, etc 5 62 Mech Power Transmission Equipment 15 106 Renting of Machinery 37 
19 Soft Drinks 5 63 General Purpose Machinery 15 107 Computing Services 38 
20 Tobacco 5 64 Agricultural Machinery 15 108 Research and Development 39 
21 Textile Fibres 6 65 Machine Tools 15 109 Legal Activities 40 
22 Textile Weaving 6 66 Special Purpose Machinery 15 110 Accountancy Services 40 
23 Textile Finishing 6 67 Weapons and Ammunition 15 111 Market Research 40 
24 Made-up Textiles 6 68 Domestic Appliances nes 15 112 Architectural etc Activities 40 
25 Carpets and Rugs 6 69 Office Machinery 16 113 Advertising 40 
26 Other Textiles 6 70 Electric Motors and Generators 17 114 Other Business Services 40 
27 Knitted Goods 6 71 Insulated Wire and Cable 17 115 Public Administration 41 
28 Wearing Apparel 6 72 Electrical Equipment nes 17 116 Education 42 
29 Leather Tanning 6 73 Electronic Components 18 117 Health and Veterinary Services 43 
30 Footwear 6 74 Transmitters for TV, Radio and Phone 18 118 Social Work 44 
31 Timber and Wood Products 7 75 Receivers for TV and Radio 18 119 Sanitary Services 44 
32 Pulp, Paper and Board 8 76 Medical and Precision Instruments 19 120 Membership Organisations 44 
33 Paper and Board Products 8 77 Motor Vehicles 20 121 Recreational Services 44 
34 Printing and Publishing 8 78 Shipbuilding and Repair 21 122 Other Service Activities 44 
35 Oil Process, Nuclear Fuel 9 79 Other Transport Equipment 21 123 Private Households with employed persons 45 
36 Industrial Gases 10 80 Aircraft and Spacecraft 21    
37 Inorganic Chemicals 10 81 Furniture 22    
38 Organic Chemicals 10 82 Jewellery and Related Products 22    
39 Fertilisers 10 83 Sports Goods and Toys 22    
40 Synthetic Resins 10 84 Miscellaneous Manufacturing nes 22    
41 Pesticides 10 85 Electricity Production and Distribution 23    
42 Paints, Dyes, Printing Ink, etc 10 86 Gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; 
steam and hot water supply 
24+25    
43 Pharmaceuticals 10 87 Collection, purification and distribution of water 26    
44 Soap and Toilet Preperations 10 88 Construction 27    
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consistent. This gives us a matrix of regional and sectoral 
pollution intensities [PI]. We use this matrix of regional and 
sectoral pollution intensities [PI] to construct our weighted 
output-pollution coefficient vector by multiplying the share 
matrix [SM] by the matrix of pollution intensities [PI]. This 
means that each element sMij (the share of total UK imports 
from sector i that are imported from region j) is multiplied by 
each element PIij (the pollution intensity of sector i in region 
j) which if we sum each row (i.e. for all i=1,...,n) gives us a 
weighted output-pollution coefficient based on the 
propensity to import from each sector in each region, taking 
account of the underlying pollution intensity of production in 
these sectors and in these regions. 
 
Appendix 2:  Working through a sectoral 
example for the UK 
 
UK Food and Drink (IOC 8-19) 
 
PAP 
In 2004, the composite UK Food and Drink sector had a 
direct CO2 intensity of 151 tonnes of CO2 per £1million 
output produced. In 2004, direct emissions in the Food and 
Drink sector accounted for 1.46% of total UK CO2 
generation under PAP (643, 806, 114 tonnes in Table 3).  
However, this does not take account of CO2 generation in 
other sectors of the UK economy (under PAP) supported by 
final demand for Food and Drink sector outputs. A standard 
Type I multiplier analysis (i.e. indirect linkages with other UK 
industries) using the UK IO tables tells us that for every 
£1million of final demand for Food and Drink, an additional 
£0.98million of output is (indirectly) required throughout the 
UK economy (i.e. the output multiplier is 1.98). The impact 
on the CO2 intensity of UK Food and Drink is even more 
significant. For every tonne of CO2 directly generated in the 
Food and Drink sector itself, another 2 tonnes are required 
throughout the UK economy. That is, the output-pollution 
multiplier (CO2 generated throughout the UK economy) is 
462 tonnes tonnes of CO2 per £1million of final demand for 
Food and Drink output (compared to the direct intensity of 
151 tonnes of CO2 per £1million of output produced). 
Taking these backward linkage effects into account, 2% of 
total UK pollution under PAP is accounted for by Food and 
Drink sector production to meet final demand accounts for.  
 
A key determinant of the UK Food and Drink sector 
multiplier is purchases from the relatively CO2-intensive 
Agriculture sector (IOC 1). The UK Agriculture sector has a 
direct CO2 intensity of 285 tonnes per £1million output. 
Intermediate purchases from Agriculture accounted for 10% 
of total inputs to the Food and Drink sector in our accounting 
year of 2004, or 19% of intermediate purchases from other 
UK sectors. In addition, 31% of imports to the Food and 
Drink sector are also Agriculture commodities (produced 
outside the UK). 
 
If we focus on the linkage between UK Food and Drink and 
the UK Agriculture sector in the first instance, the 
intermediate input requirement from the former to the latter, 
accounts for 6% of the output multiplier in the Food and 
Drink sector (noted above as 1.98), or 13% of the indirect 
effect (0.98). That is, for every £1million of final demand for 
Food and Drink commodity output, £0.12million of output is 
required in the UK Agriculture sector. However, due the 
relatively high CO2-intensity of the Agriculture sector (285 
tonnes per £1million output), this equates to 36 tonnes of 
CO2 in Agriculture generated for every £1million of Food 
and Drink output. This is 8% of the total output-CO2 
multiplier value for Food and Drink (462 tonnes of CO2 from 
above). 
 
CAP 
However, from a fuller CAP perspective, the composite 
commodity produced by the Food and Drink sector has a 
greater impact on the UK’s carbon footprint.  First of all, 
consider the impact of considering import-induced output 
and CO2 effects in the DTA CAP calculation in the second 
column of Table 3 (712, 677, 329 tonnes of CO2) – i.e. 
assuming that the direct CO2 intensities of production for 
the UK apply to all commodity production (imported or 
domestically produced) – where 3.64% of this total is 
attributable to UK final demand for Food and Drink. 
Continuing with the focus on the backward linkage with 
Agriculture, the global output multiplier effect in this sector 
rises from £0.12million to £0.21million for every £1million of 
final demand for UK Food and Drink. The additional output 
effect is on imports/production outside of the UK. The 
impact on the Agriculture component of the Food and Drink 
output-CO2 multiplier is even more significant, rising from 
35.5 tonnes (per £1million) if we consider only CO2 
generation within UK Agriculture to 60 tonnes if we consider 
the additional CO2 that the UK saves by not producing all 
the Agriculture requirements of its Food and Drink sector 
domestically.  
 
However, if we relax the DTA assumption – i.e. taking into 
account the actual direct CO2-intensity of commodity 
production in exporting countries – the impact is even more 
dramatic. Output multiplier values are unchanged; however, 
output-CO2 multiplier values change to reflect the different 
CO2 intensities. In the case of the UK Food and Drink 
intermediate input requirements of Agriculture commodities, 
94 tonnes of CO2 are required around the world for every 
£1million of final demand (or 90 grammes per £1). The 
increase of 34 relative to the 60 tonnes of CO2 under DTA 
is due to the higher CO2-intensity of agricultural production 
outside the UK.  
 
The OECD data used to relax the DTA assumption here 
(see Appendix 1) tell us that Agriculture production is only 
less CO2 intensive than the UK in Germany, France and the 
region of Developed Asia and Oceana. However, imports 
from these areas only accounts for 10% of total UK imports 
of Agriculture commodities. That is, 90% of imports are 
sourced from regions/countries where Agriculture is more 
CO2-intensive than in the UK. This will be due to a 
combination of the composition of Agriculture activity in the 
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source region/country, as well as differences in 
technologies.  
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
1More detailed analyses follow in Sections 5 and 6. The purpose of 
this section is to summarise the key findings. 
 
2 Note that throughout the analysis here we use UK Environmental 
Accounts data that include emissions from UK aviation and 
shipping.  
 
3Background information for multiplier analysis is available to 
download from the Scottish Government at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Input
-Output/Mulitipliers 
 
4The World Input Output Database Project. Information available 
from:   http://www.wiod.org/ 
 
5Here and in Figure 1 we discuss for the example of the UK but this 
could be done in the context of any region/nation under study. 
 
6In the absence of a published UK IO table in the appropriate 
analytical form, a UK IO table for 2004 was derived from the 
published Supply and Use Tables. This was done under the ESRC 
CCLF project with advice and assistance from the Scottish 
Government IO team and the Stockholm Environmental Institute. 
The table – available to download at: 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/fraser/research/2004ukindustry-
byindustryanalyticalinput-outputtables/ 
 – is reported at the 123 sector level that is standard in UK IO 
accounting. However, the analysis reported here is based on a 68 
sector breakdown that maps to the UK Environmental accounts. Of 
course it would be possible to apply the pollution intensities from 
this breakdown at the 123 sector level also. Web links to both the 
UK Supply and Use Tables and the UK Environmental Accounts 
from the ONS, are available in the references section below. 
 
7http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=2  
 
8 The World Bank: Inflation and deflation factors. Available to 
download from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG/countries/latest
?display=default 
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Introduction 
Following the recent Copenhagen Climate Change 
conference, there has been discussion of the methods and 
underlying principles that inform climate change targets. 
Climate change targets following the Kyoto Protocol are 
broadly based on a production accounting principle (PAP). 
This approach focuses on emissions produced within given 
geographical boundaries. An alternative approach is a 
consumption accounting principle (CAP), where the focus is 
on emissions produced globally to meet consumption 
demand within the national (or regional) economy1. 
Increasingly popular environmental footprint measures, 
including ecological and carbon footprints, attempt to 
measure environmental impacts based on CAP methods. 
The perception that human consumption decisions lie at the 
heart of the climate change problem is the impetus driving 
pressure on policymakers for a more widespread use of 
CAP measures. At a global level of course, emissions 
accounted for under the production and consumption 
accounting principles would be equal. It is international trade 
that leads to differences in emissions under the two 
principles.  
 
 
____________________ 
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This paper, the second in this special issue of the Fraser 
Commentary, examines how input-output accounting 
techniques may be applied to examine pollution generation 
under both of these accounting principles, focussing on 
waste and carbon generation in the Welsh economy as a 
case study. However, we take a different focus, arguing that 
the ‘domestic technology assumption’, taken as something 
of a mid-point in moving between production and 
consumption accounting in the first paper, may actually 
constitute a more useful focus for regional policymakers 
than full footprint analyses.  
 
PAP, CAP and environmental accounting 
methods within an input-output framework 
As explained in the previous paper, the issues involved in 
developing carbon accounting methods have been the 
subject of a two year ESRC Climate Change Leadership 
Fellowship (CCLF) programme led by Dr Karen Turner at 
the University of Stirling (previously at the University of 
Strathclyde) and involving collaboration with the co-authors 
of this paper. The work of the CCLF has involved examining 
different perspectives on pollution accounting methods 
using input-output tables as a means of examining the 
structure of pollution problems. Input-output tables are 
commonly constructed as part of national government 
accounting and provide a view of economic activity, in 
particular the sales and purchase relationships between 
industries, government and households. Such input-output 
tables are produced regularly in Wales by the Welsh 
Economy Research Unit. When combined with data on the 
carbon produced by different industries, and by households, 
these tables provide a means through which one can 
examine how different demands create environmental 
consequences up the supply chain.  
 
In short, the production of goods and services generates 
pollution, but this pollution is ultimately only generated to 
meet final consumption demands. An environmentally 
extended input-output system takes data on the emissions 
generated in production and attributes them according to the 
underlying pattern of final consumption. By attributing 
pollution to different types of final consumption demands 
(such as households, local government, capital formation 
and export demand) we can better understand which actors 
in the economy are driving the pollution. The following 
example may help to illustrate the underlying issue. 
 
As part of the CCLF programme, a series of knowledge 
exchange events have been held. One anecdote from an 
ESRC Festival of Social Science event highlights the issues 
under consideration here. The event at the University of 
Strathclyde involved pupils from high schools in Glasgow. At 
the beginning of the session the following question was 
posed: who is responsible for emissions generated as a 
result of a pupil drinking a glass of Spanish orange juice at 
breakfast? Is it the pupil, or those who made the orange 
juice in Spain?  The immediate answer was that it was the 
pupil’s (the consumer’s) responsibility. This answer was 
very much in line with the consumption accounting principle 
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approach discussed above. At the end of the session, and 
having taken the pupils through a discussion of international 
climate change negotiations and the various aspects of 
international pollution abatement, the response to this 
question was not as overwhelmingly one-sided as pupils 
took more of a ‘shared responsibility’ view.  
 
This anecdote helps to demonstrate why it is necessary to 
consider a range of different perspectives to fully 
understand pollution accounting issues.  It perhaps also 
explains why there is a lack of agreement at international 
and national levels on how we should attribute emissions 
across jurisdictional boundaries. However, while there is a 
lack of institutional agreement, there has been increasing 
public interest in consumers taking responsibility for the 
emissions embodied in their behaviour. In turn, this has led 
to increased interest in CAP based footprint measures, 
arguably the most popular of which is the carbon footprint 
(Wiedmann, 2009).  
 
Carbon footprint analyses have recently been carried out for 
a range of different organisations, activities, and countries. 
Notable non-state level examples include carbon footprint 
estimates for Irish households (Kenny & Gray, 2009), and 
for the Scottish Parliament (Weidmann et al, 2008). National 
level carbon footprint estimates are reported in Pan et al 
(2008) for China, Peters and Hertwich (2006) for Norway, 
Druckman & Jackson, (2009) for the UK, Maenpaa & 
Siikavirta (2007) for Finland, and many others.  Almost all of 
these studies utilise input-output data to generate their 
carbon footprint estimates. 
 
A full carbon footprint measure requires detailed information 
about the pollution embodied in trade. Due to globalisation, 
an accurate estimate of such a measure, in almost all 
cases, would require a vast and complex database detailing 
the pollution embodied in hundreds of different trade flows. 
Such a database would be akin to a world input-output 
system. Given these often prohibitive data requirements, 
simpler measures are frequently adopted to estimate carbon 
footprints. In using these simpler measures, there is a loss 
of ‘purity’ in the analysis, but there are huge gains in 
tractability and computability. Moreover, a focus on full 
footprint measures could be misleading to policymakers as it 
suggests that there is little value in other consumption-
driven measures. Our goal here is to demonstrate that it is 
only through considering other consumption driven 
measures that particular policy questions can be answered. 
 
The principle policy tools that governments can use to 
reduce domestic pollution generation tend to focus on 
domestic (both producer and consumer) behaviour. Some 
examples of policies used on the production side include 
subsidies for pollution abatement activities undertaken by 
companies, investment in renewable energies, and tougher 
pollution regulations for industry. Governments are more 
limited when it comes to policies intended to reduce the 
emissions embodied in imported goods, especially a 
regional government such as Scotland or Wales. For 
example, the Welsh Assembly Government has little ability 
to alter foreign production. However they can work to 
change aspects of domestic consumption behaviour. Then 
practically reducing the emissions embodied in imports is 
not as straightforward as amending domestic pollution 
regulations.  
 
So how might we go forward to provide transparent 
information for policymaking purposes while avoiding the 
practical issues of developing an expensive and vast 
database of pollution embodied in domestic imports?  One 
potential way ahead is to adopt what is known as a 
domestic technology assumption (DTA) method. This 
method retains the local production processes as a key 
determinant of the carbon footprint estimate, but focuses on 
local final consumption decisions as the main driving force. 
In this way, we propose that, as well as offering a solution in 
the absence of data on polluting technology used in 
producing goods that we import, it is also useful in 
considering the jurisdictional issues involved in pollution 
abatement.  
 
For example, without data on production and pollution 
technologies of all trading partners, it may be useful for 
regional (e.g. Welsh) policymakers to examine the global 
environmental impacts of domestic consumption behaviour 
as if it were being satisfied using the local production 
technologies, which they can directly affect. In short, this 
approach assumes that Welsh imports, regardless of the 
country of origin, are produced using similar technologies to 
those used in Wales and that their production has similar 
carbon consequences. Alternatively, one may view the 
approach as allowing us to consider the domestic savings of 
not producing goods and services locally, rather than the 
implied costs abroad. In what follows we illustrate a footprint 
approach using a domestic technology assumption from 
work we have undertaken in Wales (Jensen et al 2009, 
2010). 
 
Case studies of waste and carbon generation 
in the Welsh regional economy 
The Welsh Assembly Government has a legal duty to 
pursue sustainable development objectives as part of its 
core functions. Moreover, a series of strategic planning 
documents highlight the importance of the long-term 
reduction in externalities such as carbon emissions and 
waste. There has been growing interest from Welsh 
policymakers in measures that estimate the global footprint 
associated with Welsh production and consumption activity. 
In this context, much of their focus has been on the 
ecological footprint measure which links regional 
consumption to global land areas needed to support that 
consumption. Using this measure, Wales has been found to 
be consuming more than its fair share of the Earth’s 
resources. In this paper, we focus on the carbon and waste 
footprints of Welsh consumption that have been estimated 
using an environmentally extended Welsh input-output 
framework. 
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To illustrate the approach outlined in the previous section 
we have used the Welsh input-output tables for 2003 
(WERU, 2007). These tables (which adopt the same format 
as outlined in the schematic detailed in the first paper in this 
special issue) provide information on the total use of 
imported and regionally produced goods and services by 
each Welsh production sector and by different types of final 
consumers (e.g. households, tourists, government). The 
input-output data were then extended with data on physical 
waste and CO2 (as carbon) directly generated by each 
sector of the economy (including households). This 
extension allows us to examine the total waste and carbon 
that is directly generated by each production sector and final 
consumption activity within the Welsh economy.  
 
Using these data and applying the DTA approach discussed 
above, we assume that the waste and pollution intensities of 
production are given by Welsh technology, irrespective of 
the actual location of production. As a result we can then 
explore the level of pollution directly and indirectly (i.e. 
through industry supply chains) embodied in different types 
of production and consumption activities. However, in the 
case of carbon we aim to relax this assumption using data 
on the sources of imports and the corresponding direct 
carbon intensities that apply in the producing region, as has 
been done for Scotland and the UK in the first paper in this 
issue. 
 
The input-output data for 2003 show that Wales ran a 
combined trade deficit with the rest of the UK (RUK) and the 
rest of the world (ROW) of almost £8.5bn (just under £3bn 
with other UK regions and just over £5.5bn with the rest of 
the world). That is, imports of goods and services exceeded 
exports. The fact that Wales did not produce enough to 
meet its own consumption requirements suggests that its 
environmental footprints are expected to reflect significant 
external impacts in other regions and countries.  
 
Table 1:   Input- Output accounting of the Welsh waste trade balance (2003) 
 
            PAP CAP 
Total Waste Attributed (millions of tonnes)     18.61 29.77 
                
Waste supported by Welsh household and government final consumption   
                
Domestic (Welsh) waste generation:     1.52 1.52 
  Directly generated (households)     7.02 7.02 
  Indirect- generated in Welsh production sectors 8.54 8.54 
                
Indirect waste embodied in imports (DTA)       21.22 
                
Waste supported by external demands for Welsh production 10.07   
                
Implied Waste Trade Balance (Deficit):         
  Actual waste generation minus DTA waste generation     
  (Waste embodied in exports minus waste embodied in imports) -11.15   
 
 
Taking the case of physical waste generation first, Table 1 
reports the results for two different types of accounting. In 
the first column, titled PAP (production accounting principle), 
we examine the total physical amount of waste generated 
within the Welsh borders (i.e. 18.6m tonnes). Welsh waste 
generation under PAP is calculated by multiplying the 
individual sector output and final consumption expenditure 
data given in the input-output tables by Welsh-specific direct 
waste intensities (tonnes of waste per £1m output/final 
consumption expenditure). We also use standard 
techniques to attribute this domestic waste generation to the 
final consumer groups identified in the input-output tables. 
These are domestic final consumption (i.e. households and 
government) and external final consumption (exports). 
These results allow us to distinguish between waste 
generated in Wales as a direct or indirect by-product of 
domestic final consumption demand (8.5m tonnes) and 
external (export) demand (10m tonnes). Thus, we can 
conclude that the bulk of waste generated within Welsh 
borders takes place to support external rather than domestic 
final consumption demand. However, the PAP measure in 
the first column does not tell us anything about the other 
element of trade in waste: the amount embodied in imports. 
 
The advantage of the CAP results in the second column of 
Table 1 is that, as discussed above, it does account for the 
fuller waste implications of Welsh final consumption. Under 
the CAP approach, waste generated within Welsh borders 
as well as waste generated in other regions and countries to 
support Welsh final consumption demand is accounted for. 
Here, using the DTA, we address the waste generated 
outside of Wales by using information in the Welsh input-
output table framework (including data on the domestic and 
imported inputs to production), information on combined 
final demand (including imports supported by household and 
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government spending for example) but assuming Welsh 
direct waste intensities.  
 
Under the CAP measure, the 10.1m tonnes of waste 
generated in Wales to support external demands (included 
under the Welsh PAP account) are excluded from the Welsh 
waste footprint In formulating our DTA-based CAP measure, 
we therefore exclude the waste generated in Wales to meet 
export demand and include a measure of the waste 
embodied in Welsh imports (i.e. imports that directly and/or 
indirectly service the final demands of Welsh households 
and government).  
 
In the second column of Table 1, we instead account for the 
(indirect) waste generation in other regions and countries, 
estimated using our domestic technology assumption 
approach, to be embodied in imports to Welsh final 
consumption. Domestic waste generation to meet Welsh 
domestic final consumption demands remains the same as 
under the PAP measure in column one (this element is 
common to both PAP and CAP; the difference lies in the 
treatment of waste embodied in trade). Our CAP measure 
shows that in 2003, Wales had a waste footprint estimate 
that greatly exceeds the waste accounted for under PAP. 
Our results show that if we assume Welsh production and 
waste technologies are adopted by Welsh trading partners, 
there are 21.2m tonnes of waste embodied in imported 
consumption demands.  As only 10.1m tonnes of waste are 
attributed to external (export) demands in the PAP method, 
this implies that, as well as running a trade deficit in terms of 
goods and services (with the value of imports exceeding 
that of exports), Wales runs a waste trade deficit with the 
rest of the world (including the rest of the UK). This reflects 
the fact that the waste embodied in Welsh exports is less 
than the waste estimated to be embodied in imports. 
 
Table 2:  Input- Output accounting of the Welsh carbon trade balance (2003) 
 
            PAP CAP 
Total CO2 as carbon attributed (millions of tonnes)   11.75 10.86 
                
CO2 supported by Welsh household and government final consumption   
Domestic (Welsh) CO2 generation:     2.13 2.13 
  Directly generated (households)     1.91 1.91 
  Indirect- generated in Welsh production sectors 4.04 4.04 
                
Indirect CO2 embodied in imports (DTA)       6.83 
                
CO2 supported by external demands for Welsh production 7.71   
                
Implied CO2 Trade Balance (Deficit):         
  Actual CO2 generation minus DTA CO2 generation     
  (CO2 embodied in exports minus CO2 embodied in imports) 0.88   
 
 
However, it is not necessarily true that when a country runs 
a trade deficit in goods and services, it will also do so in 
environmental terms. One benefit of using an input-output 
approach to account for environmental issues is the level of 
detail on the composition of regional consumption and trade 
patterns behind these calculations.  
 
The calculations underlying the results presented in Table 2 
use the same methodology and economic data as those in 
Table 1. The only difference is that data on the direct CO2 
(as carbon) intensity of Welsh production and consumption 
activities are used instead of physical waste intensities. The 
key result in the case of carbon is that the Welsh carbon 
footprint (under CAP in column two) is less than actual 
carbon generation within the Welsh economy (estimated 
under PAP in column one). Once again the carbon 
generated in Wales and attributable to domestic final 
consumption demands is the same under both measures 
(4m tonnes). However, carbon  generation within Wales to 
support external (export) demand (7.7m tonnes) is greater 
than the carbon that we estimate to be embodied in imports 
to Welsh final and intermediate consumption demand (6.8m 
tonnes). This suggests that Welsh exports contain more 
carbon than its imports, i.e. Wales had a carbon trade 
‘surplus’ of just under 0.9m tonnes in 2003.  
 
The qualitative differences in our analyses for waste and 
carbon are interesting, and largely due to the composition of 
imports. For example, although accounting for only a small 
share of the value of total imports, the bulk of waste 
embodied in Welsh imports is related to imports from 
‘Construction’ and ‘Other Mining and Quarrying’ activities 
(although these only account for a small share of total 
imports; note also the bulk of this waste is likely to be inert, 
not hazardous, waste). Simple differences such as these 
result in the estimation of a much greater waste, as opposed 
to carbon, impact for imports from these sectors. This result 
also suggests that examining the differences between our 
results for carbon and for waste at the sectoral level may be 
useful for policymakers interested in determining which 
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industries to focus on in order to reduce different types of 
pollution.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The analyses reported in Tables 1 and 2 both employ the 
DTA method to calculate the waste and CO2 (as carbon) 
embodied in imports by assuming that the waste/carbon 
embodied in the production of the commodities consumed is 
given by Welsh production and polluting technology. This 
allows us to consider the Welsh waste and carbon footprint 
as if all consumption and production technology decisions 
were made under the jurisdiction of Welsh policymakers. As 
explained above, we believe that there is valuable 
information for both the public and for policymakers in this 
approach. This is because it facilitates the consideration of 
the environmental footprint of our consumption decisions 
under circumstances over which we have control (i.e. ‘as if’ 
a region had to meet all consumption demands based on 
that region’s own consumption and technology decisions).  
 
The DTA approach only provides hypothetical footprint 
estimates, but has the advantage of being implementable 
using domestic input-output data. We could relax the DTA 
where appropriate data on the carbon, waste (or other 
pollutant) content of imports is available. In our current 
research, as reflected in the Scottish and UK results 
reported in the first paper in this issue of the Fraser 
Commentary, we are collaborating with colleagues at the 
OECD to produce a dataset that will allow us to look at 
these issues in more detail.  
 
However, as we have already argued in this paper, getting a 
more accurate footprint measure is not the same as fully 
understanding the impacts of our actions.  As a general 
principle, we question how much is gained by adopting an 
approach using more international trade and waste data.  
That is, while it allows for a more accurate footprint 
measure, what is the value-added in policy terms (given that 
these international data provide information on technologies 
adopted in other regions/countries? A full footprint measure 
may be more ‘accurate’ but as a practical tool for 
policymakers, it may be nothing more than a performance 
indicator. On the other hand, different perspectives, such as 
the DTA method, allow policymakers to examine the impact 
of production and consumption behaviours that local 
policymakers have control over.  
 
While this paper reports on our analyses of carbon and 
waste, this approach is easily generalised for the analysis of 
other environmental externalities. We believe that there is a 
growing demand among policymakers and the public to 
better understand the global environmental consequences 
associated with their consumption choices. The challenge 
for the research community is to develop measurement 
approaches that are transparent and provide useful 
information on which policy choices can be made and 
progress towards sustainable development objectives can 
be assessed. Following from the CCLF research discussed 
in this paper, the research team is actively liaising with the 
policy community to explore ways in which the tools 
described can be extended and improved. In our continued 
research we are also working on developing more complex 
modelling applications through which one can explore the 
consequences of changes in policy on industry and 
consumer behaviour (for example, through the use of 
computable general equilibrium, CGE, modelling 
frameworks).  
 
____________________ 
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(2001) which was one of the first papers to explicitly address 
consumption v. production accounting principle approaches in the 
literature. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite much of energy policy being a reserved issue for 
the UK Government, Scotland has pursued its own 
distinctive energy policy (Allan et al, 2008a), particularly in 
relation to climate change. The Climate Change Act 
(Scotland)  was passed in 2009 and outlines Scotland’s 
commitment to tackling climate change. It requires Scottish 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2050 to be 80% less 
than their 1990 levels, with an interim target of a 42% 
reduction by 2020. 
 
Climate change is an international problem which appears 
to require a global solution and it is therefore not clear that 
the appropriate spatial scale for policy action is the regional 
or even national level. The Scottish Government is aware of 
this, but claims that such emissions’ reduction targets can 
be used as a means of supporting the UK’s international 
commitments and also showing leadership to encourage 
other nations to tackle climate change. However, Scottish 
climate change policy must also be considered in the 
context of Scottish energy policy as a whole. The Scottish 
Government has other energy policy goals, notably security 
of supply, affordability and economic growth through the 
development of low carbon technologies, notably 
renewables. 
 
This paper is intended to provide a brief overview of the 
main issues involved in Scottish climate change policy. We 
give a brief background, in Section 2, on international, EU 
and UK climate change policy. In Section 3 we provide an 
overview of the main features of the Scottish Climate 
Change Act and highlight particular differences with the UK 
equivalent framework. In Section 4 we discuss the issues 
surrounding low carbon technologies and their impact on 
climate change policy in Scotland. We consider the policy 
instruments available to the Scottish Government while 
functioning within EU and UK frameworks in Section 5. In 
Section 6 we conclude and identify avenues for future 
research. 
____________________ 
* The author(s) gratefully acknowledge the financial support 
of the EPSRC’s Supergen Marine Energy Consortium 
(reference: EP/E040136/1). The views expressed are those 
of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Fraser of 
Allander Institute. 
 
2.  Background on International, EU and UK 
policy 
Given the global nature of the climate change issue, most 
initial policy effort has been on international or multi-national 
levels, like the EU. There has also been considerable effort 
at the UK level. Scottish climate change policy is heavily 
influenced by and conditional upon policies at these other 
spatial levels. This section therefore gives a short summary 
of the main agreements, policies, instruments and 
legislation that affect Scotland. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an 
international agreement that imposes reduction targets on 
GHG emissions for developed nations. It was established in 
1997, ratified in 2005 and runs from 2008-2012. No legally 
binding successor agreement has yet been agreed, 
although the informal Copenhagen Accord was adopted in 
2009 as a step towards this. Kyoto allows countries to use 
various, specifically created, flexible market mechanisms in 
meeting their emissions reduction commitments. These are 
International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (JI), 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)1. In theory 
all these mechanisms should allow emissions abatement to 
take place in the most cost effective manner i.e. where it is 
cheapest, and also allow for the diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies to developing countries. 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-15 countries have a 
bubble which allows them to achieve together an overall 
target of an 8% reduction in emissions by 2012. In order to 
achieve this reduction the EU created its own instrument in 
the form of an emissions trading scheme, the EU ETS, in 
2005. The EU ETS is a ‘cap and trade’ system where a limit 
is put on total emissions based on Kyoto commitments and 
the scheme allows CO2 allowances, called European Union 
Allowances (EUAs), to be bought and sold between 
operators in certain emitting sectors2.   The sectors currently 
covered are: energy, ferrous metals, minerals, pulp and 
paper. Each EUA is equivalent to one tonne of CO2. All 
installations within these sectors require a permit to operate 
which covers almost half of EU carbon emissions. However 
the allocation of the tradable EUAs to permit holders is 
initiated at national level with individual Member States 
submitting National Allocation Plans (NAPs) to the EU 
Commission for approval on the distribution of allowances 
and details of all installations covered. Phase I of the EU 
ETS ran from 2005-2007 and Phase II runs in parallel with 
Kyoto from 2008-2012. 
 
 In 2008 the EU introduced its 20-20-20 targets for 2020. 
This EU goal requires that by the year 2020 there will be a 
20% reduction in GHG emissions, to have 20% of final 
energy consumption met from renewables and a 20% 
reduction in energy consumption through promoting energy 
efficiency. The EU stated that it would increase its 
emissions reduction commitment from 20% to 30% if an 
international successor to Kyoto was agreed and other 
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countries adopted strict targets. Although there is an EU 
renewables target, there is no EU-wide renewables3  policy 
instrument and each member state have their own 
renewables target and can meet it by whatever method they 
deem appropriate.  
 
The Climate Change Act 2008 outlines the UK’s contribution 
to tackling climate change by setting UK emissions targets 
for 2020 and 2050. The Climate Change Act also created 
the Committee on Climate Change, an independent body 
tasked with advising the UK Government on setting its 
emissions targets, including 5-year carbon budgets, and 
monitoring government progress towards the targets. The 
UK emissions reduction target for 2050 of 80% is the same 
as that for Scotland4 but the 2020 target is dependent upon 
a global climate change agreement being struck. If such an 
international deal is agreed, then the EU will raise its own 
emissions reduction targets (from 20% to 30%) and thus the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) cap will be 
tightened. This will require greater reductions from UK 
installations covered by the EU ETS i.e. the traded sector, 
which includes electricity generation. Therefore the UK 
Government has set a 2020 “interim target” of a 34% 
reduction but this will rise to 42% “intended target” if 
international and EU policies dictate so5. The overall UK 
target in 2020 is therefore conditional upon the EU target 
which is in turn dependent upon a global deal. This 
framework shows that the UK is willing to demonstrate 
leadership with its initial effort but that it will also commit to 
higher targets if others are willing to make more significant 
reductions. 
 
“This leadership argument is best understood in game 
theory terms: it is an attempt to induce steps towards a 
global carbon cartel to reduce the quantity of emissions.”6 
  
It is also worth stating that the UK has adopted a renewable 
energy target of 15% by 2020 as its contribution towards the 
wider EU renewables target. 
 
3.  Scottish Climate Change Act 
 
Strict targets 
The Climate Change (Scotland) Act sets a 2020 target 
which is more ambitious than the UK equivalent. Scotland 
has legislated for a 42% reduction in emissions regardless 
of what occurs at any other spatial level7. Such ambition 
may be laudable in principle but it must be informed by, and 
be consistent with, EU and UK policy and account for the 
likely impact of these other spatial levels. This therefore 
raises the question of whether it is possible for Scotland to 
meet the 42% target, especially if there is no global deal.  
The advice from the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
is that achieving the 42% target is possible but the CCC 
recommends setting separate targets for the ‘traded’ and 
‘non-traded’ sectors in Scotland. The traded sector 
emissions will be counted as Scotland’s share of the UK 
allocation in the EU ETS (CCC, 2010). This is in the spirit of 
the EU ETS, where the geographic distribution of emission 
reductions simply reflects the least-cost locations for 
meeting the overall cap. However, it also implies that, from a 
purely Scottish perspective, any extra reduction in traded 
sector emissions, for example, associated with the 
expansion of renewable electricity generation, will not count 
towards meeting the reduction targets8. This accounting 
methodology also implies that any non-CO2 GHGs 
produced within the traded sector, such as methane, will not 
be counted as Scottish emissions9.  
 
As for the non-traded sector, the CCC predicts that, with no 
global deal, there would have to be a 47% reduction in non-
traded sector emissions to meet the overall Scottish target 
of 42%.With a global deal the non-traded sector target falls 
to 39%10. It seems perverse that the non-traded target 
shrinks if a global deal is agreed. The CCC therefore 
suggests making Scotland’s non-traded target invariant to 
the achievement of a global deal. This seems logical 
because if Scotland wishes to make its framework invariant 
to international agreements, then at least one target, the 
non-traded sector, must be made invariant to reduce 
uncertainty. Given that Scotland is part of the EU ETS, there 
is nothing that can be done to make the overall target 
invariant.  
 
Annual targets 
The Climate Change (Scotland) Act has established the 
requirement of yearly carbon budgets in Scotland. It will be 
interesting to see how these are set and met in comparison 
to the UK budgets, which are set for 5-year periods. 
The frequency with which budgets are set reflects a trade-
off between certainty in the future emissions path and 
flexibility in meeting targets. Annual year-on-year targets 
provide certainty for investors, provided that there is 
confidence that these targets will be met. However, setting 
5-year budgets allows for the benefits of flexibility in 
response to uncontrollable events and a lower reporting 
burden.  
 
Of course annual targets do not necessarily imply certainty; 
increased frequency may make it more difficult consistently 
to achieve targets. For example, if a nuclear station had to 
shut one year unexpectedly then other types of electricity 
generation, most likely coal and gas, would need to make 
up the difference and thus emissions would substantially 
increase for that single year. This issue is especially 
important given Scotland’s current dependence on a small 
number of large generators11.  Less frequent budgets would 
allow Scotland to cope better with these unexpected 
fluctuations. The CCC’s report to the Scottish government 
(CCC, 2010) has expressed concern with the lack of 
flexibility in the Scottish annual targets and suggests 
measures could be considered to increase flexibility, 
although it is not within the CCC’s remit actually to 
recommend doing so.  
 
An issue with setting 5-year budgets is defining exactly how 
the budgets are expressed because the stock of carbon in 
the atmosphere is more important for global warming than 
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the flow. For example, meeting the 5 year target by a large 
reduction in the final year will leave more carbon in the 
atmosphere, and cause more global warming, than a 
gradual reduction. 
 
Targets for 2011 and 2012 are relatively small reductions, 
most likely due to the recession but from 2014 onwards 
there is a 2-3% decrease in emissions year on year. There 
is a substantial one-off increase in emissions reductions in 
2013 (9.9% relative to the previous year) due to the 
beginning of the third phase of the EU ETS and therefore 
the expected tightening of Scotland’s allocation in the traded 
sector. The Act requires reductions from 2020 to be at least 
3% each year.  
 
The Scottish annual targets were initially to be passed in 
secondary legislation in April 2010 but the first set of targets 
were rejected by a slight majority in the Scottish Parliament 
for not going far enough, as a pledge of annual 3% 
reductions each year was made in the SNP manifesto. A 
short-lived cross-party working group was then established 
to revisit these annual targets and suggest amendments. 
The targets shown above have been set out in the most 
recent Draft Order (not yet legally binding) laid before 
Parliament in September 2010. 
 
Aviation and shipping 
International aviation and shipping both cause considerable 
GHG emissions and so the Scottish framework explicitly 
includes international aviation and shipping in its emissions 
reduction targets. However, these are not yet included at the 
UK or EU level and there is no agreed method for 
accounting for these sector’s emissions. The main question 
to ask is whether the Scottish Government can influence 
emissions in these sectors. If it cannot, then what are the 
implications of including them amongst the target 
reductions; and even if the Scottish Government can 
influence those emissions, would it be desirable to do so 
unilaterally?  
 
There is likely to be considerable growth of emissions in 
international aviation and shipping, given previous trends. 
Therefore action on these sectors is imperative for tackling 
climate change. However, the ability to make significant 
reductions in these sectors is mostly outwith Scottish 
Government control unless it plans to severely limit travel 
and exports11.  Due to the international nature, the CCC do 
not attempt to identify policies that the Scottish Government 
could use to reduce emissions in these sectors. Instead, 
given the growth trends in international aviation and 
shipping, the CCC (2010) believes that GHG emission 
reductions of 44% will be necessary in the other sectors of 
the economy (i.e. the total economy less aviation and 
shipping) in order to meet the 42% Scottish target.  
Even if it were possible for the Scottish Government to 
reduce its emissions from aviation and shipping, it seems 
inappropriate, given the international nature of these 
sectors, to include them in national targets before they are 
included on an international scale. Limiting emissions in 
these sectors before other countries could lead to serious 
competitiveness affects. Exactly how these sectors are 
included is also an issue because the production-orientated-
nature of the targets makes it difficult to attribute emissions 
accurately. These sectors would lend themselves better to a 
consumption-based accounting methodology. It seems more 
likely that separate international sectoral agreements will be 
required in the long-run.  
 
From 2012 domestic aviation will be part of the EU ETS 
traded sector and will therefore be outwith Scottish control 
for accounting purposes. A specific issue with the EU ETS is 
that it only targets CO2 and therefore misses many of the 
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) attributable to aviation 
which are included in the emissions reduction targets.  
 
Banking and borrowing 
There is no banking or borrowing allowed between each 
year of the annual Scottish emissions budgets. Each yearly 
budget must be met, and any over-fulfilment cannot be 
carried over into future periods. This provides certainty in 
terms of targets but severely reduces the flexibility of 
meeting them, especially in years of significant variation in 
energy use and there is also no incentive to go beyond the 
necessary in reducing emissions in a given year.  If targets 
are consistently met this may be very beneficial as the 
credible policy provides certainty to investors. However, if 
targets are frequently missed, in part because of their 
inflexibility, then the credibility of the annual targets will 
ultimately be undermined and perhaps the credibility of the 
government as a whole. If there are signs of this happening 
in practice then banking and borrowing should be 
considered as a means of allowing budgets to be met more 
flexibly between years. For example, annual targets cannot 
take into consideration outside events such as colder than 
anticipated winters, power generation shutting down or a 
force majeure, such as the limited air travel due to the 
volcanic ash in April 2010. 
 
Use of credits 
Purchase of credits may be used to help Scotland achieve 
its emissions reduction targets. These may be through the 
EU ETS or the various Kyoto mechanisms which are 
discussed in Section 2. As discussed already, there is no 
limit on the use of European Union Allowances (EUAs), as 
these can be freely traded within the EU ETS and will count 
towards Scotland’s traded sector target. However, there is a 
limit on the “offset credits” purchased from the Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms such as JI or CDM. The Climate Change 
Scotland Act puts a limit of 20% on emissions reductions 
 
 
 
 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Figure 1: Scottish annual climate change targets - % decrease from previous year 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2010/09/22133935 
 
being made by purchased Kyoto credits which can be used 
to meet the non-traded sector target. This cap is set to 
ensure that the emissions reductions are met mainly 
through domestic measures. Theoretically these flexible 
mechanism projects would achieve abatement at lowest 
cost. However, there are two concerns about their use. 
Firstly, extensive use of credits would not incentivise the 
necessary changes in the infrastructure of the economy to 
put the country on a path to making its 2050 reduction. This 
would leave us dependent upon reductions in other nations 
to make the target. Secondly, there are concerns that no 
significant reductions would be made if the use of Kyoto 
credits are not limited, as uncertainty exists about their true 
benefits. This scepticism is due to the difficulty in proving 
the ‘additionality’ of such projects against a hypothetical 
baseline scenario. If these projects are really not credible, 
then the whole process could be undermined13.  Therefore 
domestic emissions reductions, which can be more 
accurately measured, are the preferred means of meeting 
the targets.  
 
Given the lack of flexibility of annual targets and the 
absence of banking or borrowing, then purchasing credits 
may become important as a method of meeting Scottish 
targets in years of fluctuation in emissions. This may be 
expensive. The CCC (2010) suggests credits may have to 
play a significant part in Scotland meeting its emissions 
reduction target, especially if there is no global deal. They 
estimate that a 20% emissions reduction commitment by the 
EU would require Scotland to purchase credits from the 
Kyoto mechanisms to cover a range of 9% to 17% of its 
reductions at an estimated cost of around £30million to 
£50million in 2020 in order to meet its emissions reduction 
targets. This is the most likely scenario but would fall within 
the 20% limit on credits set in the Climate Change Scotland 
Act and so would allow Scotland to meet its emissions 
reduction target. The amount of credits needed to contribute 
would be much less under the stricter 30% EU target, with 
up to 5% of the 2020 target being met by offset credits 
costing a maximum of £15 million (CCC, 2010, p. 42). Only 
time will tell if circumstances arise in which the Scottish 
Government must buy credits to meet their own self-
imposed targets and if so, how they can justify this spending 
to the public 
 
4.  Low carbon technologies 
As stated in Section 3, under the accounting principles of 
the Climate Change (Scotland) Act, low carbon technologies 
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cannot contribute towards meeting emissions reduction 
targets at Scottish level. This is because the UK’s emissions 
targets are bound to the EU ETS. Low carbon technologies 
cannot affect Scotland’s performance in meeting its 
emission reduction targets because emissions from 
electricity production are covered by the EU ETS. In theory 
a policy instrument such as the EU ETS, which prices 
carbon, should achieve the necessary emissions reductions 
efficiently and thereby induce the desired level of investment 
in low carbon technolgies. Therefore having a renewables 
target (and corresponding instrument, such as ROCs, 
discussed below), for example, only serve to raise costs and 
so prove inefficient. However, Sorrell and Sijm (2003) argue 
that, although additional policy instruments bring no 
efficiency gains, they can achieve other objectives such as 
stimulating investment in R&D where inducing initial 
investment is difficult because of moral hazard and 
imperfect information. In a Scottish context, renewables can 
be seen as contributing to other Government energy policy 
goals such as security of supply, and offering potential for 
economic development through the exploitation of low-
carbon technologies. 
 
Independently of the emissions reduction targets set out in 
the Climate Change Scotland Act, the Scottish Government 
has other policies and targets for the traded sector, in 
particular energy generation. The details and possible 
motivations of these policies are discussed below. 
 
A ‘no new nuclear’ policy is held by the current Scottish 
Government with regards to Scotland’s energy portfolio14. 
This is especially important given that Scotland’s nuclear 
generating facilities are coming to the end of their life with 
Hunterston and Torness both scheduled to close (some 
30% of Scotland’s electricity is currently generated by this 
source). Furthermore, a substantial proportion of coal-fired 
power plants are due to retire by 2016. The “no new 
nuclear” position is not enshrined in any legislation but 
reflects the stance of the two main political parties. This may 
partially reflect concerns of safety and disposal and also a 
perceived link between nuclear energy and nuclear 
weapons. In terms of climate change policy, a lack of 
nuclear capacity limits the options available for low-cost, 
low-carbon technologies available to replace emissions-
intensive electricity generation. The UK government is 
pursuing nuclear within its future energy portfolio, and given 
the integration of the British electricity market, it will be the 
case that the costs of the UK government developing 
nuclear power will be distributed among all British electricity 
consumers, including those in Scotland (Bellingham, 2008).  
 
It is not clear how Scotland will fill the energy supply gap but 
most likely this will be through the harnessing of various 
renewable energy sources15. In practice the energy gap will 
be met by market circumstances and investor decisions, 
however, the Scottish Government can indirectly attempt to 
influence the energy supply through its renewables policy. 
This is reflected in the fact that the Scottish Government has 
recently set a very demanding renewable electricity target of 
80% for 2020 i.e. 80% of Scotland’s electricity consumption 
must come from renewable sources16. The Scottish 
Government sees the potential benefit that renewables can 
have in terms of achieving energy policy goals, such as 
stimulating economic growth and promoting security of 
supply through diversity of generation sources. However, if 
the Scottish Government believes that renewables are 
contributing towards achieving Scottish climate change 
targets, they are misguided. Also, it is highly unlikely that 
strict climate change targets will do much in practice to help 
attract substantial investment in low-carbon technologies. 
Regardless of these facts, the CCC believes there is still a 
need for low carbon generation, even if it is not part of the 
emissions targets, because “given that Scotland has an 
80% target to reduce emissions, it is important not only that 
the traded sector cap is achieved, but that the way this is 
achieved is consistent with the longer-term path to an 80% 
emissions reduction in 2050 relative to 1990. Specifically, 
this path requires early decarbonisation of the power sector, 
and extension of low-carbon power to other sectors, namely 
through electric forms of transport and heat17.” This 
reasoning appears to be based upon long-term R&D 
considerations. Towards 2050 there will be increased 
electricity requirements, for instance, through significant 
predicted increases in electric transport. During the next few 
decades, as we have already stated, there will also be 
retirement of many current power generators. It therefore 
makes no sense to provide this electricity from dirty 
generating sources if we are serious about reducing 
emissions. However, there is not a credible carbon price 
that extends this far into the future. Therefore there is a 
need to put significant research and development into 
renewables in order to provide a diverse, low-carbon power 
sector. 
 
Meeting the 80% renewables target, while providing an 
adequate energy supply, will require tapping into the 
extensive renewable energy resources available in 
Scotland. A significant anticipated benefit is job creation in 
renewables and other “green” industries. This may also lead 
to Scotland becoming an exporter of renewable energy 
(Allan et al, 2007) and possibly also an exporter of 
renewable technology itself and its operative and 
management experience (Allan et al, 2010b). These 
benefits will only be fully realised if renewables projects 
embody limited imported materials and labour18. Onshore 
wind has been the major technology deployed so far in 
Scotland but it brings its own problem because of its 
intermittent nature, and therefore variable output, requiring a 
back-up to ensure supply meets demand19.   Offshore wind 
and marine technologies have the potential to play an 
important role in Scotland given their abundance, although 
the peripheral location of the most promising resources 
provides new challenges to distribution and transmission20.  
It is estimated that Scotland has 25% of Europe’s Tidal and 
Offshore wind power and 10% of its Wave power potential. 
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology also has the 
potential in Scotland to stop emissions from coal or gas 
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combustion being released into the atmosphere. CCS could 
be fitted to new or old power stations and allow for the use 
of coal and gas but without their significant CO2 emissions 
reaching the atmosphere. This is likely to be expensive to 
fund however as the technology has not yet been tested on 
a commercial scale, and these costs will likely be passed 
onto consumers through higher energy prices. The UK 
government announced a CCS demonstration competition 
as well as setting up an Office of Carbon Capture and 
Storage to coordinate the approach to CCS in the UK; this 
appears to be somewhat behind schedule. The EU has also 
passed a Directive on CCS and will use EU ETS proceeds 
to fund up to 12 CCS demonstrations. The development of 
CCS may take some time but Scotland has substantial 
capabilities to use its experience with the North Sea oil and 
gas industry, and the availability of extensive underground 
storage capacity, to help become a leader in CCS 
technology and use it to help achieve its environmental 
goals. The Scottish Government has produced its own 
roadmap as to how Scotland can become Europe’s leader in 
CCS technology (Scottish Government and Scottish 
Enterprise, 2010), the funding of which will be through EU 
and additional Scottish Government support. The export 
potential of CCS is particularly significant given that it could 
be adopted worldwide in countries which use coal and gas. 
In terms of the EU ETS it is not clear what will happen with 
CCS. Perhaps those installations fitted with CCS will be 
exempt from the EU ETS or they will otherwise be able to 
sell all their allowances. Overall, renewables should be 
preferred over CCS because although CCS helps to 
decarbonise the economy, in the long run and we would still 
be reliant upon finite fossil fuels and so it does not help 
address the energy supply. However, this does not diminish 
the value of CCS as an incredibly useful but ultimately short-
to–medium term solution to reduce carbon emissions across 
the globe. 
 
5.  Policy instruments 
Scotland is part of the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, and as such is subject to many of their climate 
change policies. At EU level Scotland is already included in 
the EU 20-20-20 targets for 2020 and policy instruments 
such as the EU ETS. At the UK level there are instruments 
such as the Climate Change Levy and the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment, renewables instruments such as 
Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) and ROCs and there are institutions 
such as the Carbon Trust and the Energy Saving Trust. The 
Scottish Government must adhere to these given their 
limited devolved powers but must also use what it has at its 
disposal to achieve its own goals and the annual targets it 
sets.  
 
The setting of emissions targets themselves may be seen 
as an instrument with which to achieve Scottish climate 
change goals. If targets are believed to be credible (i.e. in 
practice, if they are met year on year) then the mere setting 
of them may influence expectations sufficiently to alter 
behaviour, for example to induce investment in low carbon 
technologies. However, any such impact is likely to be short-
lived if the Scottish Government consistently failed to meet 
its targets. It seems unlikely, in practice, that targets could 
be judged as being instruments, especially as there is no 
clear policy lever to make sure they are met. However, 
additional credibility of the targets may be brought about by 
advice on, and monitoring of, targets by an independent 
agency. The Climate Change (Scotland) Act allows for the 
possibility of a Scottish Committee on Climate Change to 
provide advice and progress towards annual targets. So far 
this possibility has not been utilised. However the Scottish 
Government commissioned a report from the Committee on 
Climate Change whose role it is to do this for the UK 
government (CCC, 2010)21.  
 
The Scottish government has some other available options 
in terms of policy instruments. Firstly, the Scottish 
Government has been able to use its planning powers to 
help accelerate the achievement of its goals. An example of 
the use of planning permission is the acceptance of the 
Beauly to Denny power line, the creation of which will 
substantially enhance grid capabilities in Scotland. It will 
allow for easier transmission of electricity, in particular that 
generated by renewable sources located in peripheral areas 
to places of high energy consumption. Secondly, the 
Scottish Government can make funding available for energy 
efficiency improvements and legislate to ensure efficiency 
standards in important emitting sectors such as transport, 
housing and agriculture. This may be through regulating 
efficiency standards e.g. of insulation, heating and lighting 
and also undertaking demand-side initiatives for transport, 
such as encouraging public transport, car sharing and lower 
speed limits. Thirdly, there is the option of purchasing offset 
credits from the Kyoto mechanisms in order to meet 
emissions reduction targets. This may prove to be the 
cheapest option in the short-run if the price of these credits 
are low but, given the limit of 20% credit purchase in the 
Climate Change (Scotland) Act, they cannot rely heavily 
upon credits. A fourth possible, but ultimately unlikely, action 
is for the Scottish Government to use its limited fiscal 
powers to inhibit growth in the economy in order to satisfy 
their climate change targets. This is highly unlikely given the 
potential consequences of such action but it should be 
noted that sustained low growth may make the achievement 
of targets possible i.e. targets may be met entirely 
fortuitously, rather than as a consequence of policy action. 
 
In practice, the uptake of renewables will be achieved, not 
by climate change or renewables targets, but by direct 
funding and financial support over the time-scale necessary 
for investments. Extensive exploitation of renewable 
sources will require substantial funding by the Scottish and 
UK Governments in conjunction with the regulator Ofgem, 
given the integrated nature of the electricity market. How 
renewables are funded is a political decision but one which 
requires a balance between potentially “picking winners” on 
the one hand and effectively encouraging only the 
technology closest to market (a consequence of a 
“technology blind” approach). In the UK, renewables are 
substantially supported by the Renewable Obligation 
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scheme which the Scottish government helps coordinate 
with other administrations and which Ofgem administers. 
This is a trading scheme that requires electricity suppliers to 
provide a certain amount of renewable power or face a 
penalty. The “banding” of ROCs was introduced by the UK 
Government to provide greater funding for newer 
technologies and by making them more cost competitive, to 
allow them to develop faster. The Scottish Government 
have gone even further and modified the ROC scheme so 
that wave and tidal energy receive greater funding in 
Scotland, than at UK level. At UK level wave and tidal power 
receive 2 ROCs per MW/hr but in Scotland wave now 
receives the equivalent of 5 ROCs per MW/hr and tidal 
receives 3 ROCs per MW/hr. This enhanced banding is 
particularly important for the marine energy sector, and may 
make tidal power comparable in costs to that of onshore 
wind (Allan et al, 2010c). However, it is not yet clear how 
this differential incentive is to be funded. Also, in April 2010 
a UK-wide feed-in Tariff scheme (FiTs) was introduced to 
provide support for small-scale electricity generators22. The 
downside of this type of funding for renewables is that most 
of the high support costs are passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher energy prices. The Scottish Government also 
provides support through other schemes, funds and prizes 
to promote renewables, such as the Saltire Prize. 
 
 
Overall, there are limited powers available to the Scottish 
Government to achieve its substantial climate change goal 
of effecting a 42% reduction in emissions by 2020. Why the 
Scottish Climate Change Act set an emissions reduction 
target which differs from the UK target, is not entirely 
obvious. It does not appear to be purely a supply-side 
decision as 42% is a very ambitious target that will not 
necessarily be easily met on current trends and maybe 
therefore require the purchase of offset credits. It may 
reflect a political stance in Scotland that is more sympathetic 
towards environmental objectives. One possibility is that, 
given the limited instruments available to the Scottish 
Government, in order to achieve their goals they are 
seeking to influence authorities, such as the UK 
Government, that do have more powerful instruments 
available. By setting the demanding 42% reduction target 
the Scottish Government may be seeking to influence UK 
policy.  
 
 
One possible option would be for the Scottish Government 
to change the nature of the targets, or supplement them with 
additional targets focussed solely upon emissions generated 
within Scottish borders.  Although this change goes against 
the principle of the EU ETS, in which the geographic 
location of emissions reductions is essentially irrelevant, it 
would provide a direct measure of emissions reductions 
within Scotland’s borders. Clearly, in this case Scotland’s 
new 80% renewables target may influence actual domestic 
CO2 emissions, while not contributing to the UK’s emissions 
reduction target. 
 
6.  Conclusions and further research 
The aspiration of Scottish climate change policy, as 
expressed in their targets, is world leading. Currently the 
Scottish climate change framework is more ambitious than 
the UK counterpart. It includes international aviation and 
shipping, is independent of the EU framework and it sets 
annual targets. These make the Scottish framework tougher 
but less flexible than its UK equivalent. The Scottish targets 
will be more difficult to achieve but, if achieved, then this 
framework could provide an appropriate contribution to 
Scotland’s effort towards mitigating global climate change. 
These targets may also indirectly provide a credible 
incentive for substantial investment in renewable energy in 
Scotland,though direct funding for renewables is more 
appropriate in achieving this goal. If targets are missed 
regularly they will begin to lose credibility. Then measures 
such as banking, borrowing, using credits and adopting less 
frequent targets, should be taken to create more flexibility in 
meeting the targets. However, it is not clear that the Scottish 
Government actually has sufficient policy instruments to 
ensure achievement of its emissions reduction targets. 
 
One major issue currently is that the Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act does not allow for the contribution of 
renewables towards the emissions reduction targets. 
Scotland’s electricity sector is part of the EU ETS traded 
sector and as such emissions that “count” here are not 
Scotland’s actual emissions from electricity generation but 
their share under the EU ETS. The Scottish Government 
has other energy policy goals of security of supply, price 
and economic growth. It has specific policies on achieving 
growth through renewables, with an 80% renewables target 
by 2020, and also phasing-out nuclear power, a decision at 
odds with emissions reductions given nuclear may be a 
cheap low-carbon option. Scotland has the potential to 
utilise and create new industries for low-carbon 
technologies. Large-scale deployment of technologies such 
as onshore and offshore wind, as well as a marine energy, 
could help promote a diverse and potentially lucrative 
renewable energy sector. However, given the current costs, 
these infant industries will require substantial support and 
funding from the Scottish and UK Governments through 
mechanisms such as ROCs. These must be set 
appropriately to induce the levels of investment necessary 
to meet the renewables targets. It is likely that costs from 
increasing renewable penetration will be passed onto 
consumers in the form of higher energy prices. Carbon 
capture and storage also has a role to play in helping to limit 
emissions from dirtier sources and there is also a potential 
for a growing worldwide industry too. CCS will require 
substantial development support to make it large-scale and 
regulation to enforce its adoption but ultimately it is not a 
long-term option. 
 
Many determinants of emissions are beyond Scottish 
Government control e.g. energy prices, the EU ETS price 
and tax raising capabilities reserved to the UK Government. 
Therefore, should Scotland have its own climate change 
targets at all? The answer is probably no. Given that they do 
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however, the Scottish Government must use the powers 
they have, such as planning permission, encouragement for 
renewables and efficiency benchmarking in the non-traded 
sectors, to maximum effect if they are to achieve the targets 
they have set. Perhaps it could set targets that are more 
obviously linked to the available instruments, specifically on 
the non-traded sector. Of course, the absence of 
instruments does not imply that the targets will not be 
achieved: they may be but as a consequence of forces 
outside the Scottish Government’s control e.g. a prolonged 
period of low growth or a warm winter. Therefore it is 
important to know why and how targets are met. While there 
is a lack of instruments presently the Scottish Government 
may seek to exert influence on those that do have the 
necessary instruments or there may be a possible argument 
for granting more powers to the Scottish Government by 
extending the devolution agreement. Another option would 
be to change or supplement the accounting of emissions 
within the Scottish framework, to make it those emissions 
produced within Scotland’s border than count towards the 
target and preferably make sure all GHGs are included 
within these targets.  
 
This paper is intended to provide a brief summary of the 
main issues that are specific to climate change policy in 
Scotland. We think it is far from clear that Scotland currently 
has the range of instruments that it would require to achieve 
its own targets. If this is the case then there are only a few 
solutions. One response may be for the Scottish 
Government to push for more instruments and this could be 
done by extending the powers afforded to them through 
devolution. Another response would be to either reduce the 
targets and thereby making them easier to meet, or to set 
different targets that the Scottish Government has more 
control over. What is quite clear is that it would be useful to 
extend evidence base relating to the feasibility, and likely 
costs, of any climate change policies. The CCC and DECC 
are considering some of these in detail. It would be useful, 
for example, to develop an energy-environment-economy 
model of the economy to simulate system-wide effects of 
changes in policy instruments through to the final goal 
outcomes.  
 
____________________ 
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Voluntary programs are an increasing part of the 
environmental policy portfolio. These voluntary programs 
attempt to reduce environmental impacts through emission 
reduction pledges, improve the environmental awareness of 
firms or provide information to the public. A more novel use 
of voluntary programs has involved the acceleration of 
technology diffusion of environmentally beneficial 
technologies to overcome typical problems like lack of 
technical information, principal-agent problems or to lower 
the threshold of network externalities. However, this type of 
voluntary program is what will be needed for firms and 
councils to comply with the UK Climate Change Act of 2008 
and/or the Climate Change (Scotland) Act of 2009. These 
Acts require medium and large public and private sector 
institutions to meet an emissions cap that is more stringent 
than the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.  
 
One technology with a high potential for carbon emission 
reductions is combined-heat-and-power (CHP), also known 
as cogeneration. When combustion boilers burn fuels like 
oil, gas, and coal to spin a turbine for electricity generation, 
the generated heat usually dissipates without further use. 
CHP utilizes the excess heat from the combustion process 
and generates electrical or mechanical power from it. This 
means that more energy is created with the same amount of 
fuel. The overall efficiency gains depend on the type of CHP 
system and fuel used. For example a 5MW natural gas 
turbine on average increases overall efficiency from 49% to 
75% when employing CHP; which is a comparable increase 
to applications for steam, diesel and gas turbines. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change considers 
CHP as a key technology for carbon mitigation due to its 
improved efficiency. An additional benefit of CHP systems is 
that it allows for generation to be distributed amongst the 
consumers, which can increase the efficiency of the 
electricity generation and distribution system (Strbac, 2008). 
Improved energy efficiency is a pillar of many governments’ 
policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2009) argues strongly for 
the potential of efficiency improvements to reduce energy 
use and related emissions. Within the European Union, the 
20-20-20 targets for member states are to reduce energy 
consumption by 20% through increased energy efficiency. 
 
The potential for reduced emissions at low costs has led 
many countries to introduce policies that encourage CHP 
adoption.  Germany, for example, aims to increase its share 
of CHP in electricity generation to 25%. A number of U.S. 
states count CHP as a “renewable” technology in their 
renewable portfolio standard legislation as well as providing 
tax credits or grants for the adoption of CHP.  
 
The US Environmental Protection Agency’s Combined Heat-
and-Power Partnership (CHPP) was established in 2001 
and represents this new application of voluntary programs 
(US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Designed as 
a multi-sector federal voluntary program, it aims to facilitate 
the diffusion of CHP systems by giving early-stage 
consulting support to firms, public recognition as well as by 
providing a platform for contacts and knowledge transfer. 
Additionally the partnership brings various groups together 
to promote knowledge about CHP through workshops, 
conferences and web seminars. Currently there are 369 
partners including federal, state and local government 
agencies as well as private organizations like energy users 
and producers, service companies, CHP project developers, 
consultants and manufacturers. When joining, partners 
agree to designate a liaison for the partnership and to report 
data on existing and planned CHP projects. 
 
Analysis 
Given the goals and structure of CHPP two hypotheses are 
to be discussed here. The first is whether the partnership 
has encouraged the installation of CHP applications and the 
second whether it has assisted knowledge transfers and 
spillovers that helped to increase CHP utilization. The first 
question is addressed by applying a conditional logistic 
probability model on a panel data set for large boilers in the 
United States. For the second question, we test whether the 
CHPP facilitates knowledge transfers that increased the 
efficiency and use of cogeneration in plants which have 
installed the technology. For this purpose we construct a 
variable to capture the usage of CHP to test for an increase 
in utilization and efficiency due to the program. The main 
data set used for the analysis is the US Energy Information 
Administration Form 906/920, which comprises a sample of 
large boilers in the electricity industry for the years 2001 
through 2008. Table 1 gives the number of CHP systems 
installed each year in the data. Since the data start in 2001, 
we are not able to determine the year CHP systems 
installed before 2001 are installed.    
 
A conditional logistic probability model estimates the 
probability of CHP installation at a given plant depending on 
factors that influence the installation decision. These include 
partnership in CHPP, the main fuel consumed, plant size, 
electricity prices, location, state renewable portfolio 
standards (comparable to Renewable Obligation Certificates 
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Table 1:  CHP installations by year 
 
 
 
 
in the UK), and other support measures at the state level. 
This probability is estimated for each plant in each year on 
the condition that the given plant has not installed CHP in a 
previous period. As soon as a plant has installed, the 
observations for this plant are dropped from the data set as 
otherwise the installation decision will be re-evaluated by 
the model for the next year although the plant already 
adopted the technology. In this case the estimates would be 
biased. 
 
The data contain over 2700 plants with almost 1000 of them 
having installed a CHP system at some point in the sample. 
As there may be selection bias in the choice of firms to join 
CHPP, the partnership decision was instrumented for using 
membership in other voluntary programs, firm size, and 
number of previous CHP systems installed at the firm. 
Partnership in CHPP is positively associated with 
installation, though statistical significance varies with the 
control variables included. Results also show that smaller 
coal plants and large gas plants are the most likely plants to 
install CHP. Higher electricity prices are also associated 
with installation of CHP systems. Surprisingly, state 
renewable portfolio standards are found to not statistically 
alter installation behavior. 
 
Next, the data is analyzed to determine factors that lead to 
utilization of the CHP system. The model assumes that 
partnership in CHPP, state renewable portfolio standards, 
the main fuel consumed, plant size, electricity and fuel 
prices, and other controls explain utilization. Panel data 
methods are used since utilization is available for each year 
that a CHP system is in use. 
 
The hypothesis for the improvement of utilization from 
knowledge transfers and spillovers due to the program is 
supported by the data. This utilization analysis, in 
comparison to the previous method, includes observations 
only for plants in the data set that have CHP installed. We 
find that the CHPP has a significant effect on the usage of 
CHP at partner institutions compared to non-partners. This 
effect decreases (relative to non-partners) the longer the 
firm is in the partnership. There could be a number of 
explanations for this, perhaps all firms learn more about 
their CHP system as they use it but the partner firms acquire 
this knowledge quicker than non-partner. At this point we do 
not know what the reason is for the convergence in 
utilization among firms.  Other factors that also have an 
influence on the utilization and which serve as controls in 
the analysis include the following: Plant size, electricity price 
and state environmental portfolio standards have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on usage. On the other 
hand utilization of CHP is negatively affected by the 
deregulation of electricity markets. Finally, coal plants tend 
to use their systems more than oil or gas plants. 
 
Voluntary programs which encourage the adoption and 
diffusion of clean energy technology are of great interest to 
policymakers. There are many ways to structure such 
programs, so it is important to consider pathways which lead 
to diffusion.  The CHPP provides partners with information 
about the benefits of adopting CHP and then provides 
platforms for those interested to continue exchanging 
knowledge. Given this framework, two analyses are 
undertaken to determine whether CHPP has encouraged 
installation and utilization of the CHP systems in its 
partners.  The findings are generally positive, though not 
always robust to alternative econometric models and 
specifications.   
____________________ 
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Introduction  
 
An overview of the problem of ‘rebound’ 
effects 
Greenhouse gas (and other pollutant) emissions from 
energy use are now taken to be a problem both 
internationally and for individual national and regional 
governments. A number of mechanisms are being employed 
to reduce energy consumption demand. A central one is 
increased efficiency in the use of energy. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the 
United Nations (IPCC, 2007) projects that by 2030 energy 
efficiency gains will provide a substantial part of the remedy 
for climate change by reducing global energy consumption 
to approximately 30% below where it would otherwise be. 
Such a reduction is argued to be almost sufficient to offset 
energy consumption increases driven by projected global 
economic growth. Similarly the widely cited Stern report 
(Stern, 2007), and the International Energy Agency (e.g. 
IEA, 2009), attach crucial importance to the potential for 
efficiency improvements to reduce energy use and related 
emissions. Within the European Union, one of the EU 20-
20-20 targets for member states is to reduce energy 
consumption by 20% through increased energy efficiency 
(see, for example, European Commission, 2009). Moreover, 
the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) 
– see, for example, European Commission (2010) – places  
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energy efficiency at the centre of its Smart Cities and 
European Electricity Grid Initiatives (among the European 
Industrial Initiatives (EII)). At the UK level, the UK Energy 
White Paper (2003) describes energy efficiency as one of 
the most cost effective and safest ways of addressing 
energy and climate policy objectives. In Scotland, the 
recently published ‘Energy Action Plan’, the Scottish 
Government sets out Scotland’s first national target to 
improve energy efficiency and how this will be achieved with 
the use of grants given to local authorities.  In the Appendix 
to this paper, for the reader’s information, we provide a 
summary overview of energy efficiency policy instruments 
currently active within the UK and Scotland. 
 
However, the straightforward link between increased energy 
efficiency and reduced energy consumption has been 
questioned. This is due to the notion of the ‘rebound effect’. 
Rebound occurs when improvements in energy efficiency 
actually stimulate the direct and indirect demand for energy 
in production and/or consumption. It is triggered by the fact 
that an increase in the efficiency in the use of energy acts to 
reduce the implicit price of energy, or the price of effective 
energy services for each physical unit of energy used 
(Jevons, 1865; Khazzoom 1980; Brookes 1990; Herring, 
1999; Birol and Keppler, 2000; Saunders, 1992, 2000a,b; 
Schipper, 2000). The rebound effect implies that measures 
taken to reduce energy use might lead to increases in 
carbon emissions, or at least not offset them to the extent 
anticipated. The question of whether rebound provides a 
possible explanation as to whether UK energy use at the 
macro level has not reduced in line with energy efficiency 
improvements is raised in a report by the UK House of 
Lords (2005). Following this report, the UK Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC) conducted a review of evidence 
on energy efficiency and rebound, published in UKERC 
(2007), and later in 2007 the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council, ESRC, funded the current project to 
investigate economy-wide rebound effects using multi-
sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling 
techniques. Previous non-technical papers on the key 
findings of this research, published in the Fraser 
Commentary and in the Welsh Economic Review, can be 
found in Turner (2009b), Turner et al et al (2009, 2010). 
 
The purpose of the current paper is to clarify some issues 
relating to the phenomenon of rebound effects. The paper 
originates from an interview with the Principle Investigator, 
Dr Karen Turner (University of Stirling, formerly of the 
University of Strathclyde) by Maggie Koerth-Baker, a 
science journalist working on a book for Wiley & Sons about 
the future of energy in the United States. The following is 
not a precise transcript of that interview; rather it picks out 
and develops key issues from the questions posed and the 
answers given.  
  
MKB (Question). My understanding, after doing some 
reading, is that the situation that led to Jevons' famous 
observation (the Jevons Paradox – see Jevons 1865; 
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Brookes, 1990) was a little more complicated than 
simply an issue of one technology improvement directly 
lowering price of coal, which directly increased use. 
That is, there were specific applications of the improved 
engine that really mattered to the effect and a lot more 
factors going into it. Is my understanding correct? And 
how does that impact debates about backfire/Jevons 
Paradox today? 
 
KT (Answer). There are two important points here. First, 
rebound is basically driven by the change in an implicit or 
effective price, not an actual market price (though this may 
be affected as well). Jevons’s basic point was that if we 
increase the efficiency with which we use any factor of 
production, we lower its implicit price. That is, in the case of 
energy, we get more energy services from a given input of 
energy, thereby lowering the price of the former, if not the 
latter. This, like any price change, will trigger a positive 
demand response and it is the strength of this demand 
response both directly and indirectly (knock on effects 
throughout the economy) that gives us rebound. Thus, 
rebound occurs as a result of the upward pressure on 
demand for energy, which will partially or even wholly offset 
the initial efficiency effect (decreased demand as less 
energy is required to maintain a given level of production or 
consumption).  
 
Therefore, the change in the implicit price of energy when 
efficiency is improved in its use is what triggers both direct 
and also economy-wide rebound effects (the former 
affecting the change in energy use by the producer or 
consumer whose efficiency has increased, the latter 
affecting what happens to energy use at the economy wide 
level). The key point is that the implicit price change is the 
source of rebound effects. The complications come in terms 
of just how that implicit price is affected by an energy 
efficiency improvement. For example, factors such as the 
costs involved in implementing an efficiency improvement 
may limit the fall in the implicit price.  
 
A second issue is that Jevons seemed to be more 
concerned about the extreme case of rebound, commonly 
referred to as ‘backfire’, where the demand response to the 
change in the implicit price of energy is so strong that there 
is a net increase in energy use. This is a less likely outcome 
than partial rebound, but it is an important one, because it 
entirely negates the energy (and pollution) saving properties 
of energy efficiency improvements (if not the economic 
benefits). Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
circumstances under which rebound may grow into backfire 
and to consider any complicating factors.  
 
MKB (Question).  My understanding is that a lot of the 
evidence for full backfire comes from economic 
modeling using computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
as a basis. Skip Laitner at the American Council for an 
Energy Efficiency Economy (ACEEE) has some 
interesting criticisms of that basis (see Laitner, 2000), in 
particular that it assumes purely rational behaviour that 
we don't actually see in real-life consumers, and thus 
isn't likely to show real-world applicable results in a 
model. I'm curious about your perspective on that.  
 
KT (Answer). Again, there are two issues here. First, it is not 
only CGE models that generally assume rationality. 
However, it is possible to build in representation of, for 
example, irrational or habitual behaviour into economic 
models – for example, treatments of inertia that prevents 
uptake of energy efficiency improvements and/or changes in 
behaviour in response to changes in prices - where it is 
appropriate or useful to do so. More generally, if behaviour 
is affected by factors such as bounded rationality, imperfect 
information, it is important to understand such behaviours 
and identify appropriate analytical frameworks. 
 
Secondly, yes, rebound will grow when we take a wider 
range of economic responses into account, as we do in 
considering economy-wide rebound effects. However, our 
evidence for backfire (a net increase in energy use when 
efficiency improves) is quite limited. In the case of Scotland, 
we find that backfire only tends to occur when we have 
increased energy efficiency in the relatively highly energy-
intensive energy supply sectors, particularly where trade 
and competitiveness effects are important (see Turner et al, 
2009; and Turner, 2009b). Generally, backfire requires an 
economy-wide (direct and derived) demand response that is 
highly responsive (more that proportionate) to the initial 
implicit price change.  
 
MKB (Question). The studies that look at specific 
technology areas (home heating or personal 
transportation) and at direct rebound in those areas 
show reasonably low rebound effects, usually on the 
order of 10-40% or so, looking at some reviews done by 
Steve Sorrell (e.g. Sorrell led the UKERC, 2007, study). 
Why are those so different from what CGE modelling 
studies come up with? Is it simply a factor of not 
looking at indirect or economy-wide effects? 
 
KT (Answer). As explained in the last answer, indirect 
and/or economy-wide effects will add to the size of rebound. 
Moreover, economy-wide rebound effects will depend on the 
nature and structure of the economy in question (what type 
of supply and demand linkages, presence of local energy 
supply etc). Therefore, there is no implication that results of 
micro and macro studies are inconsistent. In some cases, 
the direct effects will dominate. For example, one piece of 
work in our project (carried out with Sam Anson from the 
Scottish Government) involved investigating the impacts of 
increased energy efficiency in the Scottish commercial 
transport sector (Sam wrote his MSc dissertation in this 
area, which we then developed into a paper – see Anson 
and Turner (2009) and also Turner et al (2010). Here we 
found that, aside from some key impacts on the Scottish 
refined oil supply sector, economy-wide rebound effects 
were not very big. Instead, the own sector effects (energy 
use within the Scottish commercial transport sector itself) 
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dominated and our rebound estimates were similar in 
magnitude to what had been found in micro studies. 
 MKB (Question). Is it possible to measure direct 
rebound in reality in a more accurate way? What would 
we have to know in order to do that? What about 
indirect? It seems almost impossible to tease out of all 
the different variables and unknowns? 
 
KT (Answer). Many studies use econometric techniques to 
examine the key relationship for direct rebound, which is the 
price responsiveness (or price elasticity) of demand in 
response to the change in the implicit price of energy. CGE 
studies also use empirical techniques to consider economy-
wide rebound. However, in specifying CGE models, 
knowledge of the responsiveness of direct and indirect 
(derived) demands to changes in the implicit price of energy, 
and the knock on effects on other prices (e.g. the actual 
price of output in sectors where there is an efficiency 
improvement will fall) is crucial. This can be problematic 
(see Turner, 2009a) and is a focus of our continued 
research in this area. 
 
However, the key issue is understanding causality. This 
won’t just be in terms of changes in prices and demand. 
Speaking to UK policymakers at the UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, DECC, we understand that the 
gap between expected and actual energy savings when 
energy efficiency increases will not only be due to rebound1. 
There will also be issues such as whether equipment works 
as anticipated (i.e. in terms of the desired efficiency 
improvement actually being realised). Therefore, it is 
important to consider all the causal process that may occur 
in response to an increase in energy efficiency, whether 
they only partly delay its implementation, or whether there 
are likely to be lasting rebound effects as prices (and 
incomes) change throughout the system.  
 
In terms of disentangling effects, this can be difficult 
because different effects will be interdependent. For 
example, if energy efficiency improves in production the first 
(and direct) response to the resulting fall in the implicit price 
of energy will be a substitution effect away from other inputs 
in favour of energy. This allows the price of output to fall in 
that sector and the other sectors that purchase its outputs 
as inputs to their own production. This in turn triggers 
positive competitiveness effects, which further stimulate 
rebound (as activity levels increase) and also GDP growth. 
However, if the initial substitution effects are weak, this will 
limit the size of the positive competitiveness effects, and so 
on.  
 
MKB (Question). In your work, you mention several 
issues in modelling and calculating rebound/backfire 
effects that aren't widely taken into account, like supply 
side responses. Are there other factors that aren't being 
widely considered? Do these unconsidered factors tend 
to push more towards full backfire or away from it? 
 
KT (Answer). The focus of our research on this project has 
been to consider the economy-wide effects that impact on 
the rebound effect. However, while the wider literature has 
tended to focus on the additional demand responses to the 
price (and income effects) that drive rebound, our research 
on the ESRC First Grant has had something of a more novel 
focus by investigating the importance of supply-side effects. 
We have looked at two types of supply-side effect. First, we 
have focussed in all our analyses on the role of labour and 
capital markets in allowing the economy to expand (or not), 
thus making them important determinants of economy-wide 
rebound.  
 
Second, we have also looked at the response of local 
energy supply sectors. We have looked at two specific 
effects here. First, where there is local supply of energy in 
the form of, for example, locally generated electricity or 
locally refined oil, the initial reduction in demand for energy 
in response to increased energy efficiency (as less energy is 
required to maintain a given level of production or 
consumption) will put downward pressure on the actual as 
well as the implicit price of energy. This may cause what we 
have referred to as ‘disinvestment’ effects (Anson and 
Turner, 2009; Turner, 2009a; Turner et al 2010). To explain, 
if demand is sufficiently responsive, then any decrease in 
actual energy prices will exacerbate rebound. However, if 
demand is not sufficiently responsive, then revenues and 
profits will fall in local energy supply sectors, which will 
lower the return on capital and cause a contraction in 
capacity in these sectors. This tightness in local energy 
supply will drive output prices back up, and this will act to 
constrain rebound over the longer run.  
 
We have also found that as a result of the initial contraction 
in demand for energy as efficiency increases, negative 
multiplier effects may also act to offset economy-wide 
rebound, potentially to the extent that energy savings at the 
macro level are larger than may have been anticipated. 
Negative multiplier effects occur because as demand falls 
for the output of local energy supply sectors less inputs are 
required to produce a lower output level. This will trigger 
negative multiplier effects back down the supply chain (in 
the production sectors where outputs are used as 
intermediate inputs to production). Given that energy supply 
sectors tend to be relatively energy-intensive, these 
negative multiplier effects are likely to be particularly 
important in energy supply itself (see Turner, 2009a). The 
key issue is whether negative multiplier effects are large 
enough to entirely offset rebound effects so that total energy 
use in the economy contracts. In our research we have 
found evidence for such ‘negative rebound’ effects at the UK 
level. However, negative multiplier effects seem to be of 
less importance in the Scottish case, probably due to the 
greater trade in energy (which stimulates demand to a 
greater extent as prices fall).  
 
Another important issue that has emerged from our 
research (and one which we have only recently begun 
working on) is that there is a difference in terms of how 
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energy efficiency improvements in consumption activity 
(such as household energy use) transmit to the wider 
economy relative to what happens if efficiency increases in 
production. In the latter case, increases in the efficiency with 
which any input is used will act as a productivity increase, 
stimulating competitiveness and GDP along with energy 
use. That is, it takes the form of a positive supply-side 
shock. However, in the case of household use of energy, 
increased efficiency acts a demand disturbance. The 
disinvestment and negative multiplier effects abo e are 
again important as reduced demand for energy in the 
household sector, and in the wider economy as the demand 
contraction spreads, will impact on revenues and activity 
levels in local energy supply. However, the net impact on 
economic activity in general and energy use in particular 
depends on how households spend the money that they 
save as they increase energy efficiency. If they demand 
more energy, rebound will grow, but if they demand other, 
non-energy, goods and services then the economy may 
grow with more limited rebound (see Druckman et al, 2009, 
for research into the issue of how households may redirect 
their spending). However, demand shifts change prices 
throughout the economy, with the implication that domestic 
demand may crowd out export demand (where there is 
upward pressure on prices). 
 
MKB (Question). You mention in your work that 
rebound and backfire effects vary by technology and 
location and have to be considered on individual policy 
decision basis. Why would it vary by location? Don't 
consumers behave fairly similarly throughout the 
Western world?  
 
KT (Answer). It may be that direct rebound may be expected 
to be similar among consumers across the Western world 
(though even within a single country things like income 
levels will matter). This is because direct rebound is likely to 
depend largely on behavioural responses. However, indirect 
and economy-wide rebound effects depend on the structure 
of economic activity. For example, when we have looked at 
Scotland and the UK, even where we set up our model so 
that parameters governing direct rebound (e.g. how 
producers substitute between energy and other inputs in 
production in the sector targeted with the efficiency 
improvement) are identical, we get quite different economy-
wide rebound effects. This is due to the different structure 
and composition of economic activity at the economy-wide 
level in general, particularly (but not exclusively) the 
importance and openness to trade of the Scottish energy 
supply sectors relative to their national counterparts.  
 
MKB (Question).  What does all of this mean for the idea 
that we can use efficiency to mitigate the economic 
impact of combating climate change? Does rebound 
effect necessarily kill ideas of decoupling economic 
growth from GHG emissions?  
 
KT (Answer). No. Only the extreme case of rebound 
(backfire) where there is a net increase in energy 
consumption in response to increased energy efficiency will 
cause energy use and related emissions to rise with GDP. 
Where rebound is less than 100% (which is most cases in 
our work and in the wider literature), this means that we will 
not realise one for one energy savings in response to an 
efficiency improvement. Particularly, where increased 
energy efficiency takes place in on the production side of 
the economy (so that it takes the form of a productivity 
improvement), even some reduction in energy use produces 
what we may refer to as a ‘double dividend’: increased 
economic growth with falling pollution levels. Generally, 
where energy efficiency improvements lower prices and 
improve competitiveness, and so long as we do not 
encounter increased energy use and emissions through 
backfire, this must be a positive outcome. However, the 
GHG emission issue is of course an important one in the 
context of rebound and provides an important context for 
further research. We have begun to look at this in particular 
in a new paper that is forthcoming in Energy Economics 
(Turner and Hanley, 2010).  
 
MKB (Question). What role can coupling energy 
efficiency technologies with automation play in 
reducing direct rebound effects? For instance, if I get a 
more energy efficient heater, but I have it linked up with 
programmable thermostats aren't I less likely to end up 
using more heat?  
 
KT (Answer). This is a very important issue. In the current 
project we haven’t got to the point of looking at specific 
technologies. However, rebound properties of any specific 
energy efficiency improvement will depend not only on costs 
of introducing efficiency improvements, but also on how well 
energy users are able to recognise and respond to the 
implicit price change. For example, if a household 
purchases a more energy efficient fridge, the price effect is 
automatic and will be reflected in the next electricity bill. On 
the other hand, if a household installs loft insulation, they 
need to undertake further activity, such as appropriate 
adjustments to thermostats/heating controls, before the 
efficiency improvement and subsequent price effect are 
realised. We’ve identified this type of issue as a core focus 
for future research (we have an application with colleagues 
at the Universities of Stirling and Strathclyde, most of whom 
are contributors elsewhere in this special issue, submitted to 
the European Research Council to continue our rebound 
research into a number of the areas discussed here).  
 
MKB (Question). What role can coupling energy 
efficiency technologies with information play? I'm 
thinking, in particular, about computer feedback 
systems designed to show you how much energy 
you're using compared to various times in the past. Do 
we know how people respond if they're made aware of 
the fact that they're rebounding?  
 
KT (Answer). Again, I think this is a very important question, 
and it links back to the previous one. In the examples given 
above, people find out quite quickly about the savings they 
PAGE 40 SPECIAL ISSUE  NO 1 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
make from installing a more energy efficient fridge, so this is 
the point at which they will make decisions on how to use 
the income freed up from their electricity bill. Therefore it is 
also a point at which information may be useful to them 
about the implications of rebounding by using more energy 
(and perhaps incentives put in place to prevent them from 
doing so). However, in the other example, where people 
have to adjust their behaviour after they install loft 
installation, there is also the issue that (due to a 
combination of habit and lack of information) they may 
continue to spend too much on heating (i.e. not realising the 
full energy savings that are possible, and/or getting to the 
point of rebound). In such circumstances technologies such 
as smart meters may help people make informed decisions 
to adjust their behaviour and realise potential energy 
savings. The bigger job is influencing how they spend the 
funds freed up when efficiency improves. There may be a 
role for policy here. For example, also on the production 
side of the economy, incentives may be required to induce 
energy users to realise the full energy savings that are 
possible (especially when it may lower total 
consumption/production costs to use more energy, given 
that its implicit price has fallen).   
 
MKB (Question). Cap and trade and carbon taxes have 
also been discussed as a way to counteract rebound 
effect. Do you see one or the other as being more 
effective in this way? Also, when we use these policies 
we're basically setting incentives for people to use less 
energy. The cheapest way to use less energy is 
efficiency. Why doesn't that stall rebound or backfire 
even under these policies?  
 
KT (Answer). Basically anything that offsets the decrease in 
the implicit price of energy that triggers rebound will act 
counteract it. However, there are two important issues to 
consider. First, particularly in production, where the lowering 
of the implicit price of energy triggers a productivity 
improvement, rebound is not necessarily a bad thing (only 
the extreme case of backfire increases energy use and 
emissions). It just means we have to work harder at 
achieving desired energy savings (e.g. energy efficiency 
targets may have to be proportionately larger than energy 
reduction ones to allow for rebound). If there is a need to 
prevent rebound, taxes are a possibility. However, carbon 
tax is perhaps a bit too indirect, that is it would be better to 
focus directly on the energy use where the price change 
occurs. Revenues could be partly used to bring energy 
efficiency improving technologies to the market (this is 
already done in the case of the UK Climate Change Levy). 
Nonetheless, taxes are distortive and it is difficult to design 
an optimal tax to address something as specific as the 
change in energy prices as a result of efficiency 
improvements (particularly where actual as well as implicit 
prices change). Before taking such a step, and to preserve 
the full economic benefits of improved efficiency, it would be 
useful for policymakers to consider the type of information 
issues discussed above. That is, try to help people 
understand the issues involved and encourage them to 
adjust their own behaviour voluntarily. 
 
Closing comments 
The objective of this paper has been to use the Q&A format 
of the interview designed by Maggie Koerth-Baker to 
communicate key issues regarding the rebound effect and 
key findings from the ESRC First Grant project in a non-
technical manner. A full set of outputs from the project can 
be found on the ESRC Today web-site URL below). 
However, interested readers may address questions directly 
to Karen Turner at karen.turner@stir.ac.uk. 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/viewaward
page.aspx?awardnumber=RES-061-25-0010 
 
____________________ 
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Endnote 
1The project team made a presentation on energy efficiency and 
rebound effects to the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) on Monday 20th September 2010. Following the 
presentations, a round-table discussion was held with DECC 
analysts.   
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Appendix 
 
Summary of energy efficiency policies in the 
UK 
The Sustainable Energy Act 2003 required the UK 
Government to publish a statutory aim for residential energy 
efficiency in the UK. This requirement was fulfilled in the 
2004 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, which set out to save 
3.5 million tonnes of carbon per year by 2010 through 
energy efficiency measures in the household sector. The 
range of measures implemented by the UK Government are 
summarised below. 
 
 
Table A.1 Policy levers and examples of energy efficiency policies 
 
 
Instrument   Examples
Regulation
Building Regulations, The Home Energy 
Conservation Act 1995
Grants and Fiscal Incentives
Code for Sustainable Homes, Energy 
Efficiency Commitment,  Carbonn Emissions 
Reduction Target, Supplier Obligation,,  The 
Warm Front Scheme, Improving the energy 
efficiency of our homes and buildings
Information and Awareness Raising
 Energy Certificates and air‐conditioning 
inspections for building, Supplier Obligation 
(metering and labelling), Energy Saving Trust 
programmes, Energy Performance 
Certificates, Labelling, Billing and Metering
Levers to Reduce Household Energy Consumption
 
 
Regulation 
Building Regulations (England and Wales) 2002 
  
Building Regulations (England and Wales) 2005/6 
 
Part L of the regulatory building framework sets the 
standards for energy efficiency measures and practices in 
the construction of new domestic buildings and for 
improvements to existing buildings. For energy efficiency 
measures contained in the building regulations see the link 
below. 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuil
ding/pdf/Energyefficiencyrequirements.pdf. 
 
The Home Energy Conservation Act 1995 
The Home Energy Conservation Act 1995 requires all UK 
energy conservation authorities to prepare an energy 
conservation report indentifying cost effective measures 
likely to result in the energy efficiency of all residential 
accommodation in their area.  
 
Grants and fiscal Incentives 
 
The Code for Sustainable Homes and the 
Energy Efficiency Standard for Zero Carbon 
Homes 
The Code for Sustainable Homes (the Code) is the national 
standard for the sustainable design and construction of new 
homes. It applies in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The Code goes further than the current building regulations, 
but is entirely voluntary, and is intended to help promote 
high standards of sustainable design. The Code sets 
minimum standards for energy and water use at each level 
and, within England, replaces the Eco Homes scheme, 
developed by the Building Research Establishment (BRE). 
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http://www.communities.gov.uk/planningandbuilding/sustain
ability/codesustainablehomes/ 
 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuil
ding/pdf/1415525.pdf 
 
The Warm Front Scheme 
Warm Front (the Scheme) is a key programme of the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (the 
Department) to tackle fuel poverty by improving energy 
efficiency in privately owned properties in England. 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/the_warm_front_sc
heme.aspx 
 
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 
The Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency 
Scheme (CRC) is the UK's mandatory climate change and 
energy saving scheme. It has been designed to raise 
awareness in large organisations, especially at senior level, 
and encourage changes in behaviour and infrastructure. 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/lc_uk/c
rc/crc.aspx 
 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) 
The Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) requires 
all domestic energy suppliers with a customer base in 
excess of 50,000 customers to make savings in the amount 
of CO2 emitted by householders. Suppliers meet this target 
by promoting the uptake of low carbon energy solutions to 
household energy consumers, thereby assisting them to 
reduce the carbon footprint of their homes. 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/consu
mers/saving_energy/cert/cert.aspx 
 
Supplier Obligation 
The Supplier Obligation instrument developed by DEFRA 
gives suppliers and consumers a shared incentive to reduce 
carbon emissions from homes. As a way of providing 
feedback on household energy use directly to each 
household, ‘smart’ meters have been introduced.  A ‘smart’ 
meter replaces the existing meter which can constantly 
monitor energy use and costs. From the supplier 
perspective, the smart meter provides the energy supplier 
with direct feedback on energy use through smart 
communication channels. This means that meters no longer 
have to be read manually.  
 
Supplier obligation requires that the supplier provide 
detailed information where possible (for example on utility 
bills) to highlight where energy savings and improvements 
can be made.  
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/pages/supplier-obligation-
project.html 
 
Information and Awareness Raising 
Improving the energy efficiency of our homes and 
buildings: Energy Certificates and air-conditioning 
inspections for building 
The range of initiatives introduced from January 2009 to 
help improve the energy efficiency in buildings and meet the 
UK's carbon emissions. It covers: energy performance 
Certificates (EPCs) for homes and buildings; display 
Certificates for public buildings; inspections for air 
conditioning systems. 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuil
ding/pdf/714826.pdf 
 
The Energy Saving Trust (EST) 
The Energy Saving Trust (EST) is funded by the UK 
Government to support household energy efficiency 
activities. The EST has several core activities directed at 
household consumers, for example: 
 
1. Implementing Energy Efficiency Advice Centres 
(EEACs) which provide advice to consumers and 
help them to assess their energy use and refer 
them on to any available grant offers. 
 
2. The Sustainable Energy Network (SEN) designed 
by the EST as a key delivery route for more 
effective advice to consumers, engaging 
proactively and enabling individuals to make 
personal commitments to reduce carbon. In 
addition to energy efficiency, SEN’s will promote 
carbon saving through renewables and transport.  
 
3. On-line Home Energy Checks – a personalised 
report showing consumers how much energy and 
money they can save in their home. 
 
4. The Save Your 20% consumer marketing 
campaign, which is a source of information and call 
to action for consumers to reduce their energy use 
and install energy efficiency measures. 
 
5. Accreditation of products under the Energy Saving 
Recommended label. This directs consumers to 
products that save the most energy and 
maintenance of an on-line searchable database of 
energy efficient products. 
 
6. For local authorities and registered social 
landlords, EST administers a number of 
programmes including Practical Help which is a 
tailored source of information and support on 
delivering energy efficiency to their communities. 
 
Labelling 
From an industry perspective the UK continues to work 
closely with the EU commission, supporting a mandatory 
labelling scheme which requires domestic appliances to 
display energy information. This applies to household 
refrigerators and freezers, washing machines, electric 
tumble dryers and air conditioning units.  As well as 
statutory labelling the UK Government is also encouraging 
voluntary actins by industry to provide customer information 
as an alternative to enforced regulation.  
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From a household perspective the UK Government 
promotes metering and billing schemes which aim to raise 
awareness about energy use in the domestic sector to the 
domestic sector. With the support of energy suppliers and in 
line with the measures stated in the Energy White Paper , 
consumers are aided to better understand more about their 
energy use.  
 
Energy Efficiency Policies from the Scottish 
Government 
 
Scotland 
The Scottish Government is committed to reducing carbon 
emissions in line with the UK targets and also to meet the 
Scottish Climate Change Target to reduce emissions by 
80% by 2050. As well as implementing policies and 
measures set at the UK level the Scottish Government has 
also implemented strategies and measures specific for 
Scotland.  
 
Some Scottish measures are implemented in the same 
fashion as those at the UK level. For example, raising 
household awareness and giving advice is in the hands of 
the Scottish Energy Saving Trust (EST).   
 
A short overview of the Scottish Government’s approach to 
energy policy is available from the link below. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/237670/0065265.
pdf 
 
As well as the measures outlined in the document above, 
two agendas published by the Scottish Government outline 
the measures and instruments specific to Scotland that will 
be used to achieve energy efficiency and climate change 
targets. The links to these published agendas are given 
below. 
 
Conserve and Save:  Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan  
Scotland's first national target to improve energy efficiency 
will consist of £10 million in grants to local councils to offer 
free insulation measures and provide energy saving advice 
to 100,000 households. Scotland's Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan includes a headline target to reduce total energy 
consumption by 12 per cent by 2020. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/326979/0105437.
pdf 
 
The Low Carbon Economic Strategy 
The Low Carbon Economic Strategy (LCES) is an integral 
part of the Government’s Economic Strategy to secure 
sustainable economic growth, and a key component of the 
broader approach to meet Scotland’s climate change targets 
and secure the transition to a low carbon economy in 
Scotland. The Strategy has been developed with, Scottish 
Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, Transport 
Scotland, Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Scottish 
Development International, Scottish Funding Council, Skills 
Development Scotland, Visit Scotland and COSLA.  
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/331364/0107855.
pdf 
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Abstract  
In the next two decades Scotland is facing tough 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets as well as the 
upcoming shutdown of a number of existing thermal plants.  
Given the limited timeframe it would seem imperative that 
Scotland’s energy policy is developed with public 
preferences in mind, as political unpopularity and public 
objections, with the associated need for lengthy public 
enquires, are likely to mean that targets are more likely to 
be missed.  As such, appraisal of any potential energy 
option should not be limited to consideration of financial 
viability but should also take full account of environmental 
and social costs.  The primary aim of our study was to 
determine public preferences and willingness to pay for 
alternative energy options, such as wind, nuclear and 
biomass against the current generation mix, all of which 
may form an integral part of the future generation portfolio 
for Scotland.   
 
One method of determining social costs is through stated 
preference techniques, one of which is choice experiments 
– the method applied in the current study.  Our analysis is 
based on a postal survey sent out to a random sample of 
1000 households across Scotland.  People were asked to 
choose between four energy options: wind, biomass, 
nuclear and current energy mix, depending on which energy 
option and associated mix of attributes they prefer.  
Attributes were: distance from respondent’s home, carbon 
emissions reduction, local biodiversity impacts, land 
requirements (a fixed attribute) and an annual electricity bill 
increase (the cost attribute).  Our results suggest that 
carbon-neutral energy options tend to have a positive 
willingness to pay associated with them and be more 
favoured by the population over the current energy mix with 
distance from the respondent’s home, increases in 
biodiversity and increases in energy bill all having a 
significant impact on preferences.  We also found variation 
in preferences according to socio-economic groupings, for 
example respondents with children tend to have a higher 
preference towards renewable technologies than those 
without.   
 
In addition to the overall sample, we also investigated 
divergence in preferences between three areas of Scotland 
(Highlands and Islands; Central; and South).  The results 
indicate that, depending on the geographical location, 
people’s preferences for energy generation technologies 
vary.  Our results suggest that Scottish energy policy need 
not only be planned accounting for public preferences for 
different energy options but also regional divergence of 
preferences within the country. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Energy policy is one of the central issues of the global 
political agenda.  A widely accepted need for greenhouse 
gas reduction in combination with security of supply 
concerns and ever increasing fuel costs means that the 
development of a cost-effective low-carbon energy portfolio 
has become a vital challenge for most countries worldwide, 
to which Scotland is no exception.  
 
This paper attempts to identify public preferences towards 
energy generating options in Scotland.  We investigate 
public attitudes towards three energy-generating options 
(energy from wind, nuclear power and biomass) and 
compare them with the current generation mix.  All of these 
options have the potential to become a major part of 
Scotland’s future low-carbon generation portfolio, so it is 
important that public preferences and social costs 
associated with them are considered and properly 
understood. 
 
This study uses a stated preference approach, namely a 
choice experiment to achieve the above objective.  A 
number of choice experiment studies have been carried out 
worldwide looking at public preferences towards various 
energy-generating options, e.g. Ek (2005) for Sweden, 
Fimereli et al. (2008) for South-East England, Kataria (2009) 
for Sweden, Alverez-Farizo (2002) for Spain, Meyerhoff et 
al. (2009) for Germany, Navrud (2007) for Norway and 
Krueger et al. (2010) for the US.  Much less, however, has 
been published to date with regard to public attitudes 
towards energy-generating options in Scotland.  Perhaps 
the most relevant recent publications on this topic are the 
papers by Bergmann et al. (2005) investigating renewable 
energy investments in Scotland and a follow up paper 
published in 2008 by the same author looking at rural versus 
urban preferences for renewable energy in Scotland. 
 
Our study specifies the energy options as part of a labelled 
choice experiment, to capture public preferences between 
the technologies and includes a nuclear option as part of a 
low-carbon generation mix.  This is something that to our 
knowledge hasn’t been carried out in Scotland before.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows:  Section 
2 gives a brief summary of Scotland’s energy policy and 
current generation mix.  Section 3 outlines the methodology 
and theoretical framework, Section 4 describes the design 
of the current study and discusses attributes and levels in 
more details.  Section 5 presents the results and findings 
and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a final 
summary of the research and a discussion of further 
research and potential policy implications. 
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Scotland’s energy policy and current 
generation mix study design 
By 2020 the European Union is committed to reduce its 
carbon emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels and to 
generate 20% of energy from renewables.  Strict targets 
were also put forward by the recently published ‘UK Low 
Carbon Transition Plan – National strategy for climate and 
energy’, which sets out a plan for the UK to reduce its 
carbon emissions by 34% by 2020 on 1990 levels (White 
Paper, 2009).  The Climate Change Bill passed by the 
Scottish Parliament in 2009 adopted even more ambitious 
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 
2050 with an interim target of 42% by 2020.    
 
The power generation sector is the largest producer of 
carbon dioxide emissions in Scotland accounting for around 
50% of total emissions (Wood Mackenzie, 2009).  As can be 
seen in Figure 1, Scotland currently has 12.1 GW of 
generating capacity, consisting of 3.6 GW of coal generation 
(Longannet and Cockenzie), 1.5 GW of gas (Peterhead), 2.4 
GW of nuclear power (Torness and Hunterston B) and about 
3.7 GW of renewable generation (source: Scottish 
Renewables, 2010).   
 
Figure 1: 
 
 
20%
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Scotland's Total Generation Capacity (12.1 GW) ‐ 2009
Nuclear
Coal
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Oil
Hydro (pumped)
Hydro (conventional)
Other renewables
 
 
Source:  Wood Mackenzie, Scottish renewables, Scottish Government. 
 
 
Major changes, however, are scheduled to happen to the 
Scottish generating portfolio in the next two decades.  One 
of the two remaining Scottish nuclear plants, Hunterston B is 
due to be decommissioned by 2015 at the latest, followed 
by Torness (due to be retired in 2023) (Scottish Energy 
Study, 2006).  Additionally, Scotland’s major coal-fired 
power station Cockenzie has opted out of Large 
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD)1 and will be shut down 
by the end of 2015 (BERR, 2007).  As can be seen from 
Table 1, assuming no new-built and no further 
developments and consents to extend stations life, all 
existing Scottish thermal plant could be phased out by 2030. 
 
All of the above has lead to an urgent need for development 
of the country’s energy policy to fill the upcoming energy 
gap. Given the limited timeframe available to achieve the 
Scottish Government’s targets it would seem to be 
imperative that policy is not politically unpalatable to the 
public, since this would result in the need for extensive 
public consultation, objection and enquiries.  Thus appraisal 
should not be limited to consideration of financial viability 
but should also take full account of environmental and social 
costs.  Therefore the current research aims to identify social 
preference for different future energy options. 
 
3.  Methodology and theoretical framework 
There are two branches of non-market goods valuation: 
revealed and stated preferences methods.  Revealed 
preference methods estimate value of a non-market good by 
studying actual (revealed) preferences.  The two most 
commonly used examples of revealed preference methods 
are travel cost method and hedonic price method (see 
Braden and Kolstad, 1991).  This branch of methods has 
been quite popular in non-market goods valuation, but also 
has a number of drawbacks, amongst which is impossibility 
of estimation of non-use values (Alpizar et al, 2001), more 
specifically social costs associated with a particular energy 
option in our case.  Equally there are issues with using 
revealed preference for future policy analysis in that what 
you want to value does not yet exist so there is nothing 
against which to “reveal preferences”.  The other branch of 
non-market goods valuation methods, and the one which is 
appropriate to the current research, is stated preference 
approaches.  This technique assesses individuals’ stated 
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Table 1:   Major Scottish power plants, 2009 
 
Station  Type  Capacity, GW  Assumed Closure Date 
Cockenzie 
et
Coal  1.2  2015
Longann    Coal  2.4  2020
Peterhead 
Torness 
 B 
Gas 
Nuclear 
1.5 
1.25 
1
2025
2023
2011Hunterston
  
Nuclear  .19 
Cruachan Pump s
s
torage 
torage 
0.4  ‐
Foyers  Pump  0.3  ‐
Several  
Several  
Several  
Hydro 
Wind 
Other renewables 
1.4 
2.1 
0.2 
‐
‐
‐
  
Source:   Scottish Energy Study, 2006
 
behaviour in a hypothetical setting (Alpizar et al, 2001).  
Some examples of stated preference techniques are 
conjoint analysis, contingent valuation and choice 
experiments (for a review see Hanley, Mourato and Wright, 
2001).   
 
Choice Experiment techniques (CE) draw their roots from 
traditional microeconomic theory whereby consumers are 
asked to maximise their utility subject to their budget 
constraint (Eck, 2005).  CEs are based upon the 
characteristics theory of value (Lancaster, 1966), and the 
random utility theory (McFadden, 1974; Manski, 1977).  The 
theory behind choice modelling is well described and 
reviewed by many authors, such as (Adamowicz et al. 1995, 
Hanley et al. 2001, Louviere et al, 2000, Eck, 2005, Birol et 
al., 2006), and the remainder of this section draws heavily 
upon this literature.  
 
The fundamental assumption of choice experiments is 
closely related to hedonic analysis in that consumers derive 
utility from the different characteristics of a good rather than 
from the good itself (Lancaster, 1966).  The utility function 
can be specified as:   
 
Where Uij – is the utility to the individual i, derived from 
alternative j.  In accordance with the random utility 
framework the utility function is decomposed in two parts: a 
deterministic part (V), which represents observed influences 
and a stochastic part (e), representing unobservable 
impacts on individual choice.  X is the linear index of 
observable attributes and socio-economic and policy 
characteristics interacting with these attributes while b is a 
vector of utility parameters to be estimated.   
The probability that a respondent prefers alternative “g” in 
the choice set to an alternative “h”, can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
To calculate this probability, distributions of the error terms 
(eij) should be assessed.   It is generally assumed that error 
terms are independently and identically distributed and 
therefore the probability of an alternative g being preferred 
over an alternative h can be expressed in terms of a logistic 
distribution (McFadden 1973, Hanley 2001):  
 
Once the model has been estimated and if a cost attribute is 
present in the model, implicit prices or marginal willingness 
to pay (WTP) for a change in attribute can then be 
calculated.  This is simply done by dividing a non-monetary 
attribute (for example % reduction in carbon emissions) by 
the monetary (cost) attribute with a negative sign (see for 
example Alpizar et al. 2001 for more details).  
 
One of the difficulties with using the standard conditional 
logit model is the existence of ‘independence from irrelevant 
alternatives’ (IIA) property, stating that relative probabilities 
of two options being selected must be unaffected by the 
introduction or removal of other alternatives (see Luce 
1959).  If a violation of the IIA hypothesis is observed, then 
alternative statistical mixed logit models need to be 
explored, such as the random parameters logit model 
(Train, 1998, Hanley et al. 2001), nested logit model or error 
component model.  
 
Study design 
Our study attempts to estimate public preferences and 
willingness to pay for alternative energy options, such as 
wind, nuclear, biomass and the current generation mix 
(status quo option), all of which may form an integral part of 
future generation portfolio in Scotland.  It is a collaborative 
effort between colleagues from Imperial College London and 
The University of Stirling and as such the piloting of the 
survey and two focus groups interviews were carried by 
Imperial College London (Fimereli et al, 2008).  The next 
section describes in more detail the study design and 
implementation stages: i) survey structure; ii) defining levels 
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and attributes; iii) choice scenario; and iv) sample selection, 
strategy and questionnaire logistics.   
 
4.1  Survey structure 
Respondents were presented with a mailed questionnaire 
survey and a letter stating the reasons behind the survey.  It 
was also explained that the survey was entirely confidential 
and voluntary.  The questionnaire consisted of three main 
parts:   
 
• Part A: “Energy and Environment” contained 
questions on the levels of knowledge about 
different energy options and general attitudes 
towards environmental and energy issues in the 
UK;   
 
• Part B: “Energy Options” contained a choice 
experiment section containing 5 choice cards 
where respondents were asked to choose between 
four energy options: wind, biomass, nuclear and 
the current energy mix, depending on which mix of 
attributes they prefer.  This section explained the 
UK Government’s aim to reduce carbon emissions 
by 2020 and to generate 20% of the UK’s electricity 
from low-carbon energy sources.  Participants 
were given a short description of each of the 
energy options (Wind, Biomass, Nuclear and the 
Current Energy Mix) as well as being supplied with 
a picture for each of the power plant technologies 
(see Figure 2).   
 
 
Figure 2: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
After completing the choice cards respondents 
were asked to answer some follow up questions 
testing the reasons behind the choices they made 
and also some additional questions aimed at 
finding out more about public attitudes towards off-
shore and micro-generation.  This was done to test 
public attitudes towards alternative generation and 
provide a platform for further research. 
 
• Part C: “Respondents / Household Profile” a final 
section containing socio-economic questions about 
respondents’ age, education, work status, number 
of children and income.  In this section 
respondents were reminded that the survey was 
strictly confidential, voluntary and information 
provided would only be used for statistical 
purposes. 
 
4.2 Levels and attributes 
Each of the power generating options in the experiment was 
described in terms of the following attributes: distance from 
respondent’s home (distance), carbon emissions reduction 
(carbon emissions), local biodiversity impacts (biodiversity), 
land requirements (fixed attribute) and an annual electricity 
bill increase (cost attribute).   
 
• Distance from respondents’ home – is the distance 
from the respondent’s home to newly built 
generation sites. 
 
• Carbon Emissions Reduction - is the reduction in 
emissions that future energy options can provide in 
relation to 20% of the UK’s electricity generation.   
 
• Local biodiversity – the impacts on local number of 
species of birds, mammals, insects or plants. 
• Total land – is the amount of land occupied by the 
energy option all over the UK in order to produce 
20% of total UK’s electricity.   
 
• Annual Increase in Electricity Bill – the amount by 
which each household’s annual energy bill will 
increase. 
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Table 2:  Attributes, corresponding variables, levels and coding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Example choice card 
 
EXAMPLE Card 
Characteristics 
Option 1 
Electricity from 
WIND 
Option 2 
Electricity from 
BIOMASS 
Option 3 
Electricity from 
NUCLEAR 
Option 4 
Current 
Energy Mix 
 
Distance 
from home 
6 miles 
[10km] 
0.25 miles 
[400m] 
1 mile 
[1.6km] 
18 miles 
[29km] 
 
Local biodiversity Less More No change Less 
 
Carbon emissions 
for producing 20% of UK electricity 
Reduction by 99% Reduction by 50% Reduction by 95% Reduction by 0% 
Total land 
for producing 20% of UK electricity 
5,832 ha 
Or 7,930 
football fields 
816,000 ha 
Or 1,190,750 
football fields 
568 ha 
Or 772 football 
fields 
1,594 ha 
Or 2,167 
football fields
Annual increase in electricity bill  £143 
 
£40 
 
£67 
 
£0 
Please tick your preferred option ? ? ? ?
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Table 2 contains more detailed information on the attributes 
and its levels and coding. 
 
4.3  Choice alternatives 
As part of the choice experiment respondents were asked to 
choose between four energy-generating alternatives: 
electricity from wind, electricity from biomass, electricity 
from nuclear, electricity form current energy mix.  The latter 
is the ‘status quo’ option against which the other alternatives 
were measured.  All alternatives that participants were 
presented with were labelled.   
 
The experimental design of the choice experiment was 
developed using SPSS 14.0 and followed was a fractional 
factorial main effects design.  Thirty-two choice profiles for 
each alternative were produced in the design.  Thirty choice 
cards were generated randomly and the cards were blocked 
into six blocks of five choice cards.  To minimise ordering 
bias, the order of the attributes between blocks was 
alternated (Fimereli et al, 2008).  In summary each 
respondent was presented with a questionnaire survey 
containing five choice cards.  Each card had four energy 
generating options described in terms of five attributes.  
They were asked to choose only one preferred option.  An 
example of a choice card is presented below. 
 
4.4  Sample selection and questionnaire logistics 
There are different ways of carrying out public surveys such 
as postal, internet based, and face-to-face interviews.  Each 
of these methods has its drawbacks and advantages.  Face-
to-face interviews tend to generate high response rates and 
tend to be more flexible in its implementation, but they are 
relatively expensive.  Postal surveys tend to be cheaper, 
allow respondents to complete questionnaires at their own 
pace and are more easily elicit answers to sensitive 
questions, but they are often criticised for a high chance of a 
‘self-selection bias’ and low response rates (Bennett and 
Blamey, 2001, McFadden et al. 2005).  Internet-based 
surveys tend to also be cheaper and can potentially 
generate high response rates, but they are also subject to a 
self-selection bias and technical limitations for their 
development still exist.  The current study was administered 
through a postal survey.  This method was predominantly 
chosen due to its relative cost-efficiency given the scale of 
the surveyed area.   
 
We have identified areas within Scotland that are 
representative of most of the country, namely  Glasgow, 
Stirling, Fort William, Perth, Dumfries, Oban, Inverness, 
Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Isle of Lewis, Isle of Harris and 
Orkney (these included surrounding rural areas in each 
case).  They were later combined into three distinct groups: 
‘South’, ‘Central’ and ‘Highlands and Islands’ according to 
their geographical characteristics and population density.  
The number of respondents the survey was sent out to was 
scaled according to population size within each area.  The 
survey was sent out to a sample of 1000 households across 
Scotland.  Participants were chosen randomly based on the 
2008 Electoral Register Database.  Three weeks later a 
reminder containing another copy of a questionnaire was 
sent out to all non-respondents.  After accounting for 
returned/undelivered questionnaires, 245 usable or partially 
usable responses were received – a total response rate of 
27%, which is considered to be within the common range for 
mail surveys (e.g. Bateman et al., 2002). 
 
 
Results 
 
5.1  Sample characteristics  
With 46% male, average annual income of £25,000 and 47 
years average age, our sample provides a fairly good 
representation of a typical Scottish householder according 
to the Scottish Household Survey 2007/08.  For more details 
on the comparison see Table 4 below.  
 
We have also estimated the level of information that our 
sample had access to and their level of knowledge of low-
carbon energy options offered in the current study, i.e. wind, 
nuclear and biomass.  The vast majority of people in our 
sample had heard of wind power and nuclear power (96% 
and 88% respectively).  Respondents, however, displayed 
much lower familiarity with biomass technology.   
 
With respect to the type of information that the sample had 
access to from mass media sources, half of the sample 
stated to have access to mostly positive information about 
wind power, whereas 68% of respondents on the contrary 
stated to have mostly heard negative information about 
nuclear (see Table 5 for more details).  
 
This perhaps is not surprising given the current Scottish 
Government’s commitment to “no nuclear” in Scotland.  At 
the same time the Scottish Government is backing 
renewables, such as wind power, which is of course 
reflected by the mass media coverage and as such the “type 
of information” that the public has access to.   
 
To gain an insight into the general perceptions of the 
respondents towards key problems addressed in the study 
such as climate change and the UK’s role in tackling this 
issue we also asked the respondents to express their views 
on some of the general statements described in Table 6.  
 
We found that the vast majority of respondents agree that 
solving environmental problems should be a priority when it 
comes to public spending in the UK.  Most of the 
respondents also agreed that climate change is a problem 
that needs to be addressed internationally and that 
everyone should substantially change our behaviour to 
tackle it.  Public views were not as straightforward, however, 
with regards to investment in renewable and nuclear energy 
as a way of tackling climate change.  As such only slightly 
over half of the sample (59% and 56% respectively) agree 
or strongly agree that the UK should invest more in these 
technologies.   
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Table 5:  Knowledge of and access to information about discussed energy options  
 
Knowledge of energy options Wind biomass nuclear 
% of People that heard about 96% 53% 88% 
% of People that stated to have at least some knowledge about 85% 31% 36% 
% of People that had access to mostly POSITIVE information about  50% 22% 11% 
% of People that had access to mostly NEGATIVE information about  19% 17% 68% 
 
 
Table 6:  Public attitudes towards general statements regarding climate change 
 
 
% of Total sample Disagree or Strongly disagree  Unsure 
Agree or 
Strongly 
agree 
Solving environmental problems should be one of the top 3 priorities for 
public spending in the uk. 
16% 11% 70% 
Environmental problems such as climate change and air pollution have 
been exaggerated. 
49% 24% 25% 
Developed countries are the main contributors to global warming. 20% 15% 62% 
The UK should invest more in renewable energy as a way to tackle 
climate change. 
16% 21% 59% 
The UK should invest more in nuclear power stations as a way to tackle 
climate change. 
20% 20% 56% 
Climate Change is a global problem that needs to be addressed 
internationally y all countries. 
7% 3% 86% 
We all have to substantially change our behaviour in order to help tackle 
climate change. 
9% 8% 81% 
 
 
Note:  Based on total respondents, non response to these accounts for difference from 100% 
 
5.2  Results of the choice experiment  
This section of the paper reports our findings on two 
separate estimations.  Firstly, we report on attitudes and 
preferences for the total Scottish sample including 
preferences according to socio-economic groupings and 
respondents’ willingness to pay for the energy options given 
the different levels of attributes.  Secondly we investigate 
divergence in preferences between three areas of Scotland 
(Highlands and Islands; Central; and South).   
 
Random parameters Logit Model 
 
As was mentioned earlier in section 3, one of the key 
requirements of the conditional logit model is the validity of 
the IIA assumption.  This assumption was tested using 
Hausman and McFadden chi-square test (1984) and we 
found that the IIA assumption is rejected.  To overcome this 
we then tested alternative model specifications that can 
relax the IIA property. The specifications tested were  
Random Parameters Logit Model  (RPL), Nested Logit  and 
Error Component Model .  We found that the RPL model, 
which allowed the investigation of heterogeneity across 
respondents, also provided us with the best fit and therefore 
the remainder of the paper will focus on the results 
estimated using RPL specification. 
 
As with the conditional logit model, in RPL models utility is 
decomposed into a deterministic part (V) and an error 
component stochastic term (e).  Indirect utility is a function 
of the choice attributes (Zj), with parameters β, which may 
vary across individuals by a random parameter ηi, and of 
the socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics (Si) (Birol 
et al. 2006).   
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Table 7:  Random parameter logit estimation results  
 
Variable Comment Original RPL Model including Socio-Economic Characteristics 
    Mean effect t-statistic 
Random parameters in utility functions       
        
Distance Distance Attribute 0.035** 2.61 
Biodiversity-no change No change in biodiversity -0.07 -0.7 
Biodiversity - more Increase in biodiversity  0.44** 2 
Emissions reductions 
Reduction in carbon 
emissions  0.01**   2.19 
 
Non-random parameters in utility functions     
Asc Wind 
Alternative specific constants 
- Wind, Biomass and Nuclear 
2.48*** 2.94 
Asc Biomass 1.42 1.63 
Asc Nuclear  1.92**   2.29 
Cost 
Cost attribute                            
(increase in electricity bill)  -0.01*** -7.12 
Sex*Asc wind 
Gender 
 -0.66**   -2.16 
Sex*Asc biomass -0.49 -1.52 
Sex*Asc nuclear 0.04 0.14 
Kids*Asc wind 
Households with children 
 0.6***   2.65 
Kids*Asc biomass  0.49**   2.13 
Kids*Asc nuclear 0.22 0.95 
Age*Asc wind 
Age 
 -0.45***   -4.47 
Age*Asc biomass  -0.32***   -3.16 
Age*Asc nuclear  -0.17*   -1.68 
BNW*Asc wind We should all change our 
behaviour to tackle climate 
change 
-0.03 -0.43 
BNB*Asc biomass -0.09 -1.12 
BNN*Asc nuclear  -0.29***   -3.65 
More nuclear*asc wind 
The UK should invest more 
in nuclear power stations as 
a way to tackle climate 
change  
 0.68**   2.03 
More nuclear*asc biomass 0.16 0.45 
More nuclear*asc nuclear  1.6***   4.49 
ENW*Asc wind Solving environmental 
problems should not be one 
of the top 3 priorities for 
public spending in the UK 
0.51***   3.4 
ENB*Asc biomass   0.44***   2.94 
ENN*Asc nuclear   0.48***   3.2 
 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions     
Distance     0.08**   2.44 
Biodiversity-no change   0.13 0.28 
Biodiversity - more   0.23 0.29 
Emissions reductions   0.02**   2.38 
Number of observations  1162 
Log likelihood value  -1245.6 
 
 
Note:  ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 8:  Willingness to Pay (WTP) Estimates  
 
 
Variable Mean Effect 95% confidence intervals t-statistic 
Distance (per mile) £3.8** 0.89 - 6.65 2.57 
Biodiversity-no change (from baseline ‘less’) -£7.69 -29.59 – 14.21 -0.69 
Biodiversity – more (from baseline ‘less’) £47.51* -1.82 – 96.83 1.89 
Emissions reductions (for % reduction) £1.13** 0.87 – 2.17 2.12 
 
 
Note:   ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
 
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, and by specifying 
the distributions of the error terms e and η, the equation 
above can be expressed as: 
 
This model is not restricted by the IIA assumption hence the 
correlation of the stochastic part of utility is allowed between 
the alternatives via the influence of η (Birol et al. 2006).  
 
In our study the RPL model with a non-random cost attribute 
was employed.  The model was estimated using NLOGIT 
4.0.4.  All random parameters were assigned normal 
distributions, although triangular distributions were also 
considered.  Distribution simulations were based on 500 
draws using Halton’s method.   
 
5.2.1  Total Scottish sample 
Table 7 reports the results for the Random Parameters Logit 
model (RPL) with added socio-economic variables, such as 
age, gender and number of children in the household.  The 
other socio-economic variables were also tested but, since 
we found no significant impact of those variables, they were 
excluded from the final model.  We also found that certain 
attitudinal variables had a significant impact on model fit, 
they are reported below.   
 
For the overall Scottish sample our results suggest that 
people consistently identify distance, an increase in 
biodiversity and a reduction in emissions as the most 
significant attributes.  These variables come through as 
significant at the 5% level and have positive preference 
associated with them.  Standard deviations for distance and 
reduction in emissions attributes come through as significant 
at the 5% level, which suggests the presence of 
heterogeneity in the parameter estimates over the sampled 
population (Hensher et al., 2005).  As expected, people 
prefer to live further away from power stations, wish to see 
an increase in biodiversity and have positive preferences 
towards a reduction in carbon emissions.  At the same time 
they have strong negative preferences towards increases in 
their annual energy bill, as confirmed by the reported results 
(the cost attribute is negative and significant at the 1% 
level). 
 
Interesting results were observed with regards to public 
attitudes towards alternative specific constants, i.e. 
respondents in the total sample displayed positive attitudes 
not only towards wind, but also towards the nuclear energy 
option compared to the current generation mix (alternative 
specific constants are positive and significant at 1% and 5% 
levels respectively).  These results may have direct policy 
implications for Scotland given that the current Scottish 
Government made it clear that it will not support any new-
build nuclear power stations in Scotland.  The existing policy 
in itself may be one possible explanation of such positive 
preference, i.e. the public “knows” that new nuclear will be 
built outwith Scotland, hence the positive Scottish attitude 
towards it (a continuation of the positive willingness to pay 
for greater distance to a power station).  On the other hand 
this preference may simply be a reflection of the fact that 
people do indeed prefer to have carbon free nuclear power 
plants and wind farms over existing coal and gas power 
stations.   
 
Our analysis of socio-economic characteristics showed that 
females are more likely to choose the wind energy option, 
whilst positive preferences towards low-carbon energy 
(wind, biomass and nuclear) over the current generation mix 
are decreasing with age.  Presence of children in the 
household is also a significant factor when it comes to 
choosing low-carbon energy options, specifically biomass 
and wind over the status quo.   
 
A number of attitudinal variables did have an impact on 
model fit, as such they were included in the model.  More 
specifically, those respondents who agree with the 
statement that “We should all significantly change our 
behaviour in order to tackle climate change” are less likely 
to choose the nuclear energy option over the current 
generation mix (negative and significant at 1% level).  
Perhaps not surprisingly those who agree that “The UK 
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Table 9:  RPL model results of the regional analysis 
 
 
Variable 
Central South Highlands and Islands 
Perth, Stirling and 
Aberdeen 
Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
Dumfries 
Harris, Lewis, Orkney, Inverness, 
Fort William, Oban 
Mean effect t-statistic Mean effect t-statistic Mean effect t-statistic 
 
Random parameters in utility functions  
Distance 0.04 1.64  0.07***   2.95 0 0.13 
Biodiversity - no change -0.19 -1.1 0.17 1.01 -0.06 -0.45 
Biodiversity – more 0.24 0.34 0 -0.01  0.72**   2.16 
Emissions reductions 0.01 1.54 0.02**   2.21 0 -0.11 
Non-random parameters in utility functions 
Asc Wind 2.51*   1.76 1.37 1.53  2.51***   3.45 
Asc Biomass 1.39 1.03 0.42 0.51 0.6 0.87 
Asc Nuclear 2.18 1.56 0.6 0.69  1.74**   2.47 
Cost -0.01***   -3.45   -0.01***   -5.17 -0.01***   -3.52 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions   
Distance 0.11 1.3 0.07 1.54 0.05 0.99 
Biodiversity - no change 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.35 0.08 0.18 
Biodiversity – more 0.71 0.41 0.3 0.35 0.21 0.25 
Emissions reductions 0.01 0.54 0 0.27 0.01 0.51 
Number of Observations 347 355 475 
Log Likelihood Value -413.9 -419.15 -550.73 
 
 
Note:  ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
should invest more in nuclear power stations to tackle 
climate change” displayed strong positive preference 
towards nuclear and wind energy options (positive and 
significant 1% and 5% respectively).  Finally we found that 
those respondents who think that “Solving Environmental 
Problems should not be one of the top 3 priorities for public 
spending in the UK” over the status quo, i.e. respondents 
are willing to pay for low-carbon energy themselves rather 
than relying on public funds.  This provides additional  
ground for further research when it comes to the 
investigation of public preferences towards existing energy 
policy in Scotland. 
 
Implicit prices or marginal ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) 
amounts associated with the CE attributes are reported in 
the Table 8.  These reflect the value that respondents place 
on the change in a given attribute. 
 
According to the results, the sampled population in Scotland 
is willing to pay on average £3.8 per mile for living further 
away from a power generating option.  With regards to 
increase in biodiversity respondents are willing to pay 
£47.51 for an increase and £1.13 for a 1% reduction in 
carbon emissions.  It is important to note that the values 
should not be interpreted as a ‘precise’ monetary figure, but 
an indication of the magnitude of respondents’ willingness to 
pay.  Taking the above into account implicit prices can serve 
as a valuable policy-making and investment analysis tool. 
 
5.2.2  Regional analysis 
Whilst realising limitations with the number of observations 
in our sample, at the next stage of the analysis we wanted 
to test whether energy preferences across Scotland were 
uniform throughout the country, or if there is any divergence 
depending on  regional location.  As discussed earlier in 
section 4.4, we have split our sample into three areas 
combining all the investigated regions: South, Central and 
Highlands and Islands according to their geographical 
characteristics and population density.  Just as before the 
RPL model was used in the estimation, although we have 
not reported parameter estimates for any socio-economic 
variables, as we did not find them to be significant for the 
current section of the study.  Regional analysis results are 
reported in Tables 9 and 10. 
 
Due to the small size of the sample, our results are 
somewhat lacking statistical significance, but what they do 
indicate is that depending on the region of Scotland people 
place different values on different attributes of the study, for 
example people in the Highlands and Island seem to be 
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Table 10:  Willingness to pay (WTP) estimates - regional analysis 
 
Variable 
Central – 
Mean 
effect 
95% 
conf. 
interv. 
t-stat 
South – 
Mean 
effect 
95% 
conf. 
interv. 
t-stat 
Highlands 
and 
Islands – 
Mean 
effect 
 
95% 
conf. 
interv. 
t-stat 
Distance (per mile)  4.64*   
-0.73 – 
10.01 1.69 5.83***   
1.7 – 
9.96 2.77 £0.35 
-5.16 – 
5.86 0.13 
Biodiversity-no change 
(from baseline ‘less’) -£20.88 
-58.7 – 
16.97 -1.08 £15.00 
-14.15 – 
44.14 1.01 -£9.96 
-54.5 – 
34.63 -0.44 
Biodiversity – more 
(from baseline ‘less’) £26.54 
-132.1 – 
185.17 0.33 -£0.27 
-67.83 – 
67.3 -0.01  113.41*   
-9.6 – 
236.4 1.81 
Emissions reductions 
(for % reduction) £1.41 
-0.35 – 
3.17 1.58 1.51**   
0.06 – 
2.94 2.05 -0.09   
-1.81 – 
1.63 -0.11 
 
 
Note:   ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
 
more consistent in identifying increased biodiversity as the 
most valued attribute, whereas distance from respondents 
home comes through as significant for people in the Central 
region.  For the respondents in the ‘South’ the attributes 
distance and reduction in emissions come through as highly 
significant (at 1% and 5% levels respectively).  Given that 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, the two largest and highly 
populated cities in Scotland, are included in this group, such 
preference towards these two particular attributes seems 
logical.  That is the population of these cities are likely to 
experience the highest background levels of air pollution in 
Scotland and are the most densely populated so proximity 
to electricity producing plants will be most strongly felt.  This 
is especially true of Edinburgh, with two major coal power 
plants, Longannet and Cockenzie, located nearby. 
 
Given the above, our results indicate that there is a great 
need for further research in this area since if confirmed our 
results will suggest that Scottish energy policy needs to be 
planned taking account of regional preferences to a much 
greater extent than is currently done.    
 
5.2.3  Non-compensatory preferences  
One aspect of the analysis that is of a particular interest is 
observed non-compensatory preferences across 
respondents.  The fundamental assumption in random utility 
models since Lancaster (1966) and McFadden (1974) is that 
‘individuals’ decisions respond to compensatory heuristics 
by which individual attributes are weighed by their 
contribution to the overall utility in order to evaluate the 
relative utility of each profile’ (Arana, 2009).  This implies 
that individuals are able to make trade-offs between 
attributes to identify the most preferred alternative.  Previous 
research, conducted by authors such as Kahneman and 
Frederick, 2002; Gowda and Fox, 2002; Payne et al., 1993), 
showed that people often avoid making trade-offs and that 
such non-compensating behaviour can also be a fully 
rational process (Payne et al., 1990) (for more details see 
Arana, 2009).  Presence of such non-compensatory 
behaviour, however, may have direct implications on the 
way the results of CE are interpreted and therefore, policy 
decision-making associated with them.  
 
We found that a surprisingly large proportion (42%) of 
sampled respondents in our study consistently chose one 
energy option over the others.  Out of those 46% of people 
chose wind in all cases, 4% chose biomass, 30% chose 
nuclear and 20% chose the current generation mix.  
Although consistent with random utility theory, such 
behaviour presents a challenge to a researcher in identifying 
rationality behind these choices.   To test whether this 
behaviour affects the results of the original RPL model, we 
estimated a new model using RPL where all respondents 
that consistently chose one option over the others (e.g. wind 
energy option in all cases), were excluded from the analysis 
(see Table 11 for the results). 
 
When comparing the results of the restricted sample with 
the original model, we found that the results were 
reasonably stable with regards to the alternative model 
specification.  All of the signs remained unchanged and 
most of the attributes kept their level of significance with the 
exception of an increase in biodiversity, which appeared to 
be insignificant in the restricted model.  As for alternative 
specific constants on the other hand, all of them, including 
the constant for biomass, came through as highly 
significant.  Some changes were also observed in socio-
economic variables, for example unlike in the original model, 
households with children as well as gender of respondents 
did not appear to have any significant impact on the 
respondents choices.  With regards to implicit prices, 
however, values were relatively constant, except for the 
willingness to pay for an increase in biodiversity, which 
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Table 11:  Results excluding respondents with “non-compensatory preferences”  
 
 
 
 
Variable 
  
 
Comment 
  
Restricted Sample accounting 
for Non-compensatory 
Preferences 
Mean effect t-statistic 
Random Parameters in Utility Functions  
Distance Distance Attribute   0.09***   3.36 
Biodiversity-no change No change in biodiversity 0.01 0.04 
Biodiversity - more Increase in biodiversity 0.31 0.71 
Emissions reductions Reduction in carbon emissions  0.01**   2.09 
 
Non-Random Parameters in Utility Functions  
Asc Wind 
Alternative specific constants - Wind, Biomass and 
Nuclear 
 5.66***   3.8 
Asc Biomass    4.69***   3.07 
Asc Nuclear   3.82***   2.62 
Cost Cost attribute (increase in electricity bill) -0.01*** -6.47 
 
Sex*Asc wind 
Gender 
-0.38 -0.93 
Sex*Asc biomass -0.23 -0.55 
Sex*Asc nuclear 0.33 0.76 
 
Children*Asc wind 
Households with children 
-0.15 -0.68 
Children*Asc biomass -0.23 -0.95 
Children*Asc nuclear -0.18 -0.75 
 
Age*Asc wind 
Age 
  -0.64***   -4 
Age*Asc biomass  -0.50***  -3.24 
Age*Asc nuclear   -0.34**   -2.13 
 
 We should all change our behaviour to tackle 
climate change 
-0.18*   -1.66 
BNB*Asc biomass   -0.25**   -2.3 
BNN*Asc nuclear  -0.35***   -3.06 
 
More nuclear*asc wind The UK should invest more in nuclear power 
stations to tackle climate change 
 1.50***   2.82 
More nuclear*asc biomass  1.35***   2.62 
More nuclear*asc nuclear  2.20***   3.9 
 
ENW*Asc wind Solving environmental problems should not be one 
of the top 3 priorities for public spending in the UK 
0.54***  2.94 
ENB*Asc biomass   0.59***   3.23 
ENN*Asc nuclear  0.69***   3.6 
 
Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions   
Distance    0.07**   1.96 
Biodiversity-no change  0.37 0.69 
Biodiversity - more  0.41 0.19 
Emissions reductions    0.01*   1.75 
Number of Observations  692 
Log Likelihood Value  -750.43 
 
 
Note:   ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 12:   WTP estimates for the restricted sample accounting for non-compensatory preferences 
 
Variable Mean effect 
95% confidence 
intervals t-statistic 
        
Distance (per mile) £4.5*** 2.39 – 7.6 3.76 
Biodiversity-no change (from baseline ‘less’) £0.43 -19.15 – 20.01 0.04 
Biodiversity – more (from baseline ‘less’) £22.56 -43.46 – 88.58 0.67 
Emissions reductions (for % reduction) £0.86** 0.04 – 1.68 2.05 
 
 
Note:   ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
 
came through as just insignificant.  Although relatively 
robust, our results suggest that further investigation of the 
displayed non-compensatory preferences is needed to fully 
understand underlying reasons behind them including those 
at a regional level.   
 
6.  Conclusions and future research 
The fundamental purpose of this study was to determine 
public preferences and willingness to pay for alternative 
energy options, such as wind, nuclear, biomass and current 
generation mix, all of which may form an integral part of 
Scotland’s future generation portfolio.  To achieve this we 
used a choice experiment approach involving a countrywide 
mail survey sent out to a random sample of 1000 
households across Scotland.  We compared public 
preferences across four energy options wind, biomass and 
nuclear relative to the current generation mix (the status quo 
option).  These options were described in terms of the 
following attributes: distance from respondent’s home, 
carbon emissions reduction, local biodiversity impacts, land 
requirements (fixed attribute) and an annual electricity bill 
increase (cost attribute).  
 
Our results show that respondents in Scotland display 
strong positive preferences towards wind power over the 
current generation mix.  In addition it was found that the 
nuclear energy option is also more attractive to the sampled 
population rather than the status quo.  While the first finding 
is inline with current Scottish policy of heavily backing 
renewables, the positive attitudes towards nuclear suggest 
that the current “no nuclear” policy for Scotland should 
perhaps be further examined.   
 
According to the results, respondents want to live further 
away from energy generating options and consistently 
identify an increase in biodiversity as an attribute, which is 
important to them.  They also display positive willingness to 
pay for a reduction in carbon emissions. 
 
A large number of studies (e.g. Clarkson, R. and K. Deyes, 
2002, Fankhauser, S. (1994), Haraden, J. (1993), Stern, 
N.H. et al (2006)) have investigated reductions in carbon 
emissions and estimated the shadow price of carbon (for a 
meta-analysis of social cost of carbon listing over 40 studies 
see Tol R., 2008).   The comparison of our values (for WTP 
for a 1% reduction in carbon emissions) with these studies, 
however, is difficult, as the values are typically reported in 
pounds per tonne of carbon (£/tC) or in pounds per tonne of 
CO2 equivalent (£/tCO2e).  Indeed, the shadow price of 
carbon values recommended for use in economic appraisal 
in the UK (DEFRA, 2007) also estimate this figure as 
£/tCO2e.  No studies reporting directly comparable results, 
for a 1% reduction in emissions, could be found in the 
literature.  Despite these issues of comparability applying 
our average WTP of £1.3 for a 1% reduction in carbon 
emissions (using annual emissions from power generation) 
to all UK households gives an estimate of £15.1/tCO2e.  
Comparing this to the shadow price of carbon value as per 
DEFRA 2007 of 25 £/tCO2e, represent a surprisingly close 
match, especially when taking into account our 95% 
confidence intervals (12.5-93.6 £/tCO2e). 
 
With regards to identification of regional preferences across 
Scotland, we found that depending on the location 
respondents identify different attributes as important to 
them.  For example, those who live in the Highlands and 
Islands displayed consistent preferences towards an 
increase in biodiversity, indicating that this attribute is more 
important to them than distance and level of reduction in 
carbon emissions.  On the contrary, respondents living in 
the Central and Southern regions (see section 5.2.2 for 
more details) identified distance and reduction in carbon 
emissions as the most important attributes.  Although 
somewhat statistically limited, it is felt that these results may 
have direct implications on the development of Scottish 
energy and policy planning, especially when it comes to the 
placement of future power plants.  
 
Another area that calls for further investigation is the 
presence of non-compensatory behaviour amongst the 
sampled population.  It was found that almost half of the 
sample (42%) consistently chose one energy option above 
the others, independently of attribute levels.  Although when 
tested our results proved to be fairly robust, i.e. when 
respondents who displayed “non-compensatory 
preferences” were excluded from the analysis, we found 
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little impact on the overall results (other than the 
significance of increasing biodiversity), the underlying 
reasons behind such behaviour are still to be understood.  
 
In summary it is felt that our research will provide a fresh 
and important contribution to future decision-making in the 
area of energy policy.  Scotland is faced with upcoming 
changes to the generation portfolio of the country and 
significant targets have been set for reductions in emissions 
from this sector of the economy.  Decision-making has been 
based on relatively sparse information given the lack of 
literature aimed at the investigation of energy preferences 
for Scotland.  Our research is suggestive of which 
technologies would be most acceptable to the Scottish 
public.  It is also indicative that further investigation is 
required to identify where given technologies would be most 
preferred in Scotland, which in combination with generation 
potential may suggest an optimal future generation portfolio 
that will be politically palatable in achieving Scotland’s 
world-leading emissions reduction targets. 
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Endnotes 
1The LCPD requires large electricity generators, and other large 
industrial facilities, to meet stringent air quality standards from 1 
January 2008. If generators opt-out of this obligation, the plant will 
have to close by the end of 2015 or after 20,000 hours of operation 
from 1 January 2008, whichever is the sooner.  According to BERR, 
approximately 12 GW of coal and oil-fired generating plants have 
opted-out and will have to close by the end of 2015, representing 
about 15% of Great Britain’s present total capacity. Energy Industry 
Markets Forecast 2008-2015, Scottish Enterprise. 
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1.  Introduction 
The mix of technologies used to generate electricity in 
Scotland has evolved over the last ninety years. Since 2000, 
there has been a rapid increase in renewables capacity and 
generation, particularly in onshore wind. This has been 
supported by UK and Scottish policy and the associated 
funding mechanisms, including the Renewable Obligations 
Certificates (ROCs). In the coming decade, the Scottish 
generation mix is likely to see unprecedented changes that 
will include significant investments in a range of new 
generation technologies.  
 
Section 2 of this paper explains how the existing Scottish 
electricity generation mix was attained and Section 3 
identifies the key drivers of changes over the next decade. 
Section 4 briefly examines some published scenarios for the 
Scottish generation mix and sets these in the context of the 
(recently updated) Scottish Government’s targets for 
electricity generation. The scenarios are informed by recent 
technology-specific “roadmaps”. Section 5 concludes by 
discussing the implications for policy.  
 
 
 
*The authors acknowledge the support of the Engineering and 
Physical Science Research Council through the SuperGen Marine 
Energy Consortium (EPSRC reference: EP/E040136/1) and the UK 
Sustainable Hydrogen Energy Consortium (EPSRC reference: 
EP/040071/1) as well as the EU InterReg IVA programme managed 
by the Special EU Programmes Body through the “Biomara – 
sustainable fuels from marine biomass” consortium. This paper 
provides an updated version of the non-technical elements of Allan 
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related research at the Regional Science Association International: 
British and Irish Section conference, Limerick, September 2009, 
and the International Association of Energy Economics conference, 
Rio de Janeiro, June 2010. Any remaining errors and omissions are 
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2.  Development of the existing electricity 
generation mix in Scotland 
 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show how the present operational electricity 
generation capacity in Scotland has developed through 
time. In Table 1, reading along the row for an individual 
technology identifies the decades in which the capacity (in 
MW) that is operational today was installed. Reading down 
a particular column in this table shows how much of the total 
present Scottish electricity generation capacity was installed 
in that decade. Similarly, each cell in Table 2 shows the 
number of separate facilities commissioned, by technology 
and decade. These two tables identify the evolution of the 
current Scottish electricity generation mix.  
  
Table 1 shows the major periods of activity in terms of the 
existing generation mix in Scotland. Almost one-third of the 
present-day installed capacity was commissioned in the 
1970s, with over 75% installed between the 1960s and 
1980s. The 1990s saw only a fraction of the investment of 
earlier decades, with 65MW of new capacity commissioned, 
63MW of which came from wind generation commissioned 
between 1995 and 1999. Table 1 reveals that of the 
2,007MW of capacity commissioned since 2000, over 90% 
has come from renewable technologies, with most coming 
from onshore wind projects. During this period, 1,685MW of 
onshore wind capacity and 39 onshore wind projects have 
been installed.  
 
At present, investment in renewables generation capacity is 
progressing more rapidly than the period immediately 
following the Second World War. That period saw the 
formation of the North Scotland Electricity Board and the 
generation of electricity from the water of the glens of 
Scotland using hydroelectric technologies (Hannah, 1982). 
These investments in the 1950s led to 791MW of capacity 
installed across 38 projects. Each of these individual hydro 
projects were part of larger schemes, such as the 262MW 
Sloy installation. The Sloy scheme comprised ten separate 
facilities with individual facilities coming into operation at 
different times between 1950 and 1963. The Great Glen 
scheme was similar in nature, with a total capacity of 
225MW. The earliest of its constituent parts dates from 1955 
and the most recent, an addition of 100MW to this scheme, 
from 2008. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 also identify the development of major 
capacity in non-renewable facilities: the coal stations at 
Longannet and Cockenzie in the 1960s and 1970s, the gas 
station at Peterhead in the 1980s, and the nuclear facilities 
in the 1970s and 1980s. However, since 1990, almost 94% 
of the new capacity has been in renewable technologies, 
with much of this occurring since the year 2000. 
 
Rather than the installed capacity for each technology, 
Table 3 gives the electricity (in GWh) generated by different 
technologies in 2009 (the most recent year for which data 
are available) and their respective share of total Scottish 
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Table 1:  Capacity (in MW) of plants operational in Scotland in May 2010, by technology and decade of 
commission or initial generation 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total 
N
on
-
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
Coal - - - - 1,152 2,304 - - - 3,456 
Nuclear - - - - - 860 1,205 - - 2,065 
Gas/Oil - - - - - - 1,180 - - 1,180 
Diesel - - 9 105 - 10 - 2 3 129 
Gas - - - - - - - - 123 123 
Total non-renewable - - 9 105 1,152 3,174 2,385 2 126 6,953 
R
en
ew
ab
le
s 
Wind (onshore) - - - - - - - 63 1,685 1,748 
Hydro 17 186 - 791 173 - 2 - 130 1,299 
Pumped storage - - - - 440 300 - - - 740 
Biomass - - - - - - - - 44 44 
Poultry litter - - - - - - - - 12 12 
Wind (offshore) - - - - - - - - 10 10 
Total renewables 17 186 - 791 613 300 2 63 1,881 3,853 
 Total 17 186 9 896 1,765 3,474 2,387 65 2,007 10,806 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:   DECC, Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics, accessed September 2010 
 
Table 2:  Number of plants operational in Scotland in May 2010, by technology and decade of commission 
or initial generation 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total 
N
on
-
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
Coal - - - - 1 1 - - - 2 
Nuclear - - - - - 1 1 - - 2 
Gas/Oil - - - - - - 1 - - 1 
Diesel - - 2 3 - 1 - 1 1 8 
Gas - - - - - - - - 1 1 
            
R
en
ew
ab
le
s 
Wind (onshore) - - - - - - - 4 39 43 
Hydro 2 7 - 38 14 - 1 - 11 73 
Pumped storage - - - - 1 1 - - - 2 
Biomass - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Poultry litter - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Wind (offshore) - - - - - - - - 1 1 
 Total 2 7 2 41 16 4 3 5 55 135 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  DECC, Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics, accessed September 2010 
 
Table 3:  Generation in Scotland in 2009 by technology, GWh 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 GWh % share 
Total from non-renewables 39,476 76.9 
Nuclear 16,732 32.6 
Coal / Pulverised fuel 11,965 23.3 
Gas  9,690 18.9 
Oil 1,089 2.1 
Total from renewables 11,850 23.1 
Hydro natural flow 4,877 9.5 
Non-thermal renewables 4,558 8.9 
Hydro pumped storage 1,087 2.1 
Thermal renewables 1,310 2.6 
Wastes 18 0.0 
Total from renewables eligible under RO 8,185 15.9 
Total, GWh 51,325 100.0 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  DECC Energy Trends, December 2010. Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 1: Recent electricity generation in Scotland by technology, 2004-2008, % share of total generation 
 
 
 
Source:  DECC Energy Trends, various issues. 
 
electricity generation in Scotland. Total generation was 
51,325 GWh. Approximately 23% comes from renewable 
technologies. Note that this is significantly lower than 
renewables share of installed capacity in Scotland due to 
the lower capacity factors of these technologies. Nuclear 
contributes the largest share (over 30%) and coal (23%) and 
gas (19%) produced significant shares. Figure 1 shows, for 
the same technologies identified in Table 3, how the 
contribution of each technology to total electricity generation 
in Scotland has changed between 2004 and 2009. 
 
Table 4 identifies where the electricity generated in each of 
the countries of the UK was actually consumed in 2009.
 
Table 4:  Production and consumption of electricity by region of UK, 2009, GWh 
 
  UK region of generation ROE 
imports 
Total 
consumption 
   
England Scotland 
Northern 
Ireland Wales 
 
A Generators own use 12578 3792 119 4828  21317 
B England 249051 10209  8287 3228 270775 
C Scotland  33010    33010 
D Northern Ireland  1937 6836   8773 
E Wales    17740  17740 
F ROE exports   367   367 
G Transmission losses 4838 584 156 315  5893 
H Distribution losses 17615 1793 548 1061  21017 
A+B+C+
D+E+F+
G+H 
Total generation 
284082 51325 8026 32231 3228 378892 
 
 
Source: DECC Energy Trends, December 2010, and authors calculations. Totals may not sum due to rounding. 
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Both Scotland and Wales were net exporters of electricity in 
this year, exporting 23.7% and 25.7% of net electricity 
generated in each region respectively. Northern Ireland was 
a net importer of electricity, with imports from Scotland 
greater than its exports to the rest of Europe. The 500MW 
Moyle interconnector between Scotland and Northern 
Ireland – which opened in 2002 – is currently a net exporting 
route for Scottish electricity. Scottish electricity generation 
also contributes to electricity consumed in England. Note 
that these figures refer to net exports over the year, and not 
half-hourly flows, where the regional pattern of generation 
and use could be quite different. 
 
Reading along row B, for example, we see that of the 
270,775GWh of electricity consumption in 2009 in England, 
just almost 92% was met by English generation with the rest 
coming from imports from Scotland (3.8%), Wales (3.1%) 
and the Rest of Europe (1.2%). For Northern Ireland, the 
pattern was quite different, with net exports to the rest of 
Europe corresponding to 4.6% of total generation, and net 
imports from Scotland making up 22.1% of total use. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the regional trade in electricity has 
changed between 2004 and 2009. On the vertical axis is the 
difference between annual regional exports and imports of 
electricity to regions of the UK (in GWh). While Northern 
Ireland has small net imports and exports (in absolute 
terms) over the five years, we can see that significant net 
imports by England (equivalent to between 6.1% and 10.7% 
of annual electricity consumption in that region) are provided 
by exports from Scotland, Wales and the rest of Europe. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Net exports of electricity by region of UK, 2004 to 2009, GWh 
 
 
 
 
Source:  DECC Energy Trends, various years. 
 
 
3.  Factors affecting the future electricity 
generation mix in Scotland 
Several interconnected factors are likely to produce 
significant changes in the future capacity and electricity 
generation mix in Scotland. These are due to two broad 
types of factors: technical and policy.  
 
There are two key technical factors that are important 
influences on the way in which electricity is generated in 
Scotland. One is developments in the network and the grid. 
The second is the remaining lifetimes of existing plant. We 
attempt to summarise these issues here, beginning with the 
electricity transmission system. It has been acknowledged 
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that significant reinvestment will be necessary over the next 
twenty years if renewable energy sources, typically located 
in areas away from major centres of demand, are to meet 
the levels of envisioned penetration (Royal Society of 
Edinburgh, 2006; Forum for Renewable Energy 
Development in Scotland: Marine Energy Group, 2009). 
ENSG (2009) gives details of the types of grid investments 
required under alternative scenarios. It has been argued 
that substantial upgrades are needed to Scotland’s 
electricity transmission system, and that this will depend on 
the level of renewable capacity. A recent estimate 
suggested that a programme of network investment in the 
(UK) transmission grid totalling £4.86 billion will be required 
(ENSG, 2009). Such grid enhancements include plans to 
increase the capacity of interconnection between Scotland 
and England through subsea HVDC cables to complement 
the existing onshore connection. Such transmission grid 
investments, however, require the permission of the 
networks regulator (OFGEM), which then allows the grid 
owner to recoup the costs of investment from generation 
customers who use the network, plus a (regulated) return on 
their investment. The regulator therefore predicts the extent 
to which network extensions would be used before it grants 
permission. But generators will not be willing to contract to 
site facilities in places served by the new grid until the new 
grid investment is made. This explains some of the delays in 
bringing forward additional generation in areas currently not 
served by the transmission network, and also emphasises 
the importance of developing an appropriate network for 
delivering the energy goals set by Scotland and the UK. 
 
Concerning the lifetime of existing plants, the two major coal 
power stations in Scotland are now covered by the 
European Union Large Combustion Plant Directive. From 
2011 they will have to stop production after 10,000 
additional hours of operation, or at the end of December 
2015, whichever is sooner. At the time of writing, Scottish 
Power – the operator of Cockenzie – is consulting on 
replacing the coal station with a Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) station, together with the associated 
infrastructure. Coal stations may remain in Scotland in the 
long term with the use of Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) technologies, such that the vast majority of their 
emissions are prevented from entering the atmosphere by 
being buried in previously depleted gas fields. Such storage 
capacity exists in the North Sea (Scottish Centre for Carbon 
Storage, 2009a) and it is hoped that CCS technologies 
might play a role in the future of coal generation in Scotland 
and the UK, although no full demonstration-scale plant has 
been completed. A prototype Carbon Capture unit is 
undergoing testing at Longannet coal power station. There 
are EU plans for 10-15 demonstration projects for CCS to 
be operational by 2015, although widespread deployment of 
CCS technologies is not expected to occur until 2020 
(Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage, 2009b). 
 
 
Table 5:  Renewable energy developments in Scotland at stages prior to operation stage, as of 10th 
September 2010, MW 
 
 
Technology 
Under 
construction 
Resolution to 
consent 
In 
planning 
In 
appeal 
In  
scoping 
SRO 
outstanding Total 
Hydroa 103.40 24.65 19.02 0.00 20.83 5.49 173.39 
Onshore wind 431.05 2,832.18 3,593.28 811.60 2,610.31 4.31b 10,282.73 
Offshore wind 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 115.00 4.31b 119.31 
Energy from waste 2.73 21.30 4.27 0.00 5.80 40.46 74.56 
Biomass electricity 13.70 98.80 39.00 0.00 566.00 12.90 730.40 
Biomass heat 6.40 155.00 34.32 0.00 25.00 0.00 220.72 
Wave 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 600.00 0.00 607.00 
Tidal 1.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 632.00 0.00 643.00 
Total 558.28 3,138.93 3,699.89 811.60 4,574.94 67.47 12,851.11 
 
Notes: a = excludes pumped hydro, b = total wind capacity with SRO outstanding is 8.62MW, but no disaggregation by On- or Offshore are 
provided in source. We have split this between On- and Offshore wind 50:50. Source: Scottish Renewables (2010) 
 
Of the current operational nuclear plants in Scotland 
Hunterston B was opened in 1976 and Torness in 1988. 
These plants are now reaching the end of their design lives, 
and are scheduled for closure in 2016 and 2023 respectively 
(RSE, 2006). In both cases, plant lifetime extensions are 
possible and would typically increase the working life of 
each plant by around 5 years. The recent report by a 
committee of members of the Scottish Parliament (2009) 
indicated that, while it did not see a new generation of 
nuclear facilities as necessary, “there will be a need to 
extend the operating lifetimes of the current generation of 
nuclear power stations in Scotland” (Scottish Parliament, 
2009, paragraph 144). This is to avoid the perceived 
“energy gap” caused by the loss of existing coal and nuclear 
facilities. 
 
As well as these environmental regulations, oil and gas 
generation will be affected significantly by the increasing 
level and volatility of fuel prices. Indeed, in the case of both 
forms of generation, the marginal cost of production will be a 
function of the prevailing fuel price (subject to any fuel 
contracts). For the period to 2020 and beyond, fuel prices 
are expected to rise (van Ruijven and van Vuuren, 2009). 
This reflects current concerns about resource depletion (e.g. 
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see de Almeida and Silva, 2009), reduced investment, 
greater demand (and uncertainty), and geopolitical risks. 
The range of fuel price forecasts is often huge and higher oil 
prices have been predicted before (for example, Saunders, 
1984).  
 
The main factors affecting the shape of energy policy in 
Scotland have been discussed elsewhere (Allan et al, 
2008). Of course, EU and UK energy policies will continue 
to exert significant impacts on the Scottish generation mix. 
For example, the efficacy of the EU ETS in establishing a 
credible long-term carbon price is of crucial importance in 
correcting for the pollution externalities embodied in fossil 
fuel generation. We return to the role of the EU ETS in 
Section 5. Here we briefly summarise relevant aspects of 
Scottish (and UK) energy policies. Since devolution in 1999, 
electricity generation in Scotland has increasingly become a 
concern of the Scottish Government, despite energy being 
an issue that is reserved to Westminster. The Scottish 
Government has set ambitious targets for the share of 
Scottish electricity that comes from renewable sources. Its 
previous target was for 50% of gross electricity consumed in 
Scotland to come from renewable sources by 2020, with an 
interim target of 31% in 2011. During the writing of this 
paper, the Scottish Government announced that it would be 
increasing its 2020 target to 80%. It is not clear if any new 
interim targets will be set.  
 
As of 2009 (the most recent year for which data are 
available) renewable electricity generated in Scotland was 
23.1% of Scottish generation. It can be verified from Table 4 
that for Scotland, total electricity generation less transfers 
equalled 39,179 GWh (i.e. total generation (the final row) 
less exports to England (row B) and Northern Ireland (row 
D)), while from Table 3, the amount of renewable generation 
in 2008 was 10,745 GWh (this is the sum of generation from 
“Hydro flow”, “Non-thermal renewables” and “Thermal 
renewables”). Renewable electricity generated in Scotland 
as a share of Scottish generation minus transfers was 
therefore 27.4% in 2009. We note that the existence of an 
electricity grid covering Great Britain (plus an interconnector 
between Scotland and Northern Ireland) means that there is 
no need for Scottish demand to be limited to Scottish 
generation. With regards to nuclear, the Scottish 
Government has stated that future applications for the 
building of new nuclear stations are likely to be rejected, a 
position backed in a vote in the Scottish Parliament1. 
Depending on circumstances, however, Scotland could be 
in a position of importing electricity from a GB grid which 
could have been produced in nuclear facilities in England 
(although the scenarios considered in the next section all 
envisage Scotland continuing to be a net electricity exporter 
up to 2020). 
 
Renewable electricity in the UK (including Scotland) is 
supported through the Renewables Obligation (RO), which 
requires electricity supply companies to provide 
Renewables Obligations Certificates (ROCs) to the 
electricity regulator (OFGEM). The number of certificates 
that must be produced is currently equivalent to 4.27 ROCS 
per 100 MWh supplied in 2010/11), and the UK Government 
intends that the ROC support will remain until 2037. These 
certificates are earned by accredited generators for each 
MWh generated using renewable energy sources. They can 
be sold in the ROC market, with generators on the supply 
side, and electricity retail companies on the demand side. 
The price of ROCs in theory is restrained by the provision of 
an alternative method by which supply companies can meet 
their obligation, paying a buyout price, which began at £30 
per MWh in 2001 and rises in line with the Retail Price Index 
every year. In 2009/10 the buyout price was £37.19.  
 
Monies received by OFGEM from supply companies paying 
the buyout price for any ROCs they are unable to produce 
are redistributed back to electricity supply companies, 
whose share of the total redistributed buyout fund is in 
proportion to their contribution to the total number of ROCs 
received. In practice, this has meant that since inception the 
annual value of a ROC has been between 20% and 50% 
higher than the buyout price, producing an important 
stimulus to renewable energy development (as seen from 
the growth in renewable capacity between 2000 and 2009 in 
Tables 1 and 2).  
 
From April 2009, the UK government introduced “banded” 
ROCs, whereby accredited renewable electricity generators 
receive different quantities of ROCs for each MWh they 
produce, depending on the technology used to generate 
each MWh. In this way, the support for renewables is no 
longer “technology-blind”, but is intended to bring forward 
developments in generation technologies other than 
onshore wind. The Scottish Government has introduced 
further differentiation, designed to favour new marine 
technologies. This began with the Marine Supply Obligation, 
which was superseded by the banded ROCs for wave and 
tidal stream in April 2009. Under the banded ROCs, each 
generator using wave technologies to generate electricity 
receives 5 ROCs per MWh, while tidal technologies receive 
3 ROCs per MWh2. 
 
Along with ROC banding, other measures underline the 
Scottish Government’s support for marine technologies. 
These measures include the EMEC testing site on Orkney, 
the £13 million Wave and Tidal Energy Scheme3 (WATES) 
funding for testing devices in Scottish waters, and the £10 
million Saltire Prize challenge4. These initiatives underline 
the intention of Scottish Government to ensure that 
renewables development in the next ten years is not limited 
to as narrow a range of technologies (predominately 
onshore wind) as has been the case until now. 
 
Table 5 identifies the capacity of renewable energy projects 
in Scotland, by technology, at pre-operational stage. This  
includes projects without planning permission, which are 
those indentified in the stages other than “Under 
construction” in Table 5. Even assuming that not all projects 
are granted permission, there is demand from generators to 
install renewable energy capacity in Scotland. Over 80% of 
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the capacity of the proposed projects relates to Onshore 
wind, which is likely to provide the bulk of new renewable 
energy developments up to 2020. Thus, existing renewable 
electricity generation plans suggest that a balanced portfolio 
of renewable technologies will not be delivered. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the year since September 
2009 the total capacity of pre-operational renewable energy 
developments increased by over 1,500MW. This is largely 
due to the increase in Biomass heat (up 149.16MW), 
Biomass electricity (up 172.2MW) and significant increases 
in the amount of Wave and Tidal capacity at the “Scoping” 
stage (up 600MW and 570MW respectively). 
 
Previous work (Allan et al, 2010a) has identified the UK’s 
recent Feed-in Tariff (FiT) scheme (DECC, 2010) as the 
“most significant recent policy initiative” in stimulating the 
penetration of distributed generation technologies. For 
installations under 5MW this measure replaces the Low 
Carbon Building Programme and the Renewable Obligation. 
Under this scheme, licensed electricity suppliers are 
required to pay a tariff to small scale low-carbon generators 
for electricity generation5, and an additional export tariff 
when the electricity is exported to the grid. These tariffs 
apply for the operational lifetime of the device. By obliging 
electricity suppliers to purchase renewable electricity from 
suppliers at a favourable price, the FiTs policy provides 
emerging renewable technologies an opportunity to 
compete in the electricity market. The policy is intended to 
increase the uptake of small-scale low carbon technologies 
by increasing their attractiveness for households and 
communities. 
 
The FiTs are scaled according to technology, and payments 
are scheduled to gradually fall over time, so as to produce 
incentives for cost-cutting and efficiency measures in 
renewable electricity industries. The idea behind gradual 
tariff reductions is that as demand for small-scale renewable 
devices grows, manufacturers can take advantage of 
economies of scale, price reductions are passed onto the 
consumer, and the industry becomes competitive on its 
own. In the UK, there are indications that FiTs are viewed as 
potentially profitable opportunities, with utility companies 
financing solar installations in housing developments and 
schools (Solar Power Portal, 2010), and the FiT scheme is 
likely to remain a future stimulant to investment in 
renewable energy devices by utilities and local authorities, 
as well as private investors. 
 
4.  Scenarios for Scotland’s future electricity 
generating mix 
 
4.1  Scenarios from 2008 and 2009 
We study three projections from 2008/9 of the Scottish 
electricity generation mix for Scotland in 2020. Two of these 
are produced by the private sector (SCDI, 2008; Murray, 
20096), while the third comes primarily from a recent 
Scottish Government document “Scottish Energy Study” 
(AEA Technology, 2008). In this third study there are two 
alternative scenarios, configured on “Central” and “High” 
assumptions regarding the future of primary energy prices. 
In total therefore we have four scenarios. For ease of 
exposition, we label these four scenarios the following: 
SCDI, Murray, and SES1 and SES2, respectively. 
 
All four scenarios focus on the same year, 2020, and have a 
number of other similarities. First, the total of Scottish 
electricity demands are broadly similar across all the 
scenarios. The SCDI scenario predicts annual increases 
between 2008 and 2014 of 0.9%, reduced to 0.4% per 
annum for 2016 to 2020. The Scottish consumption in this 
scenario for 2020 is 45.9TWh, 9% higher than demand in 
2008. Murray follows the assumptions in SCDI. However 
having been published six months later, this report is able to 
reflect the experiences of early 2009 when economic output 
and energy consumption fell in Scotland. The Murray (2009) 
study therefore assumes no growth in electricity demand 
between 2008 and 2009, then the same pattern of demand 
growth as SCDI between 2009 and 2020. This gives total 
Scottish electricity demand in 2020 of 45.4TWh. Total 
demand for electricity (including losses and own use) in 
Scotland according to the SES1 scenario will be 41.5TWh, 
and 42.5TWh in the SES2 scenario. These are both actually 
slightly lower than demand in 2005 and are therefore around 
9% lower than the other scenarios.  
 
Second, given the significant uncertainty surrounding some 
of the anticipated developments discussed in Section 2, it is 
perhaps somewhat surprising that the installed capacity and 
total amount of electricity generated in Scotland in 2020 
remains broadly the same across the four scenarios. The 
SCDI scenario predicts generation of 53.4TWh in 2020, 
coming from an installed capacity of 15.9GW. The Murray 
report predicts a slightly higher level of generation of 
58.0TWh with a correspondingly higher installed capacity of 
16.5GW. As with consumption, total generation is lower in 
both of the AEA Technology scenarios. The SES1 and 
SES2 scenarios, have total generation of 50.3TWh and 
54.3TWh respectively. While there are no capacity figures 
given for the SES1 and SES2 scenarios, both see large 
increases in the extent to which renewable generation 
technologies provide electricity to the generation mix. There 
is also the continuation of some nuclear (at least through 
2020), a move towards “clean coal” and the replacement of 
some new gas capacity. These figures suggest that the total 
capacity for generation in Scotland would be significantly 
higher than current levels, particularly given the lower 
capacity factors expected for onshore wind, which other 
commentators expect to produce much of the growth in 
renewables. 
 
We can see from the projected levels of generation and 
demand in Scotland in 2020 that in all four scenarios 
Scotland is forecast to remain, as now, a large net exporter 
of electricity to the rest of the UK (i.e. its local consumption 
is significantly less than its local generation). However, each 
of the scenarios anticipates a different development path for 
generation technologies, which give us four alternative 
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Figure 3:  Generation mixes in each of the four 2008/2009 scenarios 
 
 
 
 
generation mixes for Scotland in 2020. These generation 
mixes are displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Consider first the share from renewable technologies. In 
each of the scenarios there is a significant increase in 
generation from renewable sources for the reasons already 
discussed. The lowest renewable share in generation 
comes from the SCDI scenario with 48%, while the highest 
share comes from SES1 scenario is 53%. Within renewable 
technologies, Onshore wind provides most of the renewable 
generation (and around 30% of the total generation), a 
feature which is common across all scenarios, while Hydro 
provides around 10% of total generation. The remainder of 
renewable generation is assumed to come from a range of 
Biomass, Offshore wind and Wave and Tidal technologies. 
Offshore wind contributes, in all scenarios apart from SCDI 
(where biomass provides 3.4%), the third highest share of 
renewable generation. 
 
It is in non-renewable technologies that the largest 
differences are seen across the scenarios. Whilst nuclear is 
expected to provide between 14% and 18% of total 
generation, the share of coal and gas in the total generation 
mix does differ more radically, particularly so in the GH 
scenario where the mix is heavily in favour of coal 
generation, rather than gas, while in the other scenarios the 
opposite is the case.  
 
With regards to the specific technology scenarios, a number 
of renewable technologies have been studied by the Forum 
for Renewable Energy Development in Scotland (FREDS), a 
group established by the Scottish Executive. Their report in 
2005 (FREDS, 2005), estimated that the previous target of 
40% of electricity generated from renewable sources was 
consistent with an installed renewable capacity of 6GW. 
Table 1 above shows that, as of May 2010, renewable 
electricity generation capacity in Scotland is 3.85GW. The 
higher target for renewable electricity generation described 
above would therefore suggest a higher installed renewable 
capacity. 
 
On the specific renewable technologies, the report notes 
that while onshore wind is likely to provide much of the new 
renewable capacity, “assuming a range of technical and 
economic issues can be overcome, other technologies 
should also be capable of playing an important part by 
2020” (FREDS, 2005, p. 11). That same report noted that an 
estimated wave and tidal practicable resource off Scotland 
was around 1300MW installed capacity. The most recent 
study of the wave and tidal resource in Scotland (FREDS: 
MEG, 2009), illustrated three possible deployment path 
scenarios for marine capacity – ranging from 500MW to 
2000MW by 2020. 
 
4.2  Scenarios from 2010 
As this paper was in preparation, Scottish Renewables 
published commissioned work produced by Garrad Hassan 
(2010). This coincided with the announcement that the 
Scottish Government’s target for renewable electricity would 
increase from 50% by 2020 to 80% by that same year. Their 
report details four scenarios, also for 2020, in which this 
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figure is exceeded. The four scenarios combine two in which 
demand is lower, two in which demand is higher, and in 
each of these four cases, there is either “high” or “low” 
renewable development. 
 
These results are shown graphically in Figure 4. The 
publication does not identify the contribution to Scottish 
electricity generation from individual technologies. We are 
therefore unable to disaggregate by technology as in Figure 
3. This report shows how even within a short period of time, 
the future shape of the electricity generation mix in Scotland 
is predicted to be radically different from a few years 
previous. Note, for example, the huge differences in the 
capacity figures between Figures 3 and 4. Scottish demand 
estimates are broadly comparable, as is the broad pattern of 
electricity generation. The larger capacities shown in Figure 
4 account for the significant increase in the ratio between 
electricity generated from renewable sources in Scotland 
and Scottish electricity consumption. 
 
Further, considering the Scottish electricity generation mix 
explicitly as a portfolio, implies a rather different perspective 
that simply considering the individual technologies within 
that portfolio. As is shown in Allan et al (2010c), renewable 
technologies, including wave and tidal stream, can help to 
reduce the price variability of an electricity mix largely due to 
their zero correlation with the price of fuel inputs. In that 
paper we find that increasing the share of renewables in the 
Scottish generation mix can allow the cost variability of 
electricity to be reduced without any increase in the overall 
electricity price.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Generation mixes in each of the four Garrad Hassan (2010) scenarios 
 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The Scottish electricity generation mix has seen radical 
change over the last decade. It has been transformed by a 
rapid development of renewable energy capacity, largely 
coming from onshore wind. Moreover, it is likely that over 
the next decade, for both technical and policy reasons, the 
electricity mix will change as never before. Strong support 
for alternative renewable technologies such as offshore 
wind, wave and tidal is likely to bring new capacity in these 
technologies –. Similarly, decisions taken about non-
renewable technologies will be crucial for the future shape 
of the Scottish generation mix. With electricity demands 
likely to continue to increase over time, meeting these from 
a portfolio of generation technologies would be one way by 
which the energy policy goals of energy security, reduced 
environmental damage and enhanced economic 
development could be stimulated.  
 
We note, however, that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) deals with the allocation of the right to pollute 
across the EU. The rationale for Scottish Government 
ambitions for renewables therefore should be seen in light of 
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this. By being members of the EU ETS, Scotland’s targets 
for the sectors “covered” by this mechanism (which includes 
the energy sectors) are met.  
 
Accordingly, renewables policy does not directly assist the 
achievement of (domestically set) emissions reductions 
targets. Against this background, renewables must be 
regarded as contributing to the other goals of energy policy, 
such as security and supply and economic development 
through new low carbon technologies. This would be 
consistent with energy, particularly renewables, being a “key 
sector” in the Scottish Governments Economic Strategy 
(Scottish Government, 2007). See McGregor et al (2010) 
elsewhere in this special issue for more discussion of the 
relative roles played by legislation in Scottish climate 
change policy. 
 
Recent work (e.g. Allan et al, 2008b, Gilmartin et al, 2010) 
has begun to quantify the potential for Scottish and UK 
economies respectively to be stimulated by renewable 
energy development, and the exporting of knowledge and 
technical components to service this expanding industry. 
This highlights, among other things, that the next decade 
could be crucial for Scotland capturing a significant share of 
a worldwide market for renewable technologies, with all the 
knock-on benefits to the Scottish economy.  
 
The Scottish generation mix has evolved over the last ninety 
years through the development of hydropower from the 
glens, coal and nuclear facilities around the coasts, and the 
recent surge in onshore wind development, now beginning 
to move offshore. Further radical change seems likely in the 
next decade offering both significant risks and opportunities 
for Scotland. 
 
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
1Although, strictly, the Scottish Government is required to consider 
each application to build a new nuclear facility in Scotland on its 
own merits. 
 
2The impact of these proposals on the levelised costs of wave and 
tidal electricity is discussed in Allan et al (2010b). 
 
3As of September 2009, £2.946 million had been spent on WATES 
projects and their associated infrastructure for testing. It is 
anticipated that all the £13 million will be spent by March 2011. 
 
4The details of the prize are the following. “£10 million will be 
awarded to the team that can demonstrate in Scottish waters a 
commercially viable wave or tidal energy technology that achieves a 
minimum electrical output of 100 GWh over a continuous 2 year 
period using only the power of the sea and is judged to be the best 
overall technology after consideration of cost, environmental 
sustainability and safety” (Scottish Government, 2008). The prize is 
intended to be awarded in Spring 2015, following the assessment of 
qualifying marine generation between January 2010 and December 
2014. 
 
5Regardless of whether the electricity generated is exported to the 
national grid. 
 
6The private sector study (Murray, 2009) was based on research 
prepared by Garrad Hassan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
